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Zi (Chelsea) Wang
This dissertation analyzes the dilemmas of governance that confronted the Chinese state under 
the Ming dynasty. These dilemmas, I argue, arose from the Ming's dual existence as an empire (a
state that ruled over a large territory) and a bureaucracy (a state that ruled through written 
documents and hierarchically-structured offices). As a bureaucratic empire, the Ming pursued 
several distinct objectives simultaneously, the resulting complications of which form the focus of
my investigations. Chapter 1 describes the Ming state's methods for authenticating and 
synchronizing information, and shows how the needs of bureaucratic communication 
necessitated a seemingly redundant style of administrative writing. Chapter 2 explains why the 
postal system, despite its creators' best intentions, turned out to be much slower than non-postal 
methods of communication. Chapter 3 discusses how territorial officials made regular trips to the
capital to participate in state rituals and to undergo personnel evaluations, even though the trips 
generated great costs and undermined local security. Chapter 4 examines the long time it took for
officials to transfer from one province to another and the bureaucratic needs that slowed down 
their movement. Ultimately, the Ming state maintained a delicate equilibrium between four 
conflicting objectives: speed, cost-saving, administrative certainty, and propriety. Given the 
constrains of premodern communication, it was logistically impossible to meet all four 
objectives simultaneously. Any attempt to advance one objective necessarily undermined one or 
more of the other objectives, and no amount of investment in transportation or communication 
infrastructure could have resolved this basic tension.
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How did premodern bureaucratic empires maintain control over their vast territories? 
This dissertation proposes an answer using Ming China (1368-1644) as a case study, but my 
objective is not to identify Ming solutions. Certainly, there were many tools of governance 
available to the Ming, including the procedures for documentary administration, the 
infrastructures of transportation and communication, and a complex bureaucracy for territorial 
governance, all of which will be discussed in this study. However, a distinction must be made 
between a tool (a resource that may or may not work) and a solution (a successful resolution to a 
problem). My argument, put in the simplest form, is that the Ming had many imperfect tools to 
work with, but no tool or set of tools could have offered a solution to the problems it faced.
To show why this was the case, each of the following chapters will examine one of the 
Ming state's tools of governance and the dilemmas they embodied. For example, the use of 
written documents allowed the state to convey and store large quantities of information, but the 
complex procedures required for their proper management placed serious strains on its material 
and personnel resources (Chapter 1). The use of a postal system could theoretically speed up 
document delivery by considerable degrees, but the Ming attempt to run such a system with 
inadequate funds had the opposite effect of slowing down postal communication (Chapter 2). 
Like all imperial Chinese states, the Ming managed its vast empire with a territorial bureaucracy 
of great complexity (Chapters 3 and 4). Yet effective governance required substantial delegation 
of power to the territorial level, creating forces of decentralization that needed offsetting by 
seemingly wasteful means (Chapter 3). Meanwhile, the court transferred territorial officials from 
one post to another according to its changing needs, but various institutional and cultural factors 
slowed down their movements to sometimes surprising degrees (Chapter 4).
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Emerging from all cases is a common finding: not only was each tool flawed in one way 
or another, but there was also no means to fix its flaws given the technological limitations of the 
time. The problem arose, at the most fundamental level, from the Ming state's pursuit of 
competing objectives that could not have been realized at the same time. In the rough order of 
familiarity from our modern perspectives, these objectives were speed, cost-saving, 
administrative certainty, and propriety. Speed refers to the relative length of time required to 
complete a given task, such as the delivery of a document or the transfer of an official. Cost can 
be further divided into material costs (such as the ink and paper used to produce a document) and
personnel costs (the time and effort of government personnel or the wage of hired labor). The 
latter is not to be confused with speed: the production of an account book, for example, can be 
analyzed both in terms of how long it took to complete the task (speed), and how much time was 
put into the task by all persons who worked on it (personnel cost). Administrative certainty, 
likewise, is subdivided into three related elements: "administrative effectiveness" refers to the 
extent to which the state met specific goals, such as winning a military campaign or collecting a 
certain amount of taxes; "administrative safety" means minimizing the possibility of mistakes or 
fraud in government operations, such as inaccuracies in account books or deliberate misreporting
of local situations; "administrative centralization" means concentrating the sites of decision-
making in the emperor and his court. Depending on the matter at hand, these elements could 
either correlate positively or compete with one another—for example, keeping detailed account 
books helped both administrative safety and administrative centralization (Chapter 1), whereas 
effective territorial governance necessitated the decentralization of decision-making (Chapter 3). 
Finally, propriety refers to a loose collection of values associated with the traditional Chinese 
concept of li 禮, commonly translated as ceremony, ritual, or propriety (among other words). To 
use examples discussed in this study, acting with propriety could mean anything from offering 
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congratulations to the emperor at annual festivities (Chapter 3) to showing sufficient humility to 
decline important assignments and promotions (Chapter 4). To many modern observers, it may 
seem strange that the Ming (and all other imperial Chinese states) placed so much weight on 
such symbolic and seemingly impractical acts. But as my chapters will show, like the other 
objectives (when achieved), propriety too contributed to the empire's upkeep by maintaining a 
sense of unity within the bureaucracy.1
My central argument is that each tool of governance helped the Ming achieve some of its 
objectives while inadvertently undermining others: the use of written documents achieved 
administrative certainty at the expense of cost-saving (Chapter 1), special messengers allowed 
safe delivery of documents at the expense of speed (Chapter 2), territorial officials' participation 
in triennial audiences helped advance both propriety and centralization at the expense of 
administrative safety and cost-saving (Chapter 3), and so on. The fundamental tension between 
these objectives could not have been resolved by any available tool, nor was it technologically 
possible to create new tools that would have helped the Ming meet all four objectives 
simultaneously. To answer the question posed at the beginning, the Ming maintained a vast 
empire tenuously and awkwardly, by always sustaining a fragile equilibrium between its many 
objectives, and by prioritizing one objective at the expense of another according to the particular 
matter at hand. 
It is important to note that the four objectives defined here were not actors' categories, 
nor do I claim them to be exactly applicable to other times and places. While some Ming 
officials no doubt spoke of the need to make compromises in one area in order to achieve a more 
1. Imperial China was by no means unique in valuing behaviors that now seem incomprehensible to the 
modernist eye. See, for example, Douglas Allen's analysis of why institutions such as duels and venal 
offices helped keep social order in pre-nineteenth century England: Douglas W.B. Allen, The 
Institutional Revolution: Measurement and the Economic Emergence of the Modern World (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012). I thank Devin Fitzgerald for drawing my attention to this book.
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important objective, no official—as far as I know—saw the problems they faced as fundamental 
dilemmas that had no satisfactory solution. Instead, Ming commentators tended to attribute their 
problems to human factors such as laziness and greed, imagining that the problems could be 
eradicated as long as all government personnel worked more diligently. The four objectives are 
therefore derived not from concepts which Ming rulers and officials discussed explicitly, but 
from my interpretation of what was the fundamental cause of the various administrative 
problems that I have chosen as case studies. Had I examined a different set of problems or 
focused on a different dynasty, I might have found somewhat different objectives. But as 
analytical categories my current definitions are useful in a number of ways (more in a moment), 
as long as we keep in mind their potential alterability by new empirical findings.
*  *  *
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to define a number of terms that will recur in 
my writing. Here I discuss them under three headings: governance, assessment, and time.
Governance: state, court, empire, bureaucracy. In this study, a state (also referred to as
the government) refers to a combination of persons, infrastructures, and rules that together made 
it possible to extract material and human resources through occasional (but not necessarily 
continual) use of coercion, and moreover justified its existence with a claim to benefit the people
from whom it extracted those resources. In the case of the Ming state, the "court" (also referred 
to as the "central court" or the "central state") refers to portions of the state located within the 
capital—Nanjing during 1368-1420 and Beijing during 1420-1644—while the "territorial 
government" refers to those portions located outside it. It is possible to make a further distinction
between the palace—the emperor, his family, and their personal servants—and the larger court 
that contained it, but this distinction is not important in the cases examined here, and I generally 
treat the two as a single entity. Likewise, this study does not aim to analyze the differing 
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functions and agendas of the many offices that constituted the Ming court. Important as they are 
in analyzing other aspects of Ming politics and institutions, such distinctions are less useful in 
analyzing the cases examined here, which show a greater schism between the needs of the central
court and those of the territorial governments.
This study focuses on two major features of the Ming state: the Ming as an empire, and 
the Ming as a bureaucracy. The word empire, in its common usage, generally implies domination
of a core group of people over other peripheral people(s). In this study, however, the word is used
simply to denote a state that maintained jurisdiction over a very large territory.2 My usage of the 
word "bureaucracy" is more specific: it refers to a mode of governance defined by Max Weber, 
characterized by a number of features including but not limited to hierarchical structuring of 
offices, separation of person from office, and heavy reliance on written documents.3 The Ming 
state's dual existence as both empire and bureaucracy gave rise to a particular set of problems not
readily observable elsewhere, more of which will be explained shortly. 
Assessment: rationality, efficiency, effectiveness. In this study, the words "rational" and
"efficient" refer not to my own assessment of past institutions but to the ways in which other 
historians tend to describe them. The word "rational" (as well as its derivative forms "rationality"
2. As a rough and somewhat arbitrary yardstick, I see a territory as "very large" when it took three 
weeks or longer for a message (either oral or written) to travel from the capital(s) to the farthest 
frontier. In defining "empire" in purely spatial (and communicational) terms, I do not imply that the 
Ming did not contain a great degree of diversity of people and institutions (as most usages of the word
imply). It merely means that such elements are not of great importance for the purpose of my own 
analysis. On the methodological difficulty of defining the word "empire," see Peter Crooks and 
Timothy Parsons, “Empires, Bureaucracy and the Paradox of Power,” in Empires and Bureaucracy in 
World History: From Late Antiquity to the Twentieth Century, ed. Peter Crooks and Timothy Parsons, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 12-15. 
3. For more on the implications of these features on the logistics of communication and information 
management, see Chapter 1, p. 16. On the diversity of meanings invoked by the word "bureaucracy" 
and on the word's early (pejorative) usages, see Crooks and Parsons, “Empires, Bureaucracy and the 
Paradox of Power,” 15-18; Ben Kafka, The Demon of Writing: Powers and Failures of Paperwork 
(New York: Zone Books, 2012), 77-108.
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and "rationalization") carries so many discipline-specific definitions and assumptions that it may 
be more obfuscating than clarifying, but the concept is invoked so frequently by historians of 
China and elsewhere that the assumptions behind these invocations do need to be addressed.4 In 
this study I use the word "rationalization" to describe what some historians see as a process in 
which a society or institution adjusts itself to better achieve its objectives. The ways in which 
such adjustment is undertaken, as implied by common uses of the word, generally involve a re-
alignment of institutional structure that removes waste, redundancy, and contradiction. Inspired 
perhaps indirectly by works of Max Weber, "rationalization" used in this sense is problematic 
because it lures historians into dismissing institutions that differ from our own as wasteful, 
irrational, and consequently less capable of meeting their objectives.5 But as a number of my 
case studies will show, institutions and behaviors that initially seem incomprehensible to us 
nevertheless had their own rationale for existence. A change from a less familiar institutional 
structure to a more familiar one was not, therefore, a process of rationalization (Chapter 3).
The word "efficient" carries more consistent meaning, but when applied to past 
institutions, it too tends to confuse more than clarify. In its common usage, to be efficient means 
to achieve a more desirable outcome with relatively little cost. But as my chapters will show, the 
costs generated by the Ming tools of governance have often escaped the attention of both 
contemporary observers and modern historians. When historians fail to see subtle forms of cost, 
we tend to use the word "efficient" when what we really mean is "effective." For example, the 
Qing postal system may seem more "efficient" than its Ming counterpart because it delivered 
4. On the diverse definitions of "rationality" in different disciplines, see Matt Grossmann, “Rationality,” 
in Encyclopedia of Governance (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2007).
5. Weber's own discussions of rationalization processes were much more multifaceted than common 
usages of the word (as I have defined them), but it does not help that he used the word in many 
different senses without defining them clearly. See Stephen Kalberg, “Max Weber’s Types of 
Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History,” American Journal
of Sociology 85.5 (1980): 1145-79.
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documents faster, but such a designation is inaccurate unless we can assess how much more 
material and personnel resource the Qing devoted to the operation of its postal system. Even if 
such calculations were possible, "cost" in the broader sense means the objectives that the state 
sacrificed in order to achieve its other objectives, and when the sacrifice took the form of 
administrative certainty or propriety, no quantitative measurement is possible. Assessing the 
efficiency of historical institutions is therefore very difficult if not impossible. For this reason, I 
confine my analysis to the question of how fully past institutions achieved their objectives, and it
is in this sense that I use the word "effective." For example, even while we do not know whether 
the Qing postal system was more efficient, we can nevertheless say that it was more effective 
than the Ming system.
Time: premodern, imperial, late imperial. In this study the word "premodern" is used 
as a temporal-technological term referring to a time before the industrial revolution (and more 
recently the information revolution) enabled a series of technological breakthroughs that 
significantly reduced the tension between some (though not all) of the state's competing 
objectives. In terms of transportation it means pre-railway, in communication pre-telegraph, and 
in information synchronization pre-cloud. More specifically in the context of Chinese history, it 
refers to the period before the mid-nineteenth century, when railways and telegraphs first began 
to be available. "Imperial China," conforming more closely to conventional usage, refers to the 
period from the beginning of the Qin dynasty (221-207 BCE) to the end of the Qing dynasty 
(1644-1911). "Late imperial," in turn, refers roughly to the period from the beginning of the Song
dynasty (960-1279) to the end of the Qing. Although this definition strays from more 
conventional usages that reserve the label to the Ming-Qing period only, my broader definition 
captures the continuity of certain administrative developments from Song to Qing, such as the 
standardization of layered quotations in official documents (Chapter 1) and the consolidation of 
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provincial-level government offices (Chapter 3). The label "late imperial" therefore serves as a 
stylistic shorthand with which I contextualize the Ming within important long-term 
developments that spanned the second half of the imperial period. When there is a need to 
emphasize shorter continuities that the Ming shared primarily with the Qing—such as the 
discrepancy between official and actual taxation rates (partially discussed in Chapter 2), the 
designation "Ming-Qing period" will be used instead.
*  *  *
This dissertation makes three forms of contribution to the study of premodern 
governance: empirical, analytical, and comparative/theoretical. Empirically, the following 
chapters include a number of topics being studied for the first time in the Ming context (and 
often in the longer context of Chinese history as well), such as how state documents were 
delivered across long distances (Chapter 2), regulations and debates surrounding the routine 
movement of territorial officials (Chapter 3), and how long it took for high territorial officials to 
transfer between posts (Chapter 4). Other topics, such as the question of how government 
documents were authenticated (Chapter 1), have previously been treated from certain technical 
perspectives but never in the holistic manner I adopt here. The findings of each chapter add to 
our understanding of how the Ming state operated at the most mundane level of everyday 
administration. 
Analytically, by explaining various administrative problems using the framework of 
competing objectives, this study helps make sense of past institutions and behaviors that 
otherwise seem incomprehensible. For this purpose, my focus on the Ming is particularly 
significant. For while the tensions between competing objectives existed under other dynasties as
well, the particular objectives that the Ming chose to prioritize—and by extension the ones it 
sacrificed—happened to be very different from the choices that we moderns find most reasonable
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and intuitive. Had I chosen my case studies from the Song or the Qing, the same tensions would 
most likely still have existed, but they would have been much harder to discern because the Song
and Qing choices tended to be less strange and more "rational" from a modern perspective. 
But having identified these tensions, my framework can now be applied to the 
experiences of other dynasties to help analyze institutional change. Specifically, the framework 
helps avoid two common pitfalls in the study of trans-dynastic change. The first is to be purely 
descriptive, tracing every change in government structure or regulation based on sources that are 
often incomplete, abstruse, and even contradictory. While such laborious work is both necessary 
and important, at some point we need to move beyond the empirical to make sense of why and 
how change occurred. But the effort to avoid the first pitfall often leads to the second, that of 
evaluation. Thus institutional change is often described as a process of improvement or 
perfection (but usually not deterioration) of a previously-flawed system. Yet as discussed already,
we historians' assumptions about notions like rationality and efficiency tend to lure us into seeing
improvement even when there really was none or when it cannot be reliably assessed. When we 
investigate whether and how different dynasties prioritized their competing objectives 
differently, a different type of comparison becomes possible. My framework thus offers a set of 
analytical vocabularies for comparing the institutions of different time periods, without having to
judge one type of institution to be either superior or inferior than the others.
Theoretically, findings in this study revise and expand our existing understanding of the 
relations between government, communication, and information management. Although the 
intersection between these areas has recently attracted much attention among historians of China,
the more theoretical and more influential studies have generally emerged from outside the field 
of Chinese history.6 In such work, two opposing perspectives are currently prevalent. The more 
6. For studies that focus on these topics in premodern China, in addition to the works cited in p. 16 n. 7 
and p. 17 n. 8, see also Deng Xiaonan 邓小南 ed., Zhengji kaocha yu xinxi qudao: Yi Songdai wei 
- 9 -
established, and also more widely held among historians of China, examines how a state makes 
itself more effective by adopting better tools of communication and information management or 
by intensifying their use. Representative of this perspective are Geoffrey Parker's classic study of
Philip II of Spain (16th century) and Jacob Soll's recent study of the statesman Jean-Baptiste 
Colbert of France (17th century), which discuss the extensive communication and information-
management strategies that helped, respectively, maintain the Spanish empire and strengthen the 
French state.7 My own findings challenge any view that treats tools as if they are coextensive 
with solutions, but they do not so much invalidate Parker or Soll's findings as reveal the 
inadequacy of drawing theoretical generalizations from the experience of Europe alone. (Neither 
author makes such generalizations, but when their studies acquire readers and influence outside 
the field of European history, they inevitably induce such an effect.) For the tools examined by 
Parker and Soll may well have provided effective solutions within their respective contexts, but 
France was the size of a single Chinese province and suffered much less severe communicative 
time lags; and neither the French state nor the Spanish empire was nearly as bureaucratized as 
the Ming, attenuating the conflict between speed and administrative certainty that often 
accompanied bureaucratic procedures. The historiographical significance of Ming China (and all 
other imperial Chinese states) therefore lies in its dual existence as a large empire and a complex 
bureaucracy. This combination intensified the tension between competing objectives, tension 
which remained too minor to be noticeable among other polities that possessed only one or 
neither of those features.
zhongxin 政绩考察与信息渠道：以宋代为重心 (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2008); Deng Xiaonan
邓小南 et al. Wenshu, zhengling, xinxi goutong: Yi Tang Song shiqi wei zhu 文书・政令・信息沟通 —以
唐宋时期为主 (Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2012).
7. Geoffrey Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Jacob 
Soll, The Information Master: Jean-Baptiste Colbert’s Secret State Intelligence System (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2009).
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More recently, scholars have begun to examine the contradictions of bureaucratic 
paperwork. Representative of this approach are Ben Kafka's study on post-revolutionary France 
and anthropologist Matthew Hull's study on present-day Pakistan, both of which highlight the 
contradictory process by which paperwork slows down administrative work and inhibits the 
original intentions of the state.8 These findings are similar to mine in stressing the inhibiting 
effects of documents as a tool of governance. But in addition, my study also suggests that the 
contradictions observed by Kafka and Hull are not problems inherent in bureaucracy or 
paperwork per se, but constitute part of a much larger problem confronted by every government. 
Because of its rare combination of spatial extent, bureaucratic complexity, and premodern 
technology, Ming China experienced not just the tension between speed and administrative 
certainty that recent investigations into bureaucratic paperwork have revealed, but also other 
forms of tension not readily observable in a modern context.
*  *  *
Finally, it is fitting to point out the historical contingency of my own findings and what I 
have done to make them nevertheless dependable. This dissertation would have been impossible 
twenty years ago, when facsimiles of traditional Chinese books just started to be published at an 
unprecedented scale, and very difficult eight years ago (the year I started graduate school), when 
the Airusheng full-text databases had yet to become available in North America.9 The former 
8. Kafka, The Demon of Writing; Matthew S. Hull, Government of Paper: The Materiality of 
Bureaucracy in Urban Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012).
9. Major facsimile collections published around the 1990s include the Xuxiu siku quanshu 續修四庫全書 
(Shanghai, 1995-2002), Siku quanshu cunmu congshu 四庫全書存目叢書 (Tainan, 1997), Siku jinhui 
shu congkan 四庫禁燬書叢刋 (Beijing, 1997), and Siku weishou shu jikan 四庫未收書輯刊 (Beijing, 
2000). In researching for this dissertation I have used two of the Airusheng databases. The Database 
of Essential Traditional Chinese Books (Zhongguo jiben gujiku 中國基本古籍庫) was published in 
2005, and in 2011 the Library of Congress became the first North American library to acquire it. 
Series One of the China Gazetteers Database (Zhongguo fangzhiku 中國方志庫) was published in 
2008, and was first acquired in North America by Columbia University and six other universities in 
2012. See Airusheng 愛如生, "Zhongguo jiben gujiku: chanpin jianjie" 中国基本古籍库: 产品简介 (http:/
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allowed me to survey hundreds of Ming collected writings from which data in Chapter 4 has 
been drawn (a task which otherwise might have taken years), and the latter enabled me to search 
through four thousand local gazetteers for information on Ming post stations (Chapter 2), a task 
which took just over a week instead of the many months that would have been required without 
the help of full-text search. Because the subjects of this study concern mundane administrative 
procedures that Ming writers rarely consciously thought about, even a tentative reconstruction 
often requires piecing together scattered references from a wide range of genres and sources. 
Many such sources, moreover, contain highly technical expressions the meanings of which need 
to be contextualized with yet other scattered bodies of sources. For both purposes I have relied 
heavily on the Airusheng databases and on Academia Sinica's Scripta Sinica database, using 
them both as cross-generic repositories of sources and as a form of terminological index. 
Although my study draws on many non-digitalized sources as well, the convenience of full-text 
search made it much more likely for me to notice a source which had been digitalized than one 
which had not, creating a new (and sometimes invisible) form of selection bias that differs 
substantially from the bias of source preservation of which historians have traditionally been 
more concerned.
Precisely because my sources are both eclectic and context-dependent, I have made an 
effort to base each chapter's argument on a core body of sources and to analyze each body with a 
consistent methodology. In Chapter 1, the core takes the form of a close reading of a memorial, 
the stylistic peculiarity of which guides my subsequent investigation into Ming methods for 
documentary management. In Chapter 2, the core is formed by sections of local gazetteers that 
/er07.com/home/pro_3.html), "Zhongguo fangzhiku: chanpin jianjie" 中国方志库: 产品简介 (http:/
/er07.com/home/pro_87.html), "Meiguo Guohui tushuguan gouru Zhongguo jiben gujiku" 美国国会图
书馆购入中国基本古籍库 (http://er07.com/home/news_52.html), "Hafu, Yelu deng mingxiao gouru 
'Zhongguo fangzhiku' he 'Zhongguo suwenku'" 哈佛、耶鲁等名校购入《中国方志库》和《中国俗文
库》(http://er07.com/home/news_56.html), all accessed on December 19, 2016.
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describe local post stations' location, personnel, and cost. In addition to offering quantitative 
evidence for the postal system's decline, they also contain rare but revealing editors' comments 
that uncover aspects of everyday operation not discernible from official records of the central 
state. Chapter 3, on the other hand, draws its core evidence exactly from such official records. 
Their precision of dating, a common feature among state-produced sources, allows me to trace 
subtle shifts in priorities as the Ming tried to balance its competing objectives in the management
of the territorial bureaucracy. In Chapter 4, the core is formed by a special type of memorials 
known as "arrival report memorials." Originally produced to serve an administrative function but
subsequently preserved through inclusion into each official's collected writings, these memorials 
allow detailed reconstruction of the official transfer process when supplemented with centrally-
produced records. By supplementing these core sources with more eclectic peripheral sources, 
my approach establishes a certain level of generic and methodological consistency sufficient to 
offset the contingency of my source base, and to produce findings not only useful for my current 
queries, but also beneficial to other historical investigations.
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Chapter 1: Bureaucratic Paperwork and the Illusion of Waste
Introduction
The year 1587 was a year of great significance—not in Ming-dynasty China,1 but nearly 
half way across the globe at the Spanish court of Philip II. Governing an empire more extensive 
in distance if not larger in area than Ming China, in 1587 Philip busied himself drawing up the 
final plans for his naval invasion of England, what came to be known as the Spanish Armada of 
1588. According to Geoffrey Parker, its famous and disastrous failure resulted, at least partly, 
from Philip's insistence on taking personal control over all aspects of decision making. Despite 
roundtrip communicative time lags of up to six months, throughout 1585 to 1588 Philip 
maintained a steady stream of correspondence with his army commander in the Netherlands, 
receiving proposals and giving directives about one invasion plan after another but never arriving
at a solution that truly satisfied both parties. Meanwhile his desk was covered by letters arriving 
from every corner of the empire, to all of which the king tried to give his personal attention, even
though the chronic delay in his response frustrated his courtiers to no end. Even with "the largest 
brain in the world" (as a contemporary called it), Philip's insistence on micromanagement meant 
that he could not properly delegate responsibility; rather, he buried himself in a torrent of 
information that could not realistically be processed by one person alone.2
This image of Philip, overwhelmed by the volume of information arriving at his desk, 
presents both a surprising parallel and a stark contrast to the problems of information 
management that confronted the Ming. Just like Philip, Ming officials handled many documents 
1. Ray Huang, 1587, A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1981).
2. Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II, 13-45, 179-203. See especially pp. 16-17 (Philip's brain), 20 
(courtier's complaint), 28 (number of documents arriving at Philip's desk), 37 (delegation of 
authority), and 185 (example of communicative time lag).
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every day, and some officials complained bitterly about their volume and length, as we will 
shortly see. But despite the large streams of documents that flowed through every sector of Ming 
government, their processing did not depend on the hard work of one person who oversaw 
everything from the top. The Ming empire differed fundamentally from Philip's because it was 
highly bureaucratic—not only were government offices structured as a hierarchy of many layers, 
but each person occupying such an office was theoretically replaceable, including the emperor 
himself. Starting in around 1586 Emperor Wanli (r. 1573-1620) routinely canceled court 
audiences and ignored memorials submitted for his approval, engaging in a passive-aggressive 
fight with his ministers over the choice of his heir.3 Although Ray Huang has famously portrayed
this period as the beginning of the end of the Ming dynasty,4 from a different perspective the late 
Wanli reign also demonstrated the resilience of Ming bureaucracy. Despite a leader who actively 
tried to sabotage government activities, state business went on as before. Taxes were collected, 
civil examinations were held, and at least three major wars were fought.5 The Ming empire did 
not need one large brain, as long as many smaller brains worked together to ensure the continued
functioning of its elaborate bureaucracy.
The objective of this chapter is to identify the basic technologies of information 
management that enabled the Ming to function properly as a bureaucratic empire. In calling the 
Ming state a bureaucracy, I borrow Max Weber's definitions to describe a particular mode of 
administrative organization in which authority is both impersonal and diffused.6 Among the 
3. Lin Jinshu 林金树, Wanli di 万历帝, (Changchun: Jilin wenshi chubanshe, 1996), 354-63; Huang, 
1587, A Year of No Significance, 47.
4. Huang, 1587, A Year of No Significance.
5. On the so-called "three major campaigns" of the late Wanli reign, see Ray Huang, “The Lung-Ch’ing 
and Wan-Li Reigns, 1567-1620,” in Cambridge History of China, Volume 7: The Ming Dynasty, 
1368-1644, Part 1, ed. Frederick W. Mote and Denis Twitchett, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), 563-74.
6. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and 
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many characteristics discussed by Weber, three features in particular are important for 
understanding the challenges of information management that confronted the Ming. First, 
because government offices were structured as a hierarchy, most administrative matters had to 
pass through many layers of offices before final decisions could be made. Second, officials who 
staffed these offices moved from one position to another on a regular basis, rarely holding the 
same office for an extended period. Third, all formal communication took place in writing, so 
that oral orders and reports had no legal validity. For such a system to work, documents had to be
prepared in ways that made them accessible to any official who occupied the relevant office on a 
later date. Furthermore, one needed a documentary routine that enabled multiple offices, 
sometimes separated by days or even months of communicative time lag, to share information 
securely with one another while distinguishing genuine documents from possible frauds—what 
we might call the synchronization and authentication of information. Given the technologies 
available at the time, these were difficult tasks to accomplish, yet few studies have seriously 
examined how the Ming state—or any other polity in imperial China—resolved such 
fundamental difficulties.
In fact, historians of imperial China have long recognized the state's heavy reliance on 
documentary administration, but their evaluations toward it fall under two opposing views. The 
first view, more prominent among scholars writing in Japanese, considers official documents the 
essential instruments that held together the imperial state. In this view, it was by treating every 
document with the same attention and care—even if it concerned something trivial—that the 
state managed to safeguard its channels of administrative communication.7 The second view, 
London: University of California Press, 1978), 956-63.
7. Tomiya Itaru 冨谷至, Mokkan, chikukan no kataru Chūgoku kodai: shoki no bunkashi 木簡・竹簡の語
る中国古代—書記の文化史, (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2003), 129; Kobayashi Takamichi 小林隆道, 
Sōdai Chūgoku no tōchi to bunsho 宋代中国の統治と文書, (Tokyo: Kyūko shoin, 2013), 7-8.
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usually expressed by scholars writing in Chinese, sees the excessive use of documents as a sign 
of administrative inefficiency, a negative force that some enlightened emperors and officials 
worked to eliminate. According to this view, the sheer volume of documents slowed down 
administrative speed, buried important communications with unimportant ones, and over-
stretched the state's processing capacity.8 The two views emerge from separate traditions of 
inquiry not directly in conversation with each other, and to a great extent they observe two sides 
of the same coin: on the one hand written documents were essential to the operation of a 
bureaucratic state; on the other hand delays and redundancies inevitably resulted when all 
administrative tasks were conducted in writing. 
This chapter argues that the fundamental cause for delays and redundancies was neither 
the laziness of government officials nor a structural flaw in the Ming government's documentary 
routine. Rather, redundancy was essentially a technology adopted by the Ming state (as well as 
its predecessors and successors) to accomplish the difficult tasks of synchronizing and 
authenticating information. Underlying the documentary practices of the Ming was a tendency to
produce the same information in multiple locations, a strategy I call the principle of replication. 
The first half of this chapter analyzes the narrative structure of official documents, showing how 
the seemingly repetitive structure helped meet the needs of bureaucratic communication. The 
second half examines how the Ming state handled some basic problems of information 
management, the solutions of which often involved reproducing the same information in multiple
copies. In both sections, we will hear the voices of some reform-minded statesmen, who blamed 
8. Wang Jinyu 王金玉, Songdai dang’an guanli yanjiu 宋代档案管理研究, (Beijing: Zhongguo dang’an 
chubanshe, 1997), 3-11; Chen Long 陈龙, “Mingdai gongwen biange lun” 明代公文变革论, (PhD diss., 
Nanjing shifan daxue, 2007), 72-74; Yang Jianyu 杨剑宇, “Mingchao yizhi wendu zhuyi de jucuo he 
jingyan jiaoxun” 明朝抑制文牍主义的举措和经验教训, Dang’anxue tongxun (2007.4): 36-38; He 
Zhuang 何庄, “Lun Ming Qing de fanwen zhi bi ji qi chengyin” 论明清的繁文之弊及其成因, 
Dang’anxue tongxun (2006.3): 78-81.
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either official laziness or institutional failure for what they perceived as wasteful practices in the 
Ming documentary routine. What these officials did not realize, however, was that redundancy—
what they called waste—was a necessary cost of the principle of replication, without which the 
bureaucratic empire could not function.
Document Structure and the Meaning of Repetition
Anyone who has worked with official documents of late imperial China can attest to their
structural peculiarity. Following a narrative structure I call layered quotations, these documents 
cite earlier communications not by summarizing them but by quoting them directly. Because 
each quoted document may quote other documents in turn, the resulting text becomes a long 
string of layered quotations. This strange documentary form is most prominent in the many 
archival documents surviving from the Qing dynasty (1644-1911), but judging from fragmentary 
sources of earlier times, it is clear that variations of this structure had been in use for at least a 
millennium of Chinese history.9 Yet despite its long history, prominent visibility, and difficulty of
comprehension, this distinctive writing style has thus far received very little scholarly 
discussion—not only is there no full translation published in English, but even among scholars 
9. For examples of the layered quotation style before the Ming, see documents cited in Akagi Takatoshi 
赤木崇敏, “Tōdai zenhanki no chihō bunsho gyōsei: Turfan bunsho no kentō o tsūjite” 唐代前半期の地
方文書行政: トゥルファン文書の検討を通じて, Shigaku zasshi 177.11 (2008), 89-92; Sue Takashi 須江
隆, “Shibyō no kiroku ga kataru “chiiki” kan” 祠廟の記録が語る「地域」観, in Sōdai bito no ninshiki: 
Sōgo sei to nichijō kūkan 宋代人の認識 : 相互性と日常空間, ed. Sōdaishi kenkyūkai 宋代史研究会 
(Tokyo: Kyūko shoin, 2001), 31-33; Kobayashi Takamichi, Sōdai Chūgoku no tōchi to bunsho, 68-69,
303-305, 330-337; Funada Yoshiyuki 舩田善之, “‘Lingyansi zhizhao bei’ hiyō shokoku monjo o 
tōshite mita Gendai monjo gyōsei no ichi danmen” 「霊巌寺執照碑」碑陽所刻文書を通してみた元代文
書行政の一断面, Ajia Afurika gengo bunka kenkyū 70 (2005), 88-89, 94; Miya Noriko 宮紀子, 
Mongoru jidai no shuppan bunka モンゴル時代の出版文化, (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 
2006), 329-52. Traces of the layered quotation style are also found among documents appearing in the
Yuan dianzhang 元典章, although these texts often appear in abbreviated forms. See Gendai no hōsei 
kenkyūhan 元代の法制研究班, “Gen tenshō Reibu kōtei to yakuchū 1” 『元典章 禮部』校定と譯註(一), 
Tōhō gakuhō 81 (2007), 141-42. The history of the layered quotation style has also been discussed in 
Hagihara Mamoru 萩原守, Shindai Mongoru no saiban to saiban bunsho 清代モンゴルの裁判と裁判文
書, (Tokyo: Sōbunsha, 2006), 156-62. The examples cited above include those cited by Hagihara as 
well as ones that were published after the publication of Hagihara's work.
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writing in Chinese and Japanese, the structure of layered quotations is often presumed but rarely 
discussed explicitly.10 The objectives of the following discussion are threefold. For specialist 
readers, this investigation encourages rethinking of a now-familiar narrative structure, the 
strange qualities of which everyone must have felt when encountering it for the first time. For 
non-specialists, I provide the first English-language discussion on the structure—or the order of 
narration—of official documents in imperial China, laying the foundation for future comparative 
work. Finally, a close look at document structure reveals how the principle of replication served 
the particular needs of bureaucratic communication in late imperial China.
As an example of the layered quotation style, I translate below a memorial by the Ming 
official Li Shangsi 李尚思, written some time during his term as Grand Coordinator of Sichuan 
in 1589-91.11 The memorial concerned a poor official named Zhou Zhongliang 周仲良, who fell 
seriously sick while serving as the magistrate of Qianwei County 犍為縣 in southern Sichuan. 
With his life seriously in danger (or so he claimed), Zhou requested to be relieved of his official 
10. There are many guidebooks that assist novice readers with the distinctive writing style of Chinese 
official documents, but most such works focus on teaching the specialized vocabulary required to 
locate the beginning and end of quotations. Since the objective is comprehension, the structure of 
layered quotations is treated as a difficulty that needs to be deciphered, but not something that 
requires analytical explanation. For the major document-reading guides, see John King Fairbank, 
Ch’ing Documents: An Introductory Syllabus (Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard 
University, 1965); William C. Kirby, State and Economy in Republican China: A Handbook for 
Scholars (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia CenterPress, 2001), 173-80; Liu Wenjie 刘文杰, Lishi 
wenshu yongyu cidian: Ming Qing Minguo bufen 历史文书用语辞典：明・清・民国部分, (Chengdu: 
Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1988); Liu Cheng-yun 劉錚雲, Ming Qing dang’an wenshu 明清檔案文書, 
(Taipei: Guoli zhengzhi daxue renwen zhongxin, 2012), 603-26; Zhang Wode 张我德 et al. Qingdai 
wenshu 清代文书, (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1996), 116-39; Lei Rongguang 雷荣广
and Yao Leye 姚乐野 Qingdai wenshu gangyao 清代文書纲要, (Chengdu: Sichuan daxue chubanshe, 
1990), 30-44. Some Japanese scholars have produced detailed annotated translations of documents 
written in the layered quotation style (see works cited in Footnote 9), but in most cases, their 
objective is to use the documents as sources in their respective investigations, not to analyze 
documentary structure itself. The exceptions are Kobayashi Takamichi's study on Song official 
documents and Hagihara Mamoru's study on Mongolian legal documents of the Qing. These scholars 
have speculated about the origin of the layered quotation style (Hagihara) or the reason behind its use 
(Kobayashi), but their discussions remain inconclusive.
11. Li Shangsi 李尚思, Dufu zouyi 督撫奏議, "Xianling huanbin qixiu shu" 縣令患病乞休疏, 6.7a-9a
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duties and to be allowed to return home (located some 880 km away in the province of 
Huguang).12 But according to administrative regulations of the time, not only did Zhou's request 
have to be approved by the central court in Beijing (located 1,650 km away), it also had to be 
submitted on his behalf by Li Shangsi, the Grand Coordinator of Sichuan, whose office was 
located 160 km away in the provincial seat of Chengdu. The memorial that Li submitted, 
translated below, shows traces of extended documentary exchange before Li finally agreed to 
forward Zhou's petition to Beijing.
To clarify textual structure, I have placed the text into a series of rectangles, each of 
which can be regarded as a piece of document in itself.13 When a rectangle contains another 
rectangle inside, it indicates that the document is directly quoting another document. The visual 
scheme helps conceptualize the structure of layered quotations, but one must note that the 
original text does not include any such visual aid. Instead, the memorial runs from beginning to 
end as a long string of unpunctuated text, the layered structure of which must be discerned by 
parsing specialized linguistic markers that indicate the beginning and end of each quotation. 
Each pair of quotation markers includes a one-character quotation opener, which specifies the 
genre of document being quoted, and a two-character quotation closer, the exact wording of 
which changes depending on whether the document's recipient is superior, inferior, or equal to its
sender in the bureaucratic hierarchy. In my English translation, quotation openers and closers, 
along with all other references to documentary genre, are indicated in bold. The memorial is long
12. Zhou Zhongliang was a native of Hengyang county 衡陽縣, Huguang province. See Hengzhou fuzhi 衡
州府志 (1671), 23.30a.
13. This convenient visual scheme was first devised by Uematsu Tadashi 植松正 and adopted in a Kyoto 
University reading group on the Yuan dianzhang 元典章. Subsequently, it has been used by a number 
of Japanese scholars. For Uesugi's introductory remarks on this method, see Gendai no hōsei 
kenkyūhan, “Gen tenshō Reibu kōtei to yakuchū 1,” 141-42. Another way to show the structure of 
layered quotations is to represent them with indented paragraphs. But I find this method less helpful 
when dealing with highly complex documents because it is harder to keep track of where a document 
ends. For an example of the latter method, see Liu Cheng-yun, Ming Qing dang’an wenshu, 209-26.
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and repetitive, and most likely confusing to a first-time reader. Non-specialist readers are 
encouraged to pay attention to the overall narrative structure rather than details of administrative 
procedure, which will be explained later.
Figure 1.1: Structural Diagram of Li Shangsi's Memorial
A Memorial by Grand Coordinator of Sichuan $
B Report by Provincial Administration Office of Sichuan


C Report by Shangchuan-nan General Administration Circuit
 

D Declaration by Jiading Subprefecture 
E Declaration by Qianwei County 
F Declaration by Jiading Subprefecture 
H Lateral communication by Shangchuan-nan General 
    Surveillance Circuit  
I [Declaration] by Jiading Subprefecture 
J Lateral Communication by the Censorate "#
G Reply directive by Grand Coordinator of Sichuan

K Lateral Communication by the Ministry of Personnel
    	!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(A-1) A memorial regarding the following matter: A magistrate, having developed a serious illness, 
pleads for permission to return home so as to sustain his diminishing life. I have received a report 




(A-2) This [B] was received by me. According to archived records, we had earlier received a 
lateral communication from the Censorate:
1Á=&-æ[ì咨
(A-3) A copy-lateral-communication [K] was received by me, and I have followed this and forwarded 
the instruction throughout [Sichuan]. Now regarding the above matter, since the Regional Investigator 
is currently awaiting replacement at the provincial border [and therefore I cannot discuss this matter 
with him], I conclude as follows: Magistrate Zhou Zhongliang of Qianwei County has served without 
fault while in office, and his talents as an official are also laudable. However, he has been affected with 
a severe illness, and his conditions have already turned very dangerous. Moreover, the administrative 
tasks of this county are intense and numerous, and the position should not be left vacant for too long. 
Since the Administration Office and the Circuit have twice investigated and confirmed that Zhou is not 
using the sickness as a pretext to avoid something, it is appropriate for me to memorialize regarding 
this matter. I humbly request Your Majesty to instruct the Ministry [of Personnel] to discuss this matter 
and to order Magistrate Zhou Zhongliang to retire, and to appoint another official to fill the resultant 
vacancy. I have memorialized regarding the following matter: A magistrate, having developed a serious 
illness, pleads for permission to return home so as to sustain his diminishing life. Not daring to make 






(B-1) We have received a report submitted by Chen Mingjing, Vice Surveillance Commissioner of 
Sichuan in charge of the Shangchuan-nan General Surveillance Circuit and concurrently holding 
additional responsibility over the General Administration Circuit:
~Laz[C.ca:f®.Và4í²呈
(B-2) We [Administration Office of Sichuan] forwarded this upward as a detail-report, to 
which we received a reply directive [from Grand Coordinator Li Shangsi]:
詳T批
(B-3) Having received this, we forwarded this instruction downward, and [later] received a 
lateral communication from the Circuit:
TË-Ñà咨¬
(B-4) A copy-lateral-communication [I] was received at our Office. We conclude as follows: the 
service of Magistrate Zhou Zhongliang has been distinguished indeed. That an official with such a 
good reputation must retire is a regrettable matter. But since his illness has been confirmed for a 
second time by the Circuit, and since he is not trying to shirk responsibility by faking illness, it is 
proper to temporarily order him to care for his illness on the job. Meanwhile, our Office will submit 
a separate report and will instruct another official to head toward Qianwei County and take over 
the county's administration on a temporary basis. We respectfully request that you [Grand 
Coordinator Li Shangsi] quickly submit a memorial to the court, so as to allow Zhou Zhongliang to 




(C-1) I have earlier received a declaration submitted by Jiading Subprefecture:
&~KXb申
(C-2) A copy-declaration [E] was received at our Circuit. Subsequently, we ordered this 
official to take a temporary break from official duties so as to recuperate from his illness. In 
the mean time, we received another declaration submitted by the Subprefecture:
備申àîxÑbËWÕÓøë@~Ñb申¬
(C-3) This [F] was received at our Circuit. Our Circuit concludes as follows: Magistrate Zhou 
Zhongliang, since taking up his post, has been hard-working in his governance. Unexpectedly, 
he became affected with a severe illness; now, he pleads for retirement very sincerely. 
Considering his ability and talent, it seems unfortunate to let him go, but looking at the 
current situation and the wording [of Zhou's request], it also seems that he indeed has no other 
option. Moreover, the administrative tasks of Qianwei County are numerous and intense, so 
the post cannot be left vacant for too long. If we were to allow the current situation to drag on, 
surely we will hurt not only Zhou's condition, but also the county's governance. It is therefore 
appropriate to allow this official to retire, so he can return home and care for his
sickness. In addition, the vacancy needs to be reported to the court [so that the Ministry of 
Personnel will] appoint a replacement. As to the administration of Qianwei County, we will 





(D-1) We have received a declaration submitted by Qianwei County:
~´申
(D-2) This [E] was received at our Subprefecture. 
1b
(E) Zhou Zhongliang, magistrate of our county, accidentally became affected with bloody 
phlegm in the seventh month of this year. His condition is critically dangerous, with his 
life hanging by a frail thread. He therefore petitions to be replaced by another official and 
to be allowed retirement. [Quotation Closer]
´«´HÆ%g'jo¦Ê¤¥8 <nIPòÄW#
ZÃ等情
(F) This official has been affected with a critical illness that is too serious to be cured. His 
condition of bloody phlegm is turning severe—a very pitiful situation indeed. [Quotation 
Closer]
 W¿l£éÀ¼¦Ê¤Ý5Btu等因
(H) We again forwarded this instruction downward to Hu Kaochong, Vice-Prefect of Wusi 
Tribal Prefecture and provisionally holding additional responsibility over the administration of 
the Subprefecture [of Jiading]. Hu's investigation concluded as follows:
ÍË·b;|ÜhE«½¸`j
(I) It is certainly true that this official's condition is critically dangerous. At this point, he can 
no longer hold up against the illness. It is not the case that he is faking the sickness or using 
it as a pretext [for seeking retirement].
WU¤8<nd¾0ÎÏ¤p¢
(J) We have received a lateral communication from the Ministry of Personnel regarding the 
following matter: On impeaching a prefectural support official who returned home without 
permission, so as to warn future wrongdoers and to rectify official behavior. Inside this document 
was the following text:
-Få咨?­hWJ}ÂM±×]»Á¯'ê
(G) The Administration Office is to investigate this matter and report about the details.
	
(K) When local officials seek retirement, all officials from the magistrate and above must 
memorialize the court and seek permission. [Quotation Closer]
SWGÂ«´ võÔ等因
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(A-1) A memorial regarding the following matter: A magistrate, having developed a serious illness, 
pleads for permission to return home so as to sustain his diminishing life. I have received a report 




(A-2) This [B] was received by me. According to archived records, we had earlier received a 
lateral communication from the Censorate:
@ÛL¨5<āmć咨
(A-3) A copy-lateral-communication [K] was received by me, and I have followed this and forwarded 
the instruction throughout [Sichuan]. Now regarding the above matter, since the Regional Investigator 
is currently awaiting replacement at the provincial border [and therefore I cannot discuss this matter 
with him], I conclude as follows: Magistrate Zhou Zhongliang of Qianwei County has served without 
fault while in office, and his talents as an official are also laudable. However, he has been affected with 
a severe illness, and his conditions have already turned very dangerous. Moreover, the administrative 
tasks of this county are intense and numerous, and the position should not be left vacant for too long. 
Since the Administration Office and the Circuit have twice investigated and confirmed that Zhou is not 
using the sickness as a pretext to avoid something, it is appropriate for me to memorialize regarding 
this matter. I humbly request Your Majesty to instruct the Ministry [of Personnel] to discuss this matter 
and to order Magistrate Zhou Zhongliang to retire, and to appoint another official to fill the resultant 
vacancy. I have memorialized regarding the following matter: A magistrate, having developed a serious 
illness, pleads for permission to return home so as to sustain his diminishing life. Not daring to make 





(B-1) We have received a report submitted by Chen Mingjing, Vice Surveillance Commissioner of 
Sichuan in charge of the Shangchuan-nan General Surveillance Circuit and concurrently holding 
additional responsibility over the General Administration Circuit:
^tmS=vtIyÈ=hûC,ĈÌ呈
(B-2) We [Administration Office of Sichuan] forwarded this upward as a detail-report, to 
which we received a reply directive [from Grand Coordinator Li Shangsi]:
´詳f批
(B-3) Having received this, we forwarded this instruction downward, and [later] received a 
lateral communication from the Circuit:
f©å<ëû咨Å
(B-4) A copy-lateral-communication [I] was received at our Office. We conclude as follows: the 
service of Magistrate Zhou Zhongliang has been distinguished indeed. That an official with such a 
good reputation must retire is a regrettable matter. But since his illness has been confirmed for a 
second time by the Circuit, and since he is not trying to shirk responsibility by faking illness, it is 
proper to temporarily order him to care for his illness on the job. Meanwhile, our Office will submit 
a separate report and will instruct another official to head toward Qianwei County and take over 
the county's administration on a temporary basis. We respectfully request that you [Grand 
Coordinator Li Shangsi] quickly submit a memorial to the court, so as to allow Zhou Zhongliang to 




(C-1) I have earlier received a declaration submitted by Jiading Subprefecture:
5]ju申
(C-2) A copy-declaration [E] was received at our Circuit. Subsequently, we ordered this 
official to take a temporary break from official duties so as to recuperate from his illness. In 
the mean time, according to another declaration submitted by the Subprefecture:
備申£ûĉëuå"£iðîĔĆPëu申Å
(C-3) This [F] was received at our Circuit. Our Circuit concludes as follows: Magistrate Zhou 
Zhongliang, since taking up this post, has been hard-working in his governance. 
Unexpectedly, he became affected with a severe illness; now, he pleads for retirement very 
sincerely. Considering his ability and talent, it seems unfortunate to let him go, but looking at 
the current situation and the wording [of Zhou's request], it also seems that he indeed has no 
other option. Moreover, the administrative tasks of Qianwei County are numerous and 
intense, so the post cannot be left vacant for too long. If we were to allow the current situation 
to drag on, surely we will hurt not only Zhou's condition, but also the county's governance. It 
is therefore appropriate to allow this official to retire, so he can return home and care for his
sickness. In addition, the vacancy needs to be reported to the court [so that the Ministry of 
Personnel will] appoint a replacement. As to the administration of Qianwei County, we will 





(D-1) We have received a declaration submitted by Qianwei County:
µ±Î申
(D-2) This [E] was received at our Subprefecture. 
@u
(E) Zhou Zhongliang, magistrate of our county, accidentally became affected with bloody 
phlegm in the seventh month of this year. His condition is critically dangerous, with his 
life hanging by a frail thread. He therefore petitions to be replaced by another official and 
to be allowed retirement. [Quotation Closer]
£ÎÃÎY%à3£z¡6}¾ä¼½G·KZbčÞi!1
l(Ý等情
(F) This official has been affected with a critical illness that is too serious to be cured. His 
condition of bloody phlegm is turning severe—a very pitiful situation indeed. [Quotation 
Closer]
 £iÙ»ĄÚÖ¾ä¼ø#­D«R等因
(H) We again forwarded this instruction downward to Hu Kaochong, Vice-Prefect of Wusi 
Tribal Prefecture and provisionally holding additional responsibility over the administration of 
the Subprefecture [of Jiading]. Hu's investigation concluded as follows:
çåÑ£uJ²÷¬{UÃ×Òs¨}
(I) It is certainly true that this official's condition is critically dangerous. At this point, he can 
no longer hold up against the illness. It is not the case that he is faking the sickness or using 
it as a pretext [for seeking retirement].
£ig¦¼GKwØ?³èé¼¹
(J) We have received a lateral communication from the Ministry of Personnel regarding the 
following matter: On impeaching a prefectural support official who returned home without 
permission, so as to warn future wrongdoers and to rectify official behavior. Inside this document 
was the following text:
<VĀ咨±NÆ{+i\Ü_Ë#òo-#ÕÛÉ6ą
(G) The Administration Office is to investigate this matter and report about the details.
Ëzuq¡^ö
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(A-1) A memorial regarding the following matter: A magistrate, having developed a serious illness, 
pleads for permission to return home so as to sustain his diminishing life. I have received a report 




(A-2) This [B] was received by me. According to archived records, we had earlier received a 
lateral communication from the Censorate:
@ÛL¨5<āmć咨
(A-3) A copy-lateral-communication [K] was received by me, and I have followed this and forwarded 
the instruction throughout [Sichuan]. Now regarding the above matter, since the Regional Investigator 
is currently awaiting replacement at the provincial border [and therefore I cannot discuss this matter 
with him], I conclude as follows: Magistrate Zhou Zhongliang of Qianwei County has served without 
fault while in office, and his talents as an official are also laudable. However, he has been affected with 
a severe illness, and his conditions have already turned very dangerous. Moreover, the administrative 
tasks of this county are intense and numerous, and the position should not be left vacant for too long. 
Since the Administration Office and the Circuit have twice investigated and confirmed that Zhou is not 
using the sickness as a pretext to avoid something, it is appropriate for me to memorialize regarding 
this matter. I humbly request Your Majesty to instruct the Ministry [of Personnel] to discuss this matter 
and to order Magistrate Zhou Zhongliang to retire, and to appoint another official to fill the resultant 
vacancy. I have memorialized regarding the following matter: A magistrate, having developed a serious 
illness, pleads for permission to return home so as to sustain his diminishing life. Not daring to make 





(B-1) We have received a report submitted by Chen Mingjing, Vice Surveillance Commissioner of 
Sichuan in charge of the Shangchuan-nan General Surveillance Circuit and concurrently holding 
additional responsibility over the General Administration Circuit:
^tmS=vtIyÈ=hûC,ĈÌ呈
(B-2) We [Administration Office of Sichuan] forwarded this upward as a detail-report, to 
which we received a reply directive [from Grand Coordinator Li Shangsi]:
´詳f批
(B-3) Having received this, we forwarded this instruction downward, and [later] received a 
lateral communication from the Circuit:
f©å<ëû咨Å
(B-4) A copy-lateral-communication [I] was received at our Office. We conclude as follows: the 
service of Magistrate Zhou Zhongliang has been distinguished indeed. That an official with such a 
good reputation must retire is a regrettable matter. But since his illness has been confirmed for a 
second time by the Circuit, and since he is not trying to shirk responsibility by faking illness, it is 
proper to temporarily order him to care for his illness on the job. Meanwhile, our Office will submit 
a separate report and will instruct another official to head toward Qianwei County and take over 
the county's administration on a temporary basis. We respectfully request that you [Grand 
Coordinator Li Shangsi] quickly submit a memorial to the court, so as to allow Zhou Zhongliang to 




(C-1) I have earlier received a declaration submitted by Jiading Subprefecture:
5]ju申
(C-2) A copy-declaration [E] was received at our Circuit. Subsequently, we ordered this 
official to take a temporary break from official duties so as to recuperate from his illness. In 
the mean time, according to another declaration submitted by the Subprefecture:
備申£ûĉëuå"£iðîĔĆPëu申Å
(C-3) This [F] was received at our Circuit. Our Circuit concludes as follows: Magistrate Zhou 
Zhongliang, since taking up this post, has been hard-working in his governance. 
Unexpectedly, he became affected with a severe illness; now, he pleads for retirement very 
sincerely. Considering his ability and talent, it seems unfortunate to let him go, but looking at 
the current situation and the wording [of Zhou's request], it also seems that he indeed has no 
other option. Moreover, the administrative tasks of Qianwei County are numerous and 
intense, so the post cannot be left vacant for too long. If we were to allow the current situation 
to drag on, surely we will hurt not only Zhou's condition, but also the county's governance. It 
is therefore appropriate to allow this official to retire, so he can return home and care for his
sickness. In addition, the vacancy needs to be reported to the court [so that the Ministry of 
Personnel will] appoint a replacement. As to the administration of Qianwei County, we will 





(D-1) We have received a declaration submitted by Qianwei County:
µ±Î申
(D-2) This [E] was received at our Subprefecture. 
@u
(E) Zhou Zhongliang, magistrate of our county, accidentally became affected with bloody 
phlegm in the seventh month of this year. His condition is critically dangerous, with his 
life hanging by a frail thread. He therefore petitions to be replaced by another official and 
to be allowed retirement. [Quotation Closer]
£ÎÃÎY%à3£z¡6}¾ä¼½G·KZbčÞi!1
l(Ý等情
(F) This official has been affected with a critical illness that is too serious to be cured. His 
condition of bloody phlegm is turning severe—a very pitiful situation indeed. [Quotation 
Closer]
 £iÙ»ĄÚÖ¾ä¼ø#­D«R等因
(H) We again forwarded this instruction downward to Hu Kaochong, Vice-Prefect of Wusi 
Tribal Prefecture and provisionally holding additional responsibility over the administration of 
the Subprefecture [of Jiading]. Hu's investigation concluded as follows:
çåÑ£uJ²÷¬{UÃ×Òs¨}
(I) It is certainly true that this official's condition is critically dangerous. At this point, he can 
no longer hold up against the illness. It is not the case that he is faking the sickness or using 
it as a pretext [for seeking retirement].
£ig¦¼GKwØ?³èé¼¹
(J) We have received a lateral communication from the Ministry of Personnel regarding the 
following matter: On impeaching a prefectural support official who returned home without 
permission, so as to warn future wrongdoers and to rectify official behavior. Inside this document 
was the following text:
<VĀ咨±NÆ{+i\Ü_Ë#òo-#ÕÛÉ6ą
(K) When local officials seek retirement, all officials from the magistrate and above must 
memorialize the court and seek permission. [Quotation Closer]
eiX(ÜÃÎ#.Đï等因
Even though the memorial seems long and complex, the matters reported in it are rather 
straightforward. When we rearrange the narrative into chronological order, the story that emerges
is as follows (Figure 1.2): Magistrate Zhou Zhongliang of Qianwei County developed a serious 
sickness, so he submitted a petition for retirement to his direct superior office, Jiading 
Subprefecture (E). The Subprefecture forwarded this request to the Shangchuan-nan Circuit (D), 
along with a separate document supporting Zhou's request (F). The Circuit endorsed and 
forwarded the request to the Provincial Administration Office of Sichuan (C), which in turn 
forwarded it to the Grand Coordinator of Sichuan (not quoted directly in the memorial and hence
not represented in Figure 1.2). Having received the request, the grand coordinator ordered the 
Provincial Administration Office to investigate and find out whether Zhou was genuinely sick 
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(G). This instruction was forwarded all the way down to Jiading Subprefecture, the response of 
which (I) was forwarded up once again (H, B) and reached the grand coordinator's desk. The 
grand coordinator, now assured that Zhou was not faking sickness,14 submitted a memorial to the 
court on Zhou's behalf (A). To show that correct administrative procedures were being followed, 
the memorial also cited earlier court communications (K, J) that set the regulations for how such 
requests were to be handled. Considering that Zhou was already critically ill when he first 
submitted the petition, one wonders whether the back-and-forth movement of papers would not 
have further endangered his life. We know, at least, that some other officials became impatient 
and left their posts without waiting for approval, attesting to the long time it took for such 
requests to be processed.15
While such procedural delays deserve a separate study of their own,16 here I focus on the 
problem of document structure alone. Two features in the above memorial strike modern readers 
as particularly strange: the non-chronological narrative structure and the repetitiveness of 
content. In Li's memorial, narrative order is determined neither by the chronology of reported 
events nor according to the order by which a document was written or received. Rather, order of 
appearance is decided by a document's position within the layered structure of quotations. Thus a
14. Claiming illness was a common way for officials to evade punishment for administrative frauds. 
Their strategy was to retire from official service before the frauds were discovered, making 
themselves immune to punishment.
15. Qiao Bixing 喬璧星, Qiao zhongcheng zouyi 喬中丞奏議, "Chacan fuzheng shanhui shu" 查參府正擅回
疏, 8.100a-104a, "Chacan jiansi shanhui shulüe" 查參監司擅回疏略, 9.31a-35b; Zhu Xieyuan 朱燮元, 
Du Shu shucao 督蜀疏草, "Jiucan shanhui fuzheng shu" 紏叅擅回府正疏, 1.32a-33b, "Daochen 
huanbing qixiu shu" 道臣患病乞休疏, 2.13a-15b.
16. Some scholars have studied Qing regulations on official sick leaves, which were very different from 
those of the Ming. Most significantly, after 1736 Qing local officials were allowed to leave their posts
after receiving approval by the provincial governor, whereas Ming officials had to wait for formal 
approval by the central court, lengthening their waiting periods significantly. See Wu Yue 伍躍, 
“Shindai chihōkan no byōshi kyūyō ni tsuite: jinji kanri ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu” 清代地方官の病死休養
について：人事管理に関する一考察, Tōyōshi kenkyū 59.2 (2000), 41-51 (especially p. 45-46 on the 
regulation of 1736); He Bian, “Too Sick to Serve: The Politics of Illness in the Qing Civil 
Bureaucracy,” Late Imperial China 33.2 (2012): 40-75. 
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document directly received by the writer (B) is introduced before other documents quoted in it 
(C, D, E, F, G, H, I). When multiple documents are quoted within the same layer, they are 
introduced either according to the order of receipt (C, G, H) or in the order of logical necessity 
(B, J). To correctly understand the events reported in such documents, the reader must mentally 
dismantle the existing document structure and reorder the narrative chronologically. To further 
complicate matters, a few pieces of information reappear many times within the document, such 
as the statement about Zhou's critical condition (four times: E, F, I, A-3) or mention of his good 
track record (three times: C-3, B-4, A-3). Given the excessiveness of repetition, one wonders 
whether the reader of such a document would not have become annoyed by its length and 
redundancy.
Figure 1.2: Administrative Procedures in Li Shangsi's Memorial
Sichuan Grand Coordinator





[F]  Decleration 
[C] Report
















In fact, some contemporaries did get annoyed. Emperor Hongwu (r. 1368-98), the Ming 
founder himself, is said to have detested the convoluted style of official documents. Concerned 
that corrupt clerks may profit themselves by writing intentionally in an impenetrable style, the 
emperor even promulgated a document-writing manual titled "Formulas for Reducing 
Complexity in Official Documents" 案牘減繁式, the contents of which unfortunately do not 
survive.17 Despite Emperor Hongwu's efforts, however, official documents continued to be long 
and repetitive. In 1527, for example, the censor Hu Shining 胡世寧 submitted a memorial 
denouncing the wordiness of memorials of his time. Typical of arguments that idealized earlier 
years of the dynasty, Hu argued that officials during and before the Hongzhi reign (1488-1505) 
had been careful to eliminate useless words in memorials, but ever since Emperor Zhengde (r. 
1506-21) stopped reading them personally, officials quickly turned lazy:
Thinking only of making things easy for themselves, [the officials] no longer 
edited their memorials, simply allowing the clerks to copy the back-and-forth of 
earlier communications... As a result, the same matter is recounted two or three 
times, and within one memorial, more than ten pieces of paper are glued together. 
[These memorials are so long that] one's eyes cannot follow them, and yet the 
truly important phrases are often dropped or abbreviated, leading one to miss 
them and draw the wrong conclusions. On certain days, even a minister is unable 
to read through all incoming documents; how much more so when [the 





In Hu's logic, lengthy documents resulted when irresponsible officials let the clerks draft 
documents on their behalf, evidently because he believed the clerks lacked either the motivation 
17. Ming shilu (Taizu), Hongwu 12/8/15 (wuyin). On Emperor Hongwu's disdain for long documents, see
also Chen Long, “Mingdai gongwen biange lun,” 72-76; Yang Jianning, “Mingchao yizhi wendu 
zhuyi.”
18. Hu Shining 胡世寧, Hu Duanmin zouyi 胡端敏奏議, "Sheng fanwen fu jiugui yi bian qinzheng shu" 省
繁文復舊規以便勤政疏, 7.30a.
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or the intelligence to edit the documents carefully. Similar sentiments were expressed by Hai Rui
海瑞, who issued an itemized agenda for administrative reform soon after being promoted to 
Grand Coordinator of Yingtian (Nanjing) in 1569. In a section of his agenda, Hai instructed his 
subordinate officials to take measures to simplify administrative writing:
When writing about something, one need not copy earlier documents at great 
length; if something is important, incorporate it as an abbreviated passage... An 
official should draft documents personally, handing them to clerks [only when] 
making formal copies. Do not let the clerks take care of everything [including the 
drafting], as it will lead to cumbersome writing.
凡事不必抄寫前案許多。緊急者。略節用之... 本官自做稿付吏謄。不可盡付吏
書。以致煩瑣。19
The complaints of Hu and Hai clearly pointed to stylistic features that were particular to 
documents written in the layered quotation style. These documents "[copied] earlier documents 
in great length" so that "the same matter [was] recounted two or three times," reminiscent of Li 
Shangsi's memorial that we saw above. But it is worth noting that their criticisms were directed 
against what they considered to be the unnecessary length of official documents, not the layered 
quotation style itself. In fact, the layered quotation style outlasted not only the Ming but also the 
Qing, surviving well into the Republican period.20 Although some officials such as Hu and Hai 
advocated for greater succinctness in official communications, there is no evidence that Ming-
Qing officials ever discussed the possibility of switching to a different writing style altogether. 
By this time, writing in layered quotations had already become a normal and unquestionable part 
of the everyday documentary routine. Even to reform-minded officials such as Hu and Hai, the 
layered quotation style was what official documents were supposed to look like, and the idea of 
getting rid of it was simply inconceivable.
19. Hai Rui 海瑞, Bei wang ji 備忘集, "Dufu tiaoyue" 督撫條約, 5.72a-73a.
20. On the structure and vocabulary of Republican documents, see Kirby, State and Economy in 
Republican China, 173-80; Xu Wangzhi 徐望之, Gongdu tonglun 公牘通論, (Shanghai: Shanghai 
shudian, 1991).
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Why did such a long and repetitive writing style survive for so long? Some scholars 
writing in Chinese suggest that the layered quotation style was a manifestation of the problems 
of "documentism" (wendu zhuyi 文牘主義), by which they mean an excessive reliance on 
documents in government activities and a byproduct of "bureaucratism" (guanliao zhuyi 官僚主
義) in the derogatory sense of the term.21 But such views are analytically unhelpful because they 
reduce a complex and puzzling phenomenon to a universal claim about the inherent flaws of 
"bureaucratism" in general. Instead, a more fruitful approach is to directly confront the 
strangeness of our observations: if a seemingly inefficient writing style survived for such a long 
time, we should at least consider the possibility that there was a reason behind it. Although direct
evidence is lacking, I would suggest that the layered quotation style, despite its seeming 
"inefficiency," was in fact the most effective method of communication available to the late 
imperial state.
To understand why this was the case, we must consider what were the available 
alternatives. An obvious possibility was to write official documents by summarizing previous 
communications rather than quoting them directly. For example, Li Shangsi's long memorial 
could potentially be re-written into a shorter document such as the following:
Zhou Zhongliang, Magistrate of Qianwei County, submitted a petition for 
retirement due to a serious sickness. The petition reached me after being 
forwarded up by the Jiading Subprefecture, Shangchuan-nan General 
Administration Circuit, and Provincial Administration Office. Upon receiving the 
21. Yang Jianning, “Mingchao yizhi wendu zhuyi,” 38; He Zhuang, “Lun Ming Qing de fanwen.” 
Scholars who use the word wendu zhuyi (documentism) almost never discuss the word's origins, but 
since they usually define wendu zhuyi to be an element of guanliao zhuyi (bureaucratism), it is likely 
that the word originated from Chinese translations and/or interpretations of Max Weber's discussions 
on the role of files in bureaucracies. However, in most academic writings today, both words are 
detached from their Weberian origins and are used with derogatory connotations. In Japanese, the 
equivalent word is bunsho shugi 文書主義, the connotations of which are much more neutral. For 
examples of Japanese usage, see Nakamura Hiroichi 中村裕一, Tōdai kanbunsho kenkyū 唐代官文書研
究, (Kyoto: Chūbun shuppansha, 1991), 3-5; Watanabe Shigeru 渡辺滋, Kodai, chūsei no jōhō 
dentatsu: moji to onsei, kioku no kinōron 古代・中世の情報伝達––文字と音声・記憶の機能論, (Tokyo: 
Yagi shoten, 2010), 7-51.
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petition, I instructed the Administration Office to investigate and report back 
about Zhou's situation. In response to my order, Hu Kaochong, who currently 
holds provisional responsibility over Jiading Subprefecture, reported that Zhou 
was genuinely sick. The Circuit, the Administration Office, and I all agree that 
Zhou has served diligently and that it is a regret to lose him, but given his serious 
condition, it seems proper to grant him permission to retire. Therefore, in 
accordance with the current regulation on officials who seek retirement, which 
our office had earlier been informed by the Censorate, I submit this memorial to 
humbly request that Zhou's petition be approved.
This hypothetical memorial preserves the gist of the original, and for the purpose of forwarding 
Zhou's petition to the court, its content should have been sufficient. However, writing the 
memorial this way would have led to a major problem: if Zhou's claim of illness was later 
discovered to be a lie, it would have been very difficult to identify which office (or individual) 
was most responsible for getting it approved. For example, Li could be accused of exaggerating 
the situation or even bending the facts to help Zhou's case, and he would have had no means to 
counter such accusations. An important function of layered quotations, then, was to retain the 
traces of all earlier decisions and discussions as a case moved up and down the bureaucratic 
hierarchy, thereby clarifying the distribution of responsibility.22 By directly quoting the words of 
his subordinate offices, Li could claim that his decision was a reasonable one based strictly on 
information he received from lower levels of the territorial bureaucracy. Similarly, when lower 
offices directly quoted communications from superior offices (such as in Sections J and K of Li's
memorial), they claimed implicitly that their actions were based not on independent decisions of 
their own, but in strict observance to superior offices' instructions. Seen in this light, the role of 
an official document was not just to convey a message from one office to another, but also to 
demonstrate the process of earlier documentary exchange that resulted in the creation of that 
message. 
22. A similar argument is made in Kobayashi Takamichi, Sōdai Chūgoku no tōchi to bunsho, 78.
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To be sure, it was possible to reproduce prior communications without resorting to the 
layered quotation style. This possibility involved forwarding previous communications as 
separate attachments rather than embedding them into each new document. But this method, too, 
had its problems: as a case moved forward from one office to another, increasingly large 
numbers of documents would have had to be attached. In the case of Zhou Zhongliang's 
retirement request, for example, when Jiading Subprefecture forwarded his petition upward, it 
would only have needed to produce a copy of Zhou's original petition (E) and attach it to its own 
report (the equivalent of D and F). However, by the time Li Shangsi composed his memorial to 
the court, his attachments would have had to include at least seven documents reproduced from 
earlier communications (B, C, D, E or F, G, H, and I). Clearly, such a method would have been 
extremely cumbersome, requiring many bulky envelopes and extra attention to ensure that the 
attachments were not scattered or lost. Moreover, as more attachments accumulated, it would 
have become increasingly difficult to keep track of which document was written in response to 
which. 
From an organizational perspective, then, the layered quotation style can be seen as a 
technology of information management. Given the need to reproduce earlier communications 
with precision, the state had two methods to choose from. One was to develop technologies that 
functioned outside the text—by attaching earlier communications separately and developing 
elaborate filing mechanisms to keep the attachments organized. The other, which the late 
imperial state adopted, was to use a narrative structure that took care of such needs within the 
text itself. This was exactly what the layered quotation style achieved: by incorporating the 
contents of earlier communications into a single document, it obviated the need to reproduce 
these documents in their entirety, while also clarifying the long and sometimes multiple paths 
through which each quoted document had been produced. Seen in this light, some degree of 
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repetition was necessary in bureaucratic communication, for the more offices got involved in a 
case, the greater was the need to keep track of how decisions were made. Abandoning direct 
quotation in favor of summary would have meant partial abandonment of the central state's 
commitment to supervising every level of territorial government activity, a compromise the late 
imperial state was not ready to make. 
Finally, the layered quotation style had a few additional advantages from the perspective 
of paperwork needs of the state. First, documents written in layered quotations were difficult to 
fabricate, for the forger needed to compose not just a single message, but an entire trail of 
previous communications to be embedded into the document. Such efforts required great labor 
input, acting as an inhibiting factor against forgery that supplemented extratextual tools of 
authentication (more below). Second, embedding one document into another helped ease their 
storage and retrieval. When revisiting a case on a later date, there was no need to retrieve all 
relevant documents, for the most recent one likely contained quotations of all earlier 
communications relevant to the case. Thus the document itself acted as a form of archive, again 
supplementing extratextual archival methods such as the production of topical indexes and 
abbreviated summaries.23 Third, the use of direct quotations probably shortened the time required
to draft a document. This may seem counterintuitive, for one would expect that the sheer length 
layered quotations would have required a long time to reproduce. But as any experienced writer 
can attest, summarizing a text into a shorter version is often more time-consuming than copying 
it in full. Whereas verbatim copying was a mechanical task that could be delegated to a clerk, 
summarizing required a higher order of thinking and called for the personal attention of officials 
23. For descriptions of finding aids in Qing archives, see Beatrice S. Bartlett, “Archival Management in 
the Late Imperial Era: Possibilities for Using Ming-Ch’ing Archivists’ Tracking Methods for Our 
Own Purposes,” in Jindai Zhongguo Lishi Dang’an Yantaohui Lunwenji 近代中國歷史檔案研討會論文
集 (Taipei: Guo shi guan, 1998); Hagihara Mamoru, Shindai Mongoru no saiban, 148-52.
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who could bear the responsibility for any potential distortion or omission of important details. As
we remember, both Hu Shining and Hai Rui criticized the officials' over-reliance on clerks as the 
ultimate cause for what they perceived to be the excessive length of official documents. While 
Hu and Hai may have been right that these documents could have been shortened by having 
officials compose them personally, the reality was that in any government office, officials were 
few while clerks were many. Because the former's labor was more limited and the latter's more 
abundant, it made economic sense to cite earlier communications through direct quotations, 
allowing the officials to outsource a greater portion of the many steps required for a document's 
composition. Ultimately, writing in layered quotations benefitted the people most directly 
involved in government paperwork by making fabrication difficult, aiding archival management, 
and offering a structural template for keeping track of complex documentary exchange.
In sum, what initially seems like a repetitive writing style turns out to be an effective 
solution to the particular needs of a bureaucratic state. The organization of government into 
complex hierarchies meant that any single matter had to pass through many offices before it 
could finally be processed. Administrative efficiency, if it could be measured, must be judged not
by the effort it took to create any one document, but the collective effort required to produce, 
circulate, and organize a set of documents that together contributed to the settlement of a case. 
The layered quotation style made these tasks easier through the internal structure of the 
document, but once a document was produced, one also needed extra-textual mechanisms to 
ensure its smooth circulation and processing. The rest of this chapter examines how the Ming 




The Ming state handled large numbers of documents every day. Emperor Hongwu, the 
Ming founder, is said to have once read 1,660 memorials in a period of eight days.24 Later 
emperors may not have been as diligent, but the government continued to process large volumes 
of paper. A late sixteenth-century source reports that the Ministry of Personnel, an office with 19 
officials and 43 clerks on the regular payroll, received an annual quota of 205,001 sheets of 
paper for everyday use, or about 560 sheets per day.25 A near-contemporaneous source indicates 
that the Ministry of Punishment, which was responsible for supplying half of the paper used by 
all capital offices, provided an annual total of 1,136,837 sheets to various offices in Beijing, or 
24. Sun Chengze 孫承澤, Chunming mengyu lu 春明夢餘錄, 25.3a-b. Also cited in Silas H. L. Wu, 
“Transmission of Ming Memorials, and the Evolution of the Transmission Network, 1368-1627,” 
T’oung Pao 54.4/5 (1968), 282.
25. On the quota of paper, see Libu zhizhang 吏部職掌 (SKCM edition), Jixun qinglisi 稽勲清吏司, Qifu ke
起復科, "Yinse zhizha" 印色紙箚, 28a-34a. Contextual evidence suggests that the cited section reflects 
the sitution around 1571. On the number of officials and clerks, see Ming huidian 明會典 (Wanli 
edition), "Jingguan" 京官, 2.3a-4b, "Liyuan" 吏員, 7.2b. In addition to the clerks assigned under the 
regular quota, most government offices employed unidentifiable numbers of non-regular clerks, the 
exact numbers of which are hard to know. See Miao Quanji 繆全吉, Mingdai xuli 明代胥吏, (Taipei: 
Jiaxin shuini gongsi, 1969), 28-36; He Zhaohui 何朝晖, Mingdai xianzheng yanjiu 明代县政研究, 
(Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2006), 46-48.
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about 3,114 sheets per day.26 The sheer number of documents that passed through Ming 
government offices must have been daunting.
To handle documents in such large numbers, the government needed a system for 
identifying each document with precision, for only then could it be cited in a different context or 
indexed for later reference. One possibility was to assign numeric codes to all documents, but 
with too many documents in circulation across all sectors of the government, such a method 
would have been impractical—either the numbers would have run up too high and become 
unmanageable, or they would have started to repeat themselves. The solution adopted by the 
Ming state was to use character-number combinations, known as zihao 字號 (literally: character 
and number), to serve as identification codes. Somewhat reminiscent of today's library call 
numbers, each identification code consisted of a character (or much less frequently, two 
characters) and a number. But unlike some call numbers that use both characters and numbers for
classificatory purposes (such as the Library of Congress system), the identification codes of the 
Ming consisted of a classificatory character and a serial number. For example, if a document 
26. Zheng Xiao 鄭曉, Zheng Duanjian gong zouyi 鄭端簡公奏議, "Ming zhizhang shu" 明職掌疏, 
12.11b-12a (submitted 1558). The Ming government adopted a peculiar arrangement in which the 
paper used by all capital offices was, at least in theory, requisitioned from prisoners held by the 
Censorate and the Ministry of Punishment, both of which handled judicial cases. Territorial 
governments were similarly expected to obtain their own paper from the prisoners that they handled. 
Essentially, it was a variant form of taxation designed to cover the government's administrative costs 
from revenues outside the regular tax quota. Although the prisoners paid directly in paper early in the 
dynasty, these payments seem to have been commuted to silver by the second half of the Ming. 
Nevertheless, the quota remained on the accounts, and many offices continued to record the number 
of sheets that they annually received. Presumably, the Censorate and the Ministry of Punishment 
collected monetary fines from the prisoners and used those fines to purchase the required quota of 
paper. Most likely the quota only included paper needed for everyday communications and record 
keeping, not the additional paper that was sometimes needed for large-scale publication projects, 
which was obtained separately through requisitions from nearby localities. For an example of the 
commutation of paper into silver, see Tu Xun 屠勲, Tu Kangxi gong wenji 屠康僖公文集, [Yingzhi 
chenyan shi 應制陳言事], 5.9a-b. On the sources of paper in Ming government, see Ding Chunmei 丁
春梅, “Mingdai guanfu gongwen yongzhi yu dang’an de baohu” 明代官府公文用纸与档案的保护, Fujian
shifan daxue xuebao (2003.1): 119-22. It must be noted, however, that Ding's article tends to cite 
regulations in the Ming huidian with no regard to institutional change over time, so the resulting 
composite picture may not accurately reflect the situation in any given period of the Ming.
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contained a code that read "number three hundred and twenty-four of the xin character," (信字三
百二十四號), it meant the document was the 324th within a particular series of documents, 
whose classification code was the xin character. To reflect this functional distinction, I refer to 
the character component of an identification code as the "classification code," while the numeric 
component will be referred to as the "identification number."
The beauty of this identification system lay in the flexibility of Chinese characters as 
classification codes. Unlike in alphabetical writing systems, where multiple letters come together
to form a word, in Chinese each character is itself a word with distinct meanings. This meant that
a classification code was not necessarily an arbitrary symbol (although, as I explain shortly, it 
often was); rather, it could also semantically reflect the type of document (or object) being 
identified. For example, the court issued certificates of mourning to officials who took temporary
leave upon the death of a parent, a near-mandatory practice that reflected the state's commitment 
to upholding Confucian ideals of filiality. These mourning certificates, conveniently, used the 
"filial" (xiao 孝) character as their classification code.27 In early-Ming travel certificates (fuyan 
符驗), the classification codes "horse" (ma 馬) and "water" (shui 水) were used for land and 
water routes, respectively.28 Likewise, documents used in diplomatic exchanges with Japan bore 
27. For institutional regulations, see Ming huidian (Wanli edition), "Dingyou" 丁憂, 11.2a-3b, "Like" 吏
科, 213.8a-b; Libu zhizhang 吏部職掌, Jixun qinglisi 稽勲清吏司, "Guanli dingyou" 官吏丁憂, 6a-b. For 
examples of officials who received mourning certificates, see Lu Shen 陸深, Yanshan ji 儼山集, "Qi'en 
yangbing shi" 乞恩養病事, 28.11a-b; Zhang Bangqi 張邦奇, Zhang Wending gong jinguang lou ji 張文
定公覲光樓, "Guan ling xiaozi kanhe shu"關領孝字勘合疏, 5.22a-b. On the practice of mourning leaves,
see Zhao Kesheng 赵克生, “Mingdai dingyou zhidu shulun” 明代丁忧制度述论, Zhongguoshi yanjiu 
(2007.2): 115-28; Law Fen-mei 駱芬美, Mingdai guanyuan dingyou yu duoqing zhi yanjiu 明代官員丁
憂與奪情之研究, (Taipei: Huamulan wenhua chubanshe, 2009); Norman A. Kutcher, Mourning in Late 
Imperial China: Filial Piety and the State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
28. Ming huidian (Wanli edition), "Shangbao si" 尚寶司, 222.10a-b. On travel certificates in general, see 
Su Tongbing 蘇同炳, Mingdai yidi zhidu 明代驛遞制度, (Taipei: Zhonghua congshu bianshen 
weiyuanhui, 1969), 351-67; Lane J. Harris, “The ‘Arteries and Veins’ of the Imperial Body: The 
Nature of the Relay and Post Station Systems in the Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644,” Journal of Early 
Modern History 19.4 (2015), 17-18.
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the classification codes "sun" (ri 日) and "origin" (ben 本), which together made up the word 
riben, or Japan.29
In addition to such semantic usages, characters could also be used as symbols in ordered 
or unordered lists, much like alphabetical headings or bullet points. This was possible because 
over time, the Chinese had developed various schemes that placed certain characters into 
sequential sets of various numbers. These included characters that were grouped together 
because of their similar qualities, such as the Five Virtues 五常; characters associated with 
temporal or astronomical order, such as the Ten Heavenly Stems 天干, the Twelve Earthly 
Branches 地支, or the Twenty-Eight Lunar Lodges 二十八宿; and characters arranged into 
rhyming verses to aid students' learning, such as the Thousand Character Classic 千字文.30 These 
characters, while retaining their original semantic meanings, also served as ordered series of 
symbols when used alongside other characters of the same group, much like the use of the Latin 
alphabet or the Japanese kana to create ordered lists. Because characters within each set were 
arranged according to a predetermined order, they could be used to arrange documents (or 
objects) into groups that were more manageable for organizational purposes. For example, if a 
29. Many scholars have discussed the diplomatic documents used in Ming-Japanese correspondence (also
known as trade certificates), but most studies are either incorrect or inconclusive about the nature of 
these documents, caused partly by the absence of surviving originals and a general lack of 
understanding about Ming documentary practice. For the most up-to-date accounts that fill this 
documentary gap with Qing archival sources, see Wu Yue 伍躍, “Nichimin kankei ni okeru ‘kangō’: 
toku ni sono keijō ni tsuite” 日明関係における「勘合」—とくにその形状について—, Shirin 84.1 
(2001): 124-43; Hashimoto Yū 橋本雄, “Nichimin kangō saikō” 日明勘合再考, in Kyōkai kara mita 
uchi to soto 境界からみた内と外, ed. Kyūshū shigaku kenkyūkai 九州史学研究会 (Tokyo: Iwata shoin, 
2008). 
30. The Thousand Character Classic, originally composed in the sixth century, is a rhymed verse 
containing exactly a thousand characters with no character repeating itself. Starting in the Tang 
dynasty (618-907) and through the rest of imperial China, it was widely used as a primer for teaching 
students read and write. See Endymion Wilkinson, Chinese History: A New Manual (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Asia Center, 2012), 38.11 on the practice of grouping characters into groups, 38.4 
on the use of sequential character sets, 22.1.4 on the Thousand Character Classic, 39.3 on the Ten 
Heavenly Stems and Twelve Earthly Branches, and 39.1.2.5 on the Twenty-Eight Lunar Lodges. 
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government office decided to use the characters of the Thousand Character Classic as 
classification codes for a particular type of certificate, it could start by assigning the 
classification code "heaven" (tian 天), the first character of the Thousand Character Classic. Each
certificate would then be assigned a serial number starting from the number one. Once the serial 
number had run too high (say, up to one thousand), the office could then change the classification
code into "earth" (di 地), the second character in the series. By thus changing the classification 
code on a regular basis, this system prevented serial numbers from becoming too large, which 
would have made them more difficult to write down and keep track of. Furthermore, the order of 
characters made the classification codes easier to remember and manage. For example, any 
educated man, having memorized the Thousand Character Classic as a child, would know that 
"heaven" came before "earth," that "grass" (cao 草, 139th character) came before "wood" (mu 木,
140th character), and that "force" (li 力, 252th character) came before "life" (ming 命, 256th 
character). The order of characters provided a framework of mental organization that made it 
easier to keep track of the many classification codes, which otherwise would have seemed 
entirely random. Moreover, when one needed to compile these identification codes into booklets 
for later reference, the order of the characters allowed one to place the codes easily into a 
standard sequence, which would be understood by any later user of the booklet who wanted to 
look up a particular code. 
When the Ming state needed to assign large numbers of characters to serve as 
classification codes, it often chose from one or more of the most commonly-used character sets.31
31. For example, the Ming court issued a special type of imperial rescript (gaochi 誥敕) to award 
honorary titles to nobles and officials, the classification codes of which were at first chosen from 
among the 28 characters of the Twenty-Eight Lunar Lodges. But later, the court switched to a more 
complex system, using different classes of classification codes to reflect differences in the status of 
the awardees. Thus the Five Virtues were used as classification codes for awards given to nobles and 
civil officials of the first and second ranks, the Twelve Earthly Branches for awards given to civil 
officials of the third rank and below, the Twenty-Eight Lunar Lodges for first-time awards to military 
officials, and the Thousand Character Classic for any supplementary awards to military officials. See 
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But if none of the pre-existing character sets was deemed appropriate, new ones could easily be 
invented. One such case was in 1414, when the state started issuing merit reward slips 
(gongshang kanhe 功賞勘合) to keep track of the battle-field performance of its soldiers, the 
classification codes of which came from a newly-created verse of 40 characters long. Containing 
characters such as "bravery" (yong 勇), "fierceness" (meng 猛), and "strategy" (mou 謀), the 
verse provided a new series of characters that appropriately reflected the ideal warrior's qualities 
that these merit reward slips were intended to commend.32 The abundance of pre-existing 
character sets, combined with the ease of inventing new character sets whenever necessary, 
meant that the Ming state had limitless classes of classification codes to choose from. In practice 
it was like having available many different alphabets, each of which could be used to create lists 
of various lengths and purposes.
Thus by using classification codes to indicate category and serial numbers to identify 
individual items, the Ming state could theoretically identify every document and every object 
under its management. It is unclear when the character-numeric identification system had first 
developed, although it seems to have come into existence by the Song dynasty (960-1279).33 By 
Ming huidian (Wanli edition), "Zhongshu sheren" 中書舍人, 212.11a-b.
A similar mixed usage of different character groups can be observed in court-provincial 
correspondence regarding personnel appointment and investigation. Among the 13 provinces and 27 
prefectures listed by the Ming huidian as recipients of such correspondence, 11 provinces and 1 
prefecture (Yingtian) were assigned classification codes from the Twelve Earthly Branches, while 1 
province (Sichuan) and 26 prefectures received classification codes from the Twenty-Eight Lunar 
Lodges. Interestingly, this left one province (Guizhou) without a regular classification code, for one 
character among the Twenty-Eight Lunar Lodges was left unused. This unused character was the 
"ghost" (gui 鬼) character, which was probably deemed inauspicious to be used in administrative 
correspondence. Instead, Guizhou was assigned the irregular classification code of "pacification" (fu 
撫), appropriately reflecting the history of the Ming state's colonization of the province in the early 
fifteenth century. See Ming huidian (Wanli edition), "Xingyi kanhe" 行移勘合, 9.1a-2a; Libu zhizhang 
(SKCM edition), Yanfeng qingli si 驗封清吏司, Kanhe ke 勘合科, "Xingyi kanhe" 行移勘合, 22a-23a.
32. Ming huidian (Wanli edition), "Gongci" 功次, 123.2a-b.
33. Wang Jinyu, Songdai dang’an guanli yanjiu, 86-89 (use in archival management); Kobayashi 
Takamichi, Sōdai Chūgoku no tōchi to bunsho, 348-350 (use in documentary authentication).
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Ming and Qing times, its use had become very widespread both within and outside the 
government. In addition to the use in official communications and certificates that have already 
been mentioned, identification codes were found on tax slips, officially-certified contracts, and 
seals of government offices. They were also used to identify plots of land, to organize books and 
archival documents, and to organize inventories in merchants' account books.34 The ability to 
effectively and correctly identify a particular item served as an essential precondition to the 
proper functioning of the Ming system of document management. In fact, identification codes 
also played crucial roles in authenticating official documents, a topic to which we now turn.
Authenticating Documents
For a document to achieve its intended functions, the recipient needed a reliable means to
confirm its authenticity. While some societies may have preferred to verify a document's 
authenticity through the people who witnessed its creation or the messenger who carried it, the 
impersonality of bureaucratic communication meant that the authenticity of bureaucratic 
documents had to be ascertained by mechanisms embedded within the document itself.35 In this 
34. Wu Yue 伍躍, Minshin jidai no yōeki seido to chihō gyōsei 明清時代の徭役制度と地方行政, (Osaka: 
Ōsaka keizai hōka daigaku shuppanbu, 2000), 38-41 (tax slips); Luan Chengxian 栾成显, Mingdai 
huangce yanjiu 明代黄册研究, (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1998), 136-137 (land 
plots); Wang Yuming 王裕明, “Qingmo minchu diandangye dangbu pouxi” 清末民初典当业当薄剖析, 
Zhongguo shehui jingjishi yanjiu (1999.3), 69-75 (account books); Wang Jinyu, Songdai dang’an 
guanli yanjiu, 86-69 (archival organization), 92-95 (land plots); Zhonguo Mingchao dang'an zonghui 
中國明朝檔案總匯, vol. 1, Documents 49 (contract), 50 (tax slip).
35. Anneli Sundqvist discusses a similar distinction between documents that earn trust by being 
embedded to the social context of their creation, and documents that, when moved away from their 
original context, develop additional mechanisms to help establish their trustworthiness. Under this 
scheme, the bureaucratic documents discussed here belong to the latter category. See Anneli 
Sundqvist, “Documentation Practices and Recordkeeping: A Matter of Trust Or Distrust?,” Archival 
Science 11.3-4 (2011), 282-84. For examples of cultures where authenticity is established by 
testimonies of people, see Michael T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record, England, 
1066-1307, Second ed., (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 295-99; Heather MacNeil, 
“From the Memory of the Act to the Act Itself: The Evolution of Written Records as Proof of Jural 
Acts in England, 11th to 17th Century,” Archival Science 6.3-4 (2007), 314-16; Watanabe Shigeru, 
Kodai, chūsei no jōhō dentatsu, 155-219. In imperial China, perhaps the place where human 
testimony mattered the most was private contracts. For early examples, see Valerie Hansen, 
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section I discuss two such mechanisms most important to the Ming state: the well known method
of official seals, and a less famous method known as kanhe 勘合, or coded paper tallies.
The most widely used method was the seal. Dating back at least to the Warring States 
period (ca. 480-228 B.C.E.), by the sixth century seals acquired the material form that is widely 
familiar today.36 Seals were made by carving hard objects such as metal or jade in a way that 
removed background areas of the desired text (never images in the case of official seals); when 
the seal was applied with ink and pressed onto paper, an impression of the text was made (Figure
1.3). The seal was both the primary means for documentary authentication and the ultimate proof
of authority for government officials, but the text engraved on it was always the name of the 
office rather than that of its occupant. In early China, a newly-appointed official received his seal
directly from the central court and returned it back when he received a different appointment. By 
the Sui dynasty (581-618), however, seals came to be held at territorial offices indefinitely after 
they had been issued from the central court, so that the same seal was now used by different 
office holders as they came and went.37 During the Ming, official seals remained at their 
respective offices until they became too worn out for use. In the case of one county in Sichuan, a 
seal originally cast in 1439 was not replaced until some time after 1590, when its engraving had 
turned "so flat and blurry that one could no longer distinguish the real from the fake" (篆文平乏
模糊。真偽難辨).38 The fact that official seals remained physically at government offices is 
Negotiating Daily Life in Traditional China: How Ordinary People Used Contracts, 600-1400 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 24-39.
36. On early sealing practices and their transformation as paper replaced wooden strips as the medium of 
writing, see Kataoka Kazutada 片岡一忠, Chūgoku kan’in seido kenkyū 中国官印制度研究, (Tokyo: 
Tōhō shoten, 2008), 35, 74-75.
37. Kataoka Kazutada, Chūgoku kan’in seido kenkyū, 46, 51, 80.
38. Li Shangsi, Dufu zouyi, "Xianyin mohu qing huan shu" 縣印模糊請換疏, 1.40a-41b. The memorial is 
undated, but its time of composition can be deduced from internal evidence and the author's time of 
service as Grand Coordinator of Sichuan (1589-91).
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another manifestation of the bureaucratic nature of late imperial Chinese governance, in which 
political authority lay ultimately in the office itself rather than the person who held it.
Figure 1.3: Bronze Seal for a Southern Ming Company Commander, Cast in 164939
Left: Seal. Right: Seal impression. Middle: The back and side surfaces of the seal, engraved with the 
office title, date when the seal was cast, and the unique identification code.
Seen from a global comparative perspective, the Chinese stamp-seal was not the only 
sealing technology available to premodern societies.40 In medieval Europe, for example, sealing 
involved the use of a mold (the seal matrix) that was applied onto a soft material such as wax, 
producing a three-dimensional shape (the seal impression) that was usually attached to the 
bottom of a document (Figure 1.4).41 In both methods, an engraved object was used to produce 
near-identical shapes or images. But because Chinese seals were applied directly onto the surface
of paper, they could be used for a broader range of purposes. For example, the same seal could 
be applied many times to a single document, often over important phrases such as names, dates, 
39. Source: Chen Songchang 陳松長 ed., Hunan gudai xiyin 湖南古代璽印 (Shanghai: Shiji chuban jituan, 
Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 2004), 151.
40. Dominique Collon classifies seals of the world into three major types: stone seals carved intaglio and 
applied onto a soft surface such as clay, represented by those of the Ancient Near East (also used in 
early China; see footnote 36); seals involving matrices that are applied to a soft material such as wax, 
represented by those used in Europe; and stamp-seals in which the background of the design is carved
away, represented by those used in East Asia. See Dominique Collon ed., 7000 Years of Seals 
(London: British Museum Press, 1997), 9-10. 
41. P. D. A. Harvey and Andrew McGuinness, A Guide to British Medieval Seals (Toronto and Buffalo: 
University of Toronto Press, 1996), 10-13 (making seal impressions), 18-20 (means of attachment).
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and numbers to prevent them from being altered by later hands. Seals were also applied to the 
junction of two pieces of paper to prevent alterations that removed entire pieces of paper and 
replaced them with forged ones (such seals are known as joining seals, or qifeng yin 騎縫印). 
Finally, sometimes a seal was applied to two separate pieces of paper, leaving half of its 
impression on each piece. Known as half-seals (banyin 半印), this method allowed one to create 
stubs of outgoing documents that could later be used to verify a document's authenticity by 
matching the half-impression on the stub with that on the document.42
 
Figure 1.4: Seals of Medieval England43
Despite the broader possibilities of usage, Chinese seals had one major disadvantage: 
because seal impressions were two-dimensional, they were probably easier to forge than their 
three-dimensional counterparts in Europe. Forgeries could be achieved by one of the two means: 
tracing a genuine seal impression onto another piece of paper, or carving a separate seal that 
42. Wu Yue 伍躍, “Guanyin yu wenshu xingzheng” 官印与文书行政, in ‘98 Guoji Huixue xueshu taolunhui
lunwenji ‘98 国际徽学学术讨论会论文集, ed. Zhou Shaoquan 周绍泉 and Zhao Huafu 赵华富 (Hefei: 
Anhui daxue chubanshe, 2000), 336, 339-342 (joining seals and seals around important texts); 
Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’an guan 中國第一歷史檔案館 ed., Qing dai wen shu dang an tu jian 淸代文書
檔案圖鑒 (Changsha: Yuelu shushe, 2004), 8.1.14 (Qing stub book with half seals).
43. Source: Harvey and McGuinness, A Guide to British Medieval Seals, 18.
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produced an impression similar to that of the original one. Technologically speaking, even the 
latter method was not too difficult, for all one needed was an original impression and a skilled 
carver. If done well, the seals thus created could produce impressions practically 
indistinguishable from those of genuine seals, for even the latter did not always produce exactly 
identical impressions—for example, the carvings could wear out after long use, as in the case of 
the county seal in Sichuan that we saw above. Even if a genuine seal somehow managed to 
produce identical impressions all the time, it would have been impractical for government offices
to check seal impressions of all incoming documents against those of known originals, a process 
that would have seriously slowed down administrative work. In fact, Ming sources abound with 
accounts of individuals who scammed the government's communication system using fake 
documents that bore impressions of forged seals. In one particularly complicated case, the 
scammers embezzled stipends of various branches of the royal clan by intercepting the funds 
while they were being transported from the local government to the clan members. By bringing 
back forged "receipts" of the clansmen, the scammers deceived the government into believing 
that the funds had reached their intended destinations. The scam lasted for over three years, and 
when the scheme eventually came to light, it was not because anyone noticed their use of forged 
seals, but because word of the operation had got out to the government.44
The seal as a method of authentication, therefore, depended to a great extent on elements 
of trust. Since forgery of seals was technologically possible, all the government could do was to 
take measures to make officials seals as trustworthy as possible. One such measure was to 
ascertain the security of all genuine seals. During the Ming, each government-issued seal was 
given a unique identification code to help track it. (In Figure 1.3, for example, the seal bears the 
44. Zhang Wenda 張問達, Fu Chu shuchao 撫楚疏抄, "Yi fanren Guo Yanming deng Liao zong 
Xianzhuang mou diao weizhuan qinlu zhao shu" 議犯人郭彥明等遼宗憲焋謀雕偽篆侵祿招疏, 48a-89b.
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code No. 1403 of the yong 永 character.) Additionally, officials were expected to safeguard their 
seals with special attention. Fear of loss or theft was so great that one magistrate handbook 
advised seal holders to always hold onto their seals even while sleeping.45 When government 
seals fell into enemy hands, the court quickly issued replacements with slightly different designs 
to render the lost seals unusable.46 The second measure was to deter forgery with heavy 
punishments. Under Ming law, tracing seal impressions was considered a lesser crime because it 
produced only one fake document at a time, and those caught doing so were sentenced to 
military exile. Forging official seals, on the other hand, was a serious crime punishable by death, 
as was stealing genuine seals for improper usage.47 Despite the threat of death, however, daring 
individuals continued to forge official seals because potential rewards were high and detection 
was difficult if the work was done well.48 Ultimately, what sustained official seals as a system of 
authentication was a collective faith in the validity of government seal impressions, backed by 
the state's commitment to safeguard its own seals and a promise to heavily punish any forgers 
who got caught.
It was due to the ultimate vulnerability of official seals that important government 
documents adopted an additional method of authentication: coded paper tallies or kanhe 勘合 
(literally: to examine and match), as the method was called in the Ming.49 As described in the 
45. Jiang Tingbi 蔣廷璧, Pushan Jiang gong zhengxun 璞山蔣公政訓, 15a-b.
46. Xu Luan 徐鑾, Zhifang shucao 職方疏草, "Fu Yunnan fu'an ti gaizhu Wuding fuyin shu" 覆雲南撫按題
改鑄武定府印疏, 5.1a-4b; Min Hongxue 閔洪學, Fu Dian zoucao 撫滇奏草, "Cha can qicheng wenwu 
shu" 查參棄城文武疏, 1.23a.
47. Mingdai lüli huibian 明代律例彙編, VI-6 (decapitation for those who steal official seals), VI-105 
(decapitation for those who forge official seals), Jia-VI-105-2 (military exile for those who trace seal 
impressions); Tiaoli beikao 條例備考, Ducha yuan 都察院, "Miaomo yinxin" 描摸印信, 2.33b-34b 
(debate on the proper punishment for the crime of tracing seal images).
48. The forgery of official documents is worth a separate study of its own. For some Ming examples, see 
Li Shida 李世達, Shaobao Li gong zouyi 少保李公奏議, "Panhuo zhawei shi" 盤獲詐偽事, 60a-61a, 
"Yichu weiyin bing buhuo renyuan shu" 議處偽印并捕獲人員疏, 2.71a-b; Shen Yan 沈演, Zhi zhi zhai ji 
止止齋集, "Jiayin shu" 假印疏, 5.7a-13a. See also Footnote 44 above.
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Ming Veritable Records, the kanhe authentication method worked in the following manner.50 
First, an empty booklet was prepared, upon which one placed an empty piece of paper folded in 
half (Figure 1.5a). Next, an identification code was inscribed along the seam and an imperial seal
was applied over it, so that the left side of the seal-inscription unit appeared on the paper while 
the right side remained on the booklet (Figure 1.5b-c). The procedure was repeated using new 
pieces of paper until the booklet became full, with each inscription containing the same 
classification code but a different identification number (Figure 1.5d-f). In Figure 1.5e, for 
example, the right-hand inscription reads "No. 34 of the rang character" while the left-hand one 
reads "No. 35 of the rang character." The identification numbers rose serially following this 
pattern, and the booklet, now bearing many half-inscriptions and half-seals, became known as 
the reference booklet (dibu 底簿). The paper, which for analytical purposes I call the kanhe paper
(kanhe zhi 勘合紙), functioned as a pre-authenticated blank document when opened up (Figure 
1.5g-h). On a later date, further content was filled in at the blank space to complete the document
(Figure 1.5i). To verify the authenticity of such a document, one would match its half-inscription 
49. The word kanhe has caused some degrees of semiotic confusion, for Ming sources use the word to 
refer to both a method of authentication and the documents produced by such a method. As a result, 
no scholarly consensus exists on the exact definition of the word. For example, Hu Guangming 
defines it as a document whose authenticity was confirmed through the matching of a split 
handwritten code, while Liu Cheng-yun sees it as a genre of official document. My own approach is 
closer to Hu's. For analytical purposes, I use the word kanhe to refer to a technique (as opposed to a 
genre) that could be applied to many different types of documents. See Hu Guangming 胡光明, 
“Kanhe kaoshi” 勘合考释, Chongqing shanggong daxue xuebao 26.1 (2009), 143; Liu Cheng-yun 劉錚
雲 and Wang Jianmei 王健美 “Xunzhao da Qing ‘jingwei piwen’” 尋找大清「精微批文」, Gujin 
lunheng 16 (June 2007), 84-86.
50. Ming shilu (Taizong), 141.2222 (Hongwu 15/1/4 jiashen). The description in this entry is specific to 
the use of kanhe in authenticating long-distance communication. For a different description of the 
same system, see Charles O. Hucker, The Censorial System of Ming China (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1966), 102. For descriptions of kanhe used in other contexts, see Ray Huang, 
Taxation and Governmental Finance in Sixteenth-Century Ming China (London and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1974), 14 (tax delivery receipt); Huiping Pang, “Stolen Art and Lost 
Inscriber: Reconstructing Artwork Inventory Codes in the Tumultuous Wanli Period, 1573-1620,” 
Artibus Asiae 72.2 (2012), 411-412 (art inventories at court); Wu Yue, “Nichimin kankei ni okeru 
kangō”; Hashimoto Yū, “Nichimin kangō saikō,” (diplomatic communication).
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(left side) with the corresponding half-inscription (right side) on the reference booklet. Because 






































































Figure 1.5: The kanhe Authentication System
The origins of the kanhe method are unclear, but evidence of its use can be found from as
early as the Song dynasty.51 By Ming times it was used in a wide variety of contexts, the most 
51. Most existing scholarship trace the origins of kanhe to either the Yuan or the early Ming. However, 
judging from the stone inscription of an original Southern Song document reproduced by Kobayashi 
Takamichi, it is clear that the equivalent of the kanhe method was used during the Song as well. (The 
method was called hetong 合同 during the Song, which explains why Ming-Qing scholars have been 
unable to trace its origins beyond the Yuan.) It seems that no Song historian has examined this subject
in depth, and even Kobayashi is left to speculate (correctly, it turns out) that the split inscriptions were
used for reference and authentication purposes. See Kobayashi Takamichi, Sōdai Chūgoku no tōchi to
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important of which was the authentication of long-distance communication. By distributing 
reference booklets to territorial governments in advance, the court gave them a secure means to 
confirm the authenticity of all subsequent communications. Likewise, territorial governments 
were given blank pieces of the kanhe paper, the corresponding reference booklets of which were 
kept at court. Although one may reasonably doubt whether the reference booklets were actually 
used in practice, we know that in at least one case in 1638, an incoming document was 
reportedly "carefully examined against the reference booklet" (細查底簿) as part of the 
administrative routine before it was forwarded to the relevant office for further action.52 In 
addition to authenticating long-distance communication, the kanhe method was also used in a 
wide variety of government-issued certificates (Figures 1.6 and 1.7).53 In such cases, the 
reference booklets were probably held at the offices that issued the certificates rather than 
distributed to remote locations. Some offices produced the certificates in the tens of thousands at 
a time, as was the case in 1521, when the Ministry of War produced 20,000 merit reward slips, 
each of which bore a half-inscription written by one of the ten National University student-
interns (lishi jiansheng 歷事監生) assigned specifically to the task.54 An early Ming official even 
suggested that the kanhe method be used to authenticate government-issued paper money, but the
bunsho, 348-50; Hu Guangming, “Kanhe kaoshi,” 140-142 (traces origin to the Yuan); Zuo Shu’e 左
书谔, “Mingdai kanhezhi lun” 明代勘合制论, Qiushi xuekan 3 (1991), 78 (traces origin to early Ming).
52. Dong Yuchen 董羽宸, Ze yan xiaocao 擇焉小草, "Ti can zhayuan shu" 題參詐員疏, 7.52b.
53. On the types of Ming documents that adopted the kanhe method, see Zuo Shu’e, “Mingdai kanhezhi 
lun.”
54. Merit reward slips (gongshang kanhe 功賞勘合) were certificates given to soldiers who showed 
extraordinary performance in battles. The Ministry of War produced these slips in 1521 because 
Emperor Jiajing (r. 1522-66) had just ascended the throne, making it necessary to replace the outdated
slips that bore the Zhengde reign name (1506-21). This particular production was therefore more a 
one-time undertaking rather than a recurring task. See Ming huidian (Wanli edition), "Gongci" 功次, 
123.2a-b; Tiaoli beikao 條例備考, Bingbu 兵部, "Gongshang kanhe dibu" 功賞勘合底簿, 4.73a-74b.
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measure seems to have never been adopted, probably because of the great costs that such an 
undertaking would have required.55
Figure 1.6: Certificate of Household 
Registration with kanhe56
A certificate of household registration (xinpiao 信
票) for Zhu Jinlu 朱進祿, dated 1591. The kanhe 
portion (a half-inscription and half-seal) is located 
at the top center.
In comparison to seals, the kanhe method relied much less on trust and more on the 
materiality of the document itself. One may regard it as a highly sophisticated adaptation of split 
tallies, another common technique of authentication in the premodern world. Originally, tallies 
were made by breaking a hard object into two halves, each of which was held by a different 
party. By matching the two halves on a later date, one confirmed the authenticity of each piece, 
and by extension, the identity of its holder.57 Tallies offered a reliable way of verifying 
55. Xie Jin 解縉, Wenyi ji 文毅集, "Taiping shice" 太平十策, 1.17a. Among the Ming paper money 
reproduced in Zhongguo huobi daxi, none bears a split inscription or even an identification code. 
However, since all reproduced notes are from the Hongwu reign (1368-98), I have not been able to 
confirm whether or not split inscriptions were used in notes of the later reigns. Some Qing bank notes 
did use the kanhe method. See Ma Feihai 馬飛海 ed., Zhongguo lidai huobi daxi 中國歷代貨幣大系 
(1993), vol. 5 p. 402-07, 410-17 (Ming paper money), vol. 7 p. 49 (Qing bank notes).
56. Source: Luan Chengxian, Mingdai huangce yanjiu, plate 9.
57. On the use of split tallies in early China, see Kataoka Kazutada, Chūgoku kan’in seido kenkyū, 26-27;
Tomiya Itaru, Mokkan, chikukan no kataru Chūgoku kodai, 187-88. On the European use of tallies for
keeping financial records, see W. T. Baxter, “Early Accounting: The Tally and Checkerboard,” The 
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authenticity, but their bulkiness made them less suitable for conveying long and elaborate 
messages. The innovation of kanhe lay in the fact that it transferred the technology of tallies onto
the surface of paper.58 To some extent, we can observe similar techniques used in other contexts, 
such as the half-seals discussed earlier or the chirographs of medieval Europe,59 both of which 
verified the authenticity of a document by matching a split shape on a two-dimensional surface. 
What truly set apart the kanhe method, however, was that the shape to be matched was also an 
identification code. Thus in addition to being a method of authentication, kanhe served also as a 
method of tracking.60 In this respect, it was a truly innovative technology which, to the extent of 
my knowledge, was used by the Chinese state exclusively.
Ultimately, though, the vast majority of Ming government documents were authenticated 
by seals, not split inscriptions. The kanhe method was very costly, and its selective use in Ming 
government shows both the strength and shortcoming of the principle of replication. To 
compensate for the ultimate unreliability of seals, the government adopted the alternate method 
of kanhe, which required two pieces of paper to verify the authenticity of a single document. By 
physically splitting an inscription into two different places, kanhe offered a system of 
authentication where forgery was theoretically impossible. But for the system to work, one had 
Accounting Historians Journal 16.2 (1989), 43-64; Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record, 
123-24.
58. A similar point has been made in Hu Guangming, “Kanhe kaoshi,” 142. 
59. Used primarily to record agreements, the chirograph was made from a single piece of parchment with 
the word CHIROGRAPHUM (or an equivalent word or phrase) inscribed at the center. The 
parchment was subsequently cut into two or more pieces along the script, each of which bore texts of 
the same content and was held by one of the agreement-forming parties. See Clanchy, From Memory 
to Written Record, 87-88.
60. For example, regional inspectors (xun'an yushi 巡按御史) were particularly meticulous in citing the 
identification codes of incoming court communications, perhaps a precautionary measure to avoid 
later-day and confusion. For select examples, see Wang Tingxiang 王廷相, Junchuan zouyi ji 浚川奏議
集, "Qing ba Lan Hai fu zongbing shu" 請罷藍海副總兵疏, 16a; Huang Zan 黃瓚, Xuezhou ji 雪洲集, 
"Feibao jinji zeiqing shu" 飛報緊急賊情疏, 41a.
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to devote substantial time and resources into producing and matching the half-inscriptions. 
Unable to adopt such procedures on all official documents, the Ming government continued to 
authenticate most documents with seals while reserving kanhe for important documents that 
required extra security. What we observe, then, is another conflict between cost-saving and 
administrative certainty: while secure authentication of documents was technologically possible, 
the use of such a technology also required great costs.
Figure 1.7: Patent of Investiture with kanhe61
Top and middle: A patent of investiture (chiming 敕命) 
bestowing titles on the official Liu Sanzhai 劉三宅 and his wife 
née Ding 丁氏, dated 1579. Bottom: Kanhe portion enlarged.
61. Source: Zhou Qingming 周慶明 ed., Zhongguo shengzhi daguan 中國聖旨大觀 (Shanghai: Shanghai 
cishu chubanshe, 2006), 22-23.
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Synchronizing Information
A final precondition to effective bureaucratic governance was the ability to share 
information among multiple parties, what we might call synchronization. As we have already 
seen, one way the Ming state achieved it was by writing in layered quotations, which offered a 
convenient framework to embed words of different offices within a single document. The method
worked well for communications of on-going cases, but the Ming state also produced many 
documents that were not meant to be communicative but rather referential—administrative 
records such as tax registers, account books, personnel evaluations, and so on. When multiple 
offices needed access to information of this type, there was simply no technological replacement 
to physically reproducing the documents in multiple copies.
When only two offices required access to the same information, synchronization was 
relatively simple. A commonly-used method was to keep records on circulating notebooks 
(xunhuan bu 循環簿), which were used to help a supervising office keep track of the work of a 
subordinate office. In this method, the subordinate office created two identical notebooks, 
sending one to the supervising office for safekeeping while retaining the other for daily use. At 
pre-determined intervals, the subordinate office brought its notebook to the supervising office, 
where the latter's notebook was updated and the two notebooks exchanged. At this point, the 
supervising office could also apply its seal onto any new content to prevent later alterations.62 
The method allowed the supervising office to always have access to a notebook almost identical 
to the one held at the subordinate office. Additionally, it made fraud more difficult, for alteration 
of past records would have required making the same changes on both notebooks, but the 
62. This account is based on partial clues in the following two texts: Li Hualong 李化龍, Ping Bo quanshu
平播全書, "Xing xun Dong Nan erdao fangliang guize" 行巡東南二道放糧規則, 8.36a-b (on the two 
notebooks being exchanged regularly); Zhu Wan 朱紈, Pai yu zaji 甓餘雜集, "Guan zhi fengliang shi" 
關支俸糧事, 7.22a-b (on the use of seals).
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subordinate office could never have access to both notebooks at the same time. Because of the 
simplicity, circulating notebooks could be used for a wide variety of purposes. For example, a 
county magistrate might use them to keep track of the number of prisoners held at the county jail,
or provincial governments may use them to keep track of the disbursement of soldiers' stipends.63
Circulating notebooks were useful for sharing information between two offices, but very 
often, local government offices had to submit copies of the same document to multiple superiors.
For example, records of household registration, the so-called Yellow Registers (huangce 黃冊), 
were prepared in four total copies, with one formal copy submitted to the Ministry of Revenue 
and the remaining three retained by the provincial, prefectural, and county levels of the territorial
government.64 For reasons that must be left for speculation, extant sources are particularly 
detailed in recording such practices among military sectors of the Ming government.65 In early 
63. See the texts cited in footnote 62 (soldiers' stipends), and Zhang Xuan 張選, Zhongjian Jingsi Zhang 
gong yiji 忠諫靜思張公遺集, "Zuo xian shiyi" 作縣事宜, 4.8b-9a (county jail).
64. Wenxian Zhang, “The Yellow Register Archives of Imperial Ming China,” Libraries & the Cultural 
Record 43.2 (2008), 150; Luan Chengxian, Mingdai huangce yanjiu, 15.
65. For example, in the Guangdong provincial gazetteer discussed below (see footnote 66), the section on
military expenditure (junxu 軍需) gives a detailed list of all record books produced by Guangdong's 
guards and battalions, including their reported cost and the regional inspector's readjusted quota of the
maximum-allowable cost. The section on civil administrative cost (junping 均平), on the other hand, 
does not list the record books by item, but rather shows a single amalgamated item called "various 
costs for the annual compilation of record books, paper, brush and ink, and scribe salaries" (每年造冊
紙劄筆墨并書手工食等項). See Guangdong tongzhi chugao 廣東通志初稿 (1535), "Junping" 均平, 
26.11b. The reason for this discrepancy, I suspect, derives from the fact that civil government offices 
were self-sufficient, whereas the military was not. Because the civil sector partially supplied 
operating costs of the military establishment, civil officials such as grand coordinators and regional 
inspectors (who oversaw both civil and military offices within a province) probably felt a need to see 
clear accounts of how much money was spent on each budgetary item within the military. By 
contrast, the civil sector as a whole cared little about keeping accurate record of each administrative 
expense, as long as the counties managed to collect enough taxes to cover administrative costs of the 
entire provincial bureaucracy. In fact, as scholars such as Ray Huang and Iwai Shigeki have 
explained, it was common practice to collect the cost of one budgetary item under the name of 
another, so the cost of paperwork (and by extension, evidence of paperwork itself) tended to be 
concealed under the name of other expenses. For this reason, although my discussion here draws 
primarily from practices in the military sector, I believe that the civil sector also shared a similar (if 
not greater) tendency to reproduce administrative records in many copies. See Huang, Taxation and 
Governmental Finance, 63-68 (military finances), 48-49 (collecting taxes under different names); 
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sixteenth-century Guangdong, for example, an ambitious regional inspector left detailed accounts
of his effort to assess and reduce administrative expenses of the province's military defense units,
the guards (wei 衛) as they were called in the Ming. Constituting large portions of the 
expenditure were the many record books that had to be compiled on a regular basis. Among the 
20 record books that continued to be produced after a rigorous cost-cutting reform, at least 15 
were reportedly produced in two or more identical copies (Table 1.1).66 Particularly noteworthy 
is one record book that was prepared in seven total copies, with one copy each submitted to the 
Grand Coordinator 巡撫, Regional Inspector 巡按, Provincial Administration Office 布政司, 
Provincial Surveillance Office 按察司, Regional Military Commission 都司, General 
Administration Circuit 分守道, and General Surveillance Circuit 分巡道—essentially the entire 
territorial civil bureaucracy (plus the highest provincial military office).67
It is not clear how most Ming officials felt about replicating documents in such large 
numbers, but at least one official spoke out loudly against it. This was Li Chengxun 李承勛, 
grand coordinator of Liaodong (a frontier defense zone located to the northeast of Beijing) in the 
early 1520s. Following an inspection tour where he personally observed the degree of destitution
in the region, Li memorialized the emperor to suggest five areas of reform, one of which 
concerned the heavy burden of paperwork.68 According to Li, each of Liaodong's twenty-five 
Iwai Shigeki 岩井茂樹, Chūgoku kinsei zaiseishi no kenkyū 中国近世財政史の研究, (Kyoto: Kyoto 
daigaku gakujutsu shuppankai, 2004), 357-370 (discrepancy between formal and actual accounts).
66. Guangdong tongzhi chugao (1535), "Junxu fu" 軍需附, 32.7a-24b. The gazetteer, edited by regional 
inspector Dai Jing 戴璟 and completed in 1535, reproduces various local administrative documents 
(many of which written by Dai himself) in the form of appendices. See Tian Liang 田亮, “Guangdong 
tongzhi chugao fulu de wenxian jiazhi” 《广东通志初稿》附录的文献价值, Guangxi difangzhi (2013.4): 
19-26.
67. Guangdong tongzhi chugao (1535), "Junxu fu" 軍需附, 32.17b: "撫按三司守廵共册七本." The record 
book in question, tianzhu ce 填註冊, reportedly concerned the evaluation and selection of "military 
policy officials" (軍政官員). It is not clear to me whether they were military officials or civil officials 
dispatched to assist affairs in the military.
68. Li Chengxun 李承勛, Shaobao Li Kanghui gong zoucao 少保李康惠公奏草, "Liaodong fuchu canpo 
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guards was annually required to compile a large number of record books, including 3 required by
the Ministry of Personnel, 15 required by the Ministry of Revenue, 2 required by the Ministry of 
Rites; 9 required by the Ministry of War, and 4 required by the Ministry of Works (Table 1.2). 
Each record book, moreover, had to be produced in six or seven identical copies—one was kept 
as the original record (presumably by the battalion or suo 所, a military unit below the guard 
level); another was submitted to the guard; another was submitted to the Regional Military 
Commission, with yet another copy submitted occasionally to branch offices of the Pasturage 
Office 苑馬寺 or of the Court of Imperial Stud 太僕寺; another was submitted to one of the Six 
Ministries; another was submitted to the Chief Military Commission 都督府;69 and a final copy 
was appended to a formal memorial submitted to the emperor. In all, the guards of Liaodong 
annually prepared 33 different types of record books, each of which was produced in 6 or 7 
copies, totaling more than 200 record books produced annually.
In Li's view, the task of compiling the record books placed an additional burden on the 
already destitute local population. His memorial went on to argue that the record books, despite 
their high production costs, offered no practical benefit to the state:
In the frontier, paper is hard to come by and scribes are few, so [the guards] must 
buy paper from afar and hire scribes at a high wage... If these record books could 
help eliminate corruption, or if they could aid administrative investigation, then it 
would be reasonable to continue producing them. Yet I have in the past served as 
a subordinate official in the Ministries of Revenue, Punishment, and Works; I 
have personally seen record books that, as soon as they had been delivered, were 
placed onto tall shelves, only to be damaged by mice and bugs or else stolen by 
corrupt clerks. What I have not seen is a single budgetary item that was identified 
from these record books and applied to state revenue.
邊方紙張難得。能書者少。遠路買紙。高價雇人...若文冊足以革奸弊。存之可
biancheng shu lüe" 遼東撫處殘破邊城疏略, 1.5b-7a.
69. The original text reads "one is submitted to the fu" 一繳該府. I take fu to mean one of the Five Chief 
Military Commissions (wujun dudu fu 五軍都督府) because no prefecture (fu 府) existed in Liaodong. 
The only civil administrative units in Liaodong were Zizai Supbrefecture 自在州 and Anle 
Subprefecture 安樂州. See Ming huidian (Wanli edition) 15.28b; Hasumi Moriyoshi 荷見守義, Mindai 





On these grounds, Li petitioned that the Six Ministries be ordered to reevaluate the usefulness of 
each record book it commissioned, and as much as possible, to eliminate unnecessary items and/
or reduce the number of copies made. Li may have exaggerated the record books' uselessness, or 
he may have been right that most record books, once they had been delivered to the designated 
offices, were never looked at again. In either case, what mattered was that once a documentary 
routine had come into existence, institutional momentum made it very difficult to eliminate. Li's 
proposal, for example, was met by a firm rejection from the Ministry of War: in a memorial 
submitted in response to Li's original proposal, the Ministry of War concluded that the record 
books it required were all closely related to frontier defense, that they were not entirely useless 
writings, and that they could not be eliminated or reduced (皆關切邊務。非盡虛文 ... 難議减免). 
To this the emperor agreed, and presumably, Li's suggestion was subsequently rejected.71 
Li Chengxun's failed push for reform shows that ultimately, the Ming state had no 
alternative but to rely heavily on the principle of replication to make information available to all 
concerned parties. Even though contemporary officials realized that the costs were high, the 
general tendency was to produce more documents rather than fewer, and to replicate them in 
multiple copies rather than create one copy only. In a society where all administrative 
information was stored on the surface of paper, sharing information meant duplicating the 
medium that held it, and when multiple offices required access to the same information, the end 
product could become bulky.
70. Li Chengxun, Shaobao Li Kanghui gong zoucao, "Liaodong fuchu canpo biancheng shu lüe," 1.6b.




At first sight, observations in this chapter might seem to confirm a commonly held view 
that the Ming state was inefficient.72 To be sure, some of its methods for information 
management—such as the layered quotation style, the character-numeric identification codes, 
and the kanhe authentication method—were highly sophisticated. Yet at a fundamental level, 
most such methods relied heavily on a surprisingly crude technique: the replication of texts and 
papers in multiple locations. In a pre-digital society where administrative information was rarely 
detached from its material medium, the only way to authenticate and synchronize information 
with absolute certainty was to replicate it, whether in the form of repetitive narratives of layered 
quotations, the two-piece authentication method of kanhe, or the large-scale copying of 
administrative records. Because information management relied fundamentally on the principle 
of replication, the resulting documentary practices appear wasteful and inefficient in the eyes of 
both modern scholars and contemporary critics.
But to claim that an organization was inefficient is to assume that a more "efficient" 
alternative was possible. While a full assessment of the effectiveness of Ming governance must 
await structured comparison with other imperial Chinese polities, my examinations in this 
chapter suggest that in the area of information management, the Ming state had little room for 
improvement given the technological limitations. It may have been true, as Li Chengxun 
claimed, that the government produced many redundant records that had no immediate use. But 
as we saw earlier in the fraud of government fund interception (p. 44), state institutions could 
72. Charles O. Hucker, The Traditional Chinese State in Ming Times (1368-1644) (Tucson: University of 
Arizona Press, 1961), 77; Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance. An opposite view is to regard 
the dynasty's longevity as a sign of success. For an example of this perspective, see John W. Dardess, 
Ming China, 1368-1644: A Concise History of a Resilient Empire (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2012), 61-85.
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easily be undermined when they failed to share information within a geographically dispersed 
bureaucracy. Redundancy, then, did not necessarily translate to waste. Although contemporary 
critics may not have been aware, it was the excessiveness of replicated information—even if 
some of it was never put to use—that provided a sense of security to the cumbersome 
information system of the Ming.
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Chapter 2: Postal Communication and the Problem of 
Responsibility
Introduction
Writing some time before 1628, the late-Ming scholar and military strategist Mao Yuanyi 
茅元儀 made the following observation about official communications of his time:
In Song times [960-1279], both memorials and private letters could be delivered 
through the postal service. Today this is occasionally true for private letters, but 
never the case for memorials.
宋時奏疏書牘。俱可入遞。今書牘間有之。而奏疏絶無矣。1
Most historians of the Ming, I suspect, will find this comment somewhat perplexing. As 
historians of imperial China are familiar, the postal service transmitted state documents through 
series of postmen who ran in relays. Since the system was run by and for the state, it is not 
surprising that the Ming, like most other Chinese dynasties, prohibited the postal service from 
delivering private letters, though some letters did enter the postal system through informal 
means.2 What is surprising, rather, is Mao's remark that memorials were "never" delivered 
through the postal system in his time. If documents as important as memorials did not pass 
through the postal system—an institution designed precisely to transmit government 
documents—how exactly did territorial reports reach the central court in Beijing?
Whether or not Mao was himself aware, his comments alluded to an important and little-
known transformation in the structure of Ming state communication.3 When Emperor Hongwu 
1. Mao Yuanyi 茅元儀, Xialao zhai zaji 暇老齋雜集, 4.1b.
2. Compared to other imperial Chinese dynasties, the Song was exceptional in allowing officials to send 
personal letters through the postal system. See Lik Hang Tsui, “Institutional Arrangements for Postal 
Communications in Middle Period China: Ideals and Realities,” paper presented at Communications 
in Chinese History: A Comparative Conversation (Columbia University, April 16, 2016), cited with 
permission. For examples of Ming personal letters that informally entered the postal system, see 
Timothy Brook, “Communications and Commerce,” in Cambridge History of China, Volume 8: The 
Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, Part 2, ed. Denis Crispin Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 640-41.
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first established the dynasty, he expected most state documents to pass through the state-run 
postal service. By the early sixteenth century, however, officials dispatched the most important 
documents not through the postal system, but through messengers who carried them all the way 
to their destinations. The objective of this chapter is to explain why this transformation occurred, 
and what it tells us about the nature of the Ming state. In what follows, I first examine how other 
Chinese dynasties had approached the shared problem of long-distance transportation and 
communication, and how the Ming solution differed from those of its predecessors. While all 
dynasties developed postal systems of one form or another, the Ming arrangement stood out in its
strong commitment to reducing operational cost. The drive toward cost-reduction, however, 
undermined the Ming state's continued need for speed. When delivery speed dropped far below 
the early-Ming ideal, postal delivery was gradually abandoned in favor of single-messenger 
delivery, now considered a faster and more secure alternative. Ultimately, achieving high 
communication speed came at a price. Architects of the Ming postal system wanted to achieve 
high speed without considering its cost, eventually causing the system's decline.
Before proceeding further, some terminological clarification is needed. In the existing 
scholarship on premodern communications, words such as "post," "relay," and "courier" are often
3. A number of historians have studied the Ming state's postal-relay system, often focusing more on its 
role in relay transportation than on its role in postal delivery. (For my definitions of "post" and 
"relay", see p. 61.) For a recent synthesis that includes substantial discussion of the postal component,
see Harris, “The Nature of the Relay and Post Station Systems.” On the role of the postal-relay 
system within Ming society, see Brook, “Communications and Commerce,” 582-95. An important 
early comprehensive study is Su Tongbing, Mingdai yidi zhidu. For another early study with emphasis
on how relay institutions were financed, see Hoshi Ayao 星斌夫, Min Shin jidai kōtsūshi no kenkyū 明
清時代交通史の研究, (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 1971). For determining the locations of relay 
stations, the standard reference is Yang Zhengtai 楊正泰, Mingdai yizhan kao 明代驛站考, (Shanghai: 
Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2006). 
Among these works, only Su Tongbing (p. 191) makes a brief reference to the transition from postal 
to single-messenger delivery, but without giving specific examples. Lane Harris (p. 20) argues that 
the postal system functioned smoothly throughout the dynasty, implying that most state documents, 
including memorials, continued to be delivered through it.
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used interchangeably or with inconsistent definitions, making cross-temporal and cross-regional 
comparison semantically difficult. In what follows, I use the term "relay transportation" to refer 
to an arrangement that stationed animals, carts, or boats at set intervals to facilitate the 
movement of people. "Postal delivery," in turn, refers to an arrangement that stationed delivery 
persons at set intervals to facilitate the movement of documents.4 Both arrangements were 
common ways to speed up long-distance movement within the constrains of premodern 
technology, and like many other premodern polities, successive states of imperial China 
maintained integrated postal-relay systems that served the functions of both.5 But as we will see, 
maintaining an analytical distinction between post and relay is essential to analyzing institutional
4. Most historians of China who write in English make a similar distinction between what I call relay 
and postal, but often using different words. My choice of words follows that of Lane Harris, who uses
"relay" and "postal" to describe the Ming transportation and communication systems respectively. 
Timothy Brook refers to the former as "courier" and the latter as "postal," Peter Golas uses "courier-
transport" as an all-purpose term that captures both connotations in the Song context, and Fairbank 
and Teng use "postal" to refer to the Qing postal-relay system as a whole. The inconsistency of usage 
partially arises from the fact that relay and postal institutions overlapped in various configurations 
under each dynasty (as discussed below in pp. 66-71), creating subtle institutional differences that 
cannot be readily captured by existing terminologies. See Harris, “The Nature of the Relay and Post 
Station Systems”; Brook, “Communications and Commerce,” 582-95; Peter Golas, “The Courier-
Transport System of the Northern Sung,” Papers on China 20 (1966), 2; John K. Fairbank and Ssu-yu
Teng, “On the Transmission of Ch’ing Documents,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 4.1 (May 
1939): 12-46.
Outside the China field, "post" is often used with a broader definition that aligns with the word's 
etymology, which originally meant "posting" animals, carts, and/or delivery persons along the road. 
Used in this broader sense, the word "post" encompasses both what I call "relay transportation" and 
what I call "postal delivery." For examples of this broader usage, see Klaus Beyrer, “The Mail-Coach 
Revolution: Landmarks in Travel in Germany Between the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” 
German History 24.3 (2006), 375; Adam J. Silverstein, Postal Systems in the Pre-Modern Islamic 
World (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1; Karen Radner, “An 
Imperial Communication Network: The State Correspondence of the Neo-Assyrian Empire,” in State 
Correspondence in the Ancient World: From New Kingdom Egypt to the Roman Empire, ed. Karen 
Radner, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 71-77 (uses "post" and "relay 
postal" interchangeably).
5. A prominent exception is the Roman Empire's cursus publicus, which started as a postal institution 
but was quickly changed into a relay system. See Anne Kolb, “Transport and Communication in the 
Roman State: The Cursus Publicus,” in Travel and Geography in the Roman Empire, ed. C. E. P. 
Adams and Ray Laurence, (London and New York: Routledge, 2001).
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change over time, and ultimately to understanding the invisible logic that underlay the particular 
arrangement adopted by the Ming state.
The Ming Postal System as an Ideal
At first sight, the Ming postal-relay system appears highly sophisticated and tightly 
regulated.6 The relay network consisted of several major routes that connected the capital with all
provincial seats, supplemented by secondary routes that allowed traffic within and between 
provinces (Figure 2.1). Along these routes, relay stations (yi 驛) were set up at intervals of about 
60-80 li (30-40 km).7 Each station combined the functions of an accommodation facility and a 
transportation terminal, providing complimentary meals, guest rooms, and means of transport 
(horses, donkeys, or boats) to qualified government personnel and foreign embassies. 
Superimposed on the relay network was a denser postal network that connected the empire's 
lowest administrative units (Figure 2.2). Post stations (pu 舖) were set up at intervals of about 10 
li (5 km), a distance short enough for postmen to walk between the stations and deliver the 
documents by foot. Together, the two networks were made up of about 1,000 relay stations and at
6. The basic regulations on the Ming postal-relay system, announced by Emperor Hongwu in 1368, are 
recorded in Ming shilu (Taizu), Hongwu 1/1/29 (gengzi). Unless otherwise stated, all my subsequent 
references to early-Ming regulations are based on this Ming shilu entry. The Hongwu regulations 
remained formally effective through the rest of the dynasty, but subsequent reigns issued various 
amendments to address changing realities and new problems that appeared over time. Most 
amendments issued up to the early 1580s, along with the initial regulations, are recorded in Ming 
huidian (Wanli edition), "Yichuan" 驛傳, 145.2019a-b, 148.2061a-79b, 149.2081a-89a. In addition to 
administrative regulations, the Ming also issued penal clauses specifying the punishments for those 
who obstructed the postal-relay system's proper operation. These clauses can be found in Mingdai lüli
huibian 明代律例彙編, V56-71.
7. The actual distance between stations could be longer or shorter. For example, stations located along 
the route between Beijing and Nanjing were separated by distances of 35-80 li, with 60-70 li being 
the most common. See the travel guidebook Yitong lucheng tuji 一統路程圖記, reproduced in Yang 
Zhengtai, Mingdai yizhan kao, 207.
The li, also known as the Chinese mile, was an approximate measure of distance whose exact 
definitions differed according to time and context. For the purpose of this study, I presume 1 li to be 
equal to 500 meters at all times. On the changing definitions and ambiguity of the li as a unit, see 
Wilkinson, Chinese History: A New Manual, 42.3, Box 81.
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least ten times as many post stations,8 all of which were financed and managed by individual 
counties (xian 縣), the lowest level of government in Ming administrative hierarchy.9 (A third 
network specialized in transporting bulky goods and prisoners, but this network had no impact 
on the Ming communication system and is therefore excluded from the current study.)10
8. For a tabulation of the number of relay stations at different times of the Ming, see Harris, “The Nature
of the Relay and Post Station Systems,” 21. A series of cost-reduction campaigns brought down the 
number of relay stations from about 1,300 at the beginning of the dynasty to about 900 by the 
dynasty's end. A 1613 source recorded a total of 1,060 relay stations, which averaged to fewer than 
one station in each of the empire's 1,394 lowest-level administrative units (counties and lower-level 
subprefectures; the count is for the year 1640). As can be seen in Table 2.1, the number of post 
stations in a county or subprefecture could range anywhere from 2 to 40 or more. If we take a 
somewhat conservative estimate of 7 post stations for each county and subprefecture (following 
Harris, p. 9 n. 21), the empire-wide number of post stations would have been about 10,000. For the 
count of administrative units, see Guo Hong 郭红 and Jin Runcheng 靳润成 Zhongguo xingzheng 
quhua tongshi: Mingdai juan 中国行政区划通史: 明代卷, (Shanghai: Fudan daxue chubanshe, 2007), 
11-12.
9. Also taking part in the management of relay and post stations were certain subprefectures (zhou 州), 
which occupied a special place in Ming administrative hierarchy between the county (lowest 
administrative unit) and the prefecture (second lowest administrative unit). For the purpose of stylistic
simplicity, I will only speak of counties when referring generally to the administrative units that 
managed relay and post stations.
10. This network consisted of about 300 transport stations (diyun suo 遞運所) in the early Ming, but their 
functions were gradually absorbed by relay stations. By 1587, only 146 transport stations remained. 
See Su Tongbing, Mingdai yidi zhidu, 164-78. Other dynasties showed similar overlaps between 
facilities that transported goods and those that transported people and/or documents. 
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Figure 2.1: Major Relay Routes in 1587 11
Figure 2.2: Relay and Postal Routes in Xinghua and Quanzhhou Prefectures, Fujian12
11. Source: Yang Zhengtai, Mingdai yizhan kao, 112.
12. The postal routes are reconstructed from Xinghua fuzhi 興化府志 (1503), 37.18a-20b; Quanzhou fuzhi 
泉州府志 (1612), 4.18a-20a. The locations of relay stations are based on Yang Zhengtai, Mingdai 
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Documents delivered by the postal system were required to travel nonstop, day and night,
at a speed of 300 li/day (about 104 meters/minute). The Ming founder and his advisors devised 
three interrelated measures to ensure that the speed requirement would be met. First, supervisory 
personnel were placed at various levels of the postal system. Each post station was staffed with a 
station master (pusi 舖司) who, like the ordinary postmen (pubing 舖兵), was drafted from 
among the local population. At the county level a postmaster (puzhang 舖長) was selected from 
among the clerks of the county government. The postmaster in turn reported to the county 
magistrate, who was ultimately responsible for all post stations and any relay stations within his 
area of jurisdiction. Second, the early Ming architects designed a set of procedures to track 
delivery. Each post station kept a logbook in which the station master recorded the arrival times 
of incoming documents. (In theory no departure times were needed, since the documents were 
required to depart toward the next station as soon as they arrived.) The postman in turn carried 
his own booklet, where the station master who received his delivery wrote down the arrival time 
as an acknowledgement of delivery. Attached to the document was its own tracking form, upon 
which the station masters recorded the document's arrival times and the names of postmen who 
carried it. Finally, one section of the Ming Code specified the punishments for persons who 
obstructed the transmission of mail. Postmen who failed to meet the speed requirement were 
punished with up to 50 strokes of beating, and those who damaged the document or its outer 
envelope were punished with up 80 strokes. Anyone who purposely concealed documents or 
opened sealed envelopes was punished by up to 100 strokes. The postmaster was required to visit
each of the county's post stations once a month to audit its logbook; if he failed to uncover any of
the above violations, he was punished by 40 strokes.13
yizhan kao, 27, 118. Prefectural boundaries are based on CHGIS, Version 4.
13. Mingdai lüli huibian 明代律例彙編, V56.
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Given its extensive network and elaborate regulations, one may wonder why the late-
Ming postal service did not transmit memorials, arguably the most important and time-sensitive 
of all government documents. The question becomes even more perplexing when we consider 
the fact that memorials had routinely passed through the postal service under both the Song and 
the Qing dynasties, the two long-lasting empires that preceded and followed the Ming.14 What, 
then, was special about the Ming system? 
Postal systems had existed in China since at least the Qin dynasty, but we know 
surprisingly little about how they operated, and even less about how they had changed over time.
This is because most Chinese dynasties maintained integrated postal-relay systems with 
considerable overlap between facilities that transported people (relay) and those that transmitted 
documents (post). Consequently, in both historical sources and modern scholarship, the postal 
system tends to be overshadowed by the more costly and prominent relay system that existed 
alongside it, or else it is subsumed under the larger postal-relay system that contained it. We may
even say that there was no consistent Chinese word that denoted "postal delivery" as a concept, 
and as a result both imperial Chinese writers and present-day scholars have lacked the linguistic 
categories through which to compare postal institutions of different dynasties.15 In order to 
14. For examples of Song sources that mention the postal delivery of memorials, see the following 
sources (both cited in other contexts by studies appearing in footnote 19):
• An edict issued in 990 ordering fiscal commissioners to send reports through the postal service 
instead of visiting the capital personally to seek an audience: Song huiyao jigao 宋會要輯稿, 
Shihuo 食貨 49.7.
• An edict issued in 1066 ordering urgent memorials to be delivered by the horse post and all other
documents to be delivered by the foot post: Song huiyao jigao, Zhiguan 職官 41.123.
Qing memorials were delivered either by special messengers or through the postal service depending 
on the type of memorial and its degree of urgency. For related discussions, see Liu Wenpeng 刘文鹏, 
Qingdai yichuan ji qi yu jiangyu xingcheng guanxi zhi yanjiu 清代驿传及其与疆域形成关系之研究, 
(Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2004), 180-87.
15. In imperial China, the word most frequently associated with postal delivery was you 郵, the usage of 
which can be traced back to the Han institution of post houses, or youting 郵亭. But a word could 
acquire new meanings and/or lose its original meaning with the passage of time, and this was 
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analyze changes in postal systems over time, therefore, our first task is to identify the postal 
components within the larger postal-relay systems in which they were contained.
Figure 2.3 represents a summary of such an endeavor based on what we currently know 
about the postal-relay systems of Han, Tang, Song, Ming, and Qing dynasties.16 The chart 
conceptually breaks down a postal-relay system into three types of resources essential to its 
operation: (1) resting places that provided meals and accommodation (essential in a relay 
system); (2) transport animals such as horses (essential in a relay system and optional in a postal 
system);17 and (3) postmen who delivered documents (essential in a postal system). In China as 
especially the case for words that referred to institutions. For example, at least one Ming official used 
the word you when referring to relay transportation, while the Qing state used this word to describe 
the postal-relay system as a whole. Other related words, such as pu 舖, di 遞, and chuan 傳, 
experienced similar changes in usage. See Qi Biaojia 祁彪佳, Yifen quangao 宜焚全稿, [Wei youfu 
xufa yijiu...shi 為郵符須發已久...事], 9.509-10 (you used as "relay"); Qing huidian shili 清會典事例 
(Guangxu edition), "Youzheng" 郵政, 655.199b-703.764a (you used as "postal-relay"). For related 
discussions on the changing usages of similar words, see also Liu Guangsheng 刘广生 ed., Zhongguo 
gudai youyi shi 中国古代邮驿史 (Beijing: Renmin youdian chubanshe, 1999), 1-5; Cao Jiaqi 曹家齐, 
“Tang Song yichuan zhidu bianji tanlüe” 唐宋驛傳制度變迹探略, Yanjing xuebao 17 (2004), 2-5.
16. The recent availability of excavated wooden strips gives Han historians the rare opportunity to work 
with primary sources such as dispatch logs and waybills, but because these sources are both 
fragmentary and hard to decipher, Han historians have yet to reach a consensus that takes into account
the many conflicting models and interpretations that have been proposed. My understanding of the 
Han system is based on the summary given in Takatori Yūji 鷹取祐司, “Shin Kan jidai no bunsho 
densō hōshiki: Yi you xing, yi xian ci chuan, yi ting xing” 秦漢時代の文書伝送方式: 以郵行・以県次
伝・以亭行, Ritsumeikan bungaku 619 (December 2010), 51-53. For other related studies, see also 
Chen Wei 陈伟, “Qin yu Han chu de wenshu chuandi xitong” 秦与汉初的文书传递系统, in Liye 
gucheng, Qinjian yu Qin wenhua yanjiu 里耶古城・秦简与秦文化研究 (Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 
2009); Fujita Katsuhisa 藤田勝久, Chūgoku kodai kokka to shakai shisutemu 中国古代国家と社会システ
ム, (Tokyo: Kyūko shoin, 2009), 411-38; Tomiya Itaru 冨谷至, Bunsho gyōsei no Kan teikoku: 
Mokkan, chikukan no jidai 文書行政の漢帝国: 木簡・竹簡の時代, (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku 
shuppankai, 2010), 218-59. On the Tang and Song systems, see footnotes 18 and 19. Existing studies 
on the Yuan system are not detailed enough to allow analysis through my comparative scheme, or to 
answer the important question of how the Ming system may have grown out of preexisting Yuan 
practices. For recent investigations, see Li Man 李漫, Yuandai chuanbo kao: gaimao, wenti ji xiandu 
元代传播考: 概貌、问题及限度, (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2013), 48-57; Qiu Shusen 邱树森 
and Mo Shumin 默书民 “Yuandai guanfu gongwen chuanshu de jige wenti” 元代官府公文传输的几个问
题, Hebei xuekan 24.2 (March 2004): 176-79. On the Qing system, see Liu Wenpeng, Qingdai 
yichuan; Fairbank and Teng, “On the Transmission of Ch’ing Documents.”
17. Stations located on water routes were equipped with boats. Because water routes were used primarily 
for human transport, here I will consider only land routes, which were used for both human transport 
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in the rest of the premodern world, postal and relay institutions tended to be integrated because it
was administratively simple to concentrate two or more resources in the same location. But as 
the chart shows, there was no necessary reason to gather all three resources at the same place 
either. By analyzing the grouping and separation of these resources, we can start to discern the 
administrative priorities that underlay the particular arrangements of each dynasty.
and document delivery. Likewise, my following discussion will not consider other transport animals 
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Figure 2.3: Evolution of Postal and Relay Institutions in Imperial China
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The Tang system, for example, represents an arrangement that prioritized administrative 
simplicity. Under this system, all three resources were packed into a multi-purpose facility 
known as the yi 驛 (what I translate as relay stations in the Ming context). Separated by distances
of about 30 li (15 km), the Tang yi stations offered accommodation and transport animals to 
qualified travelers, while their horse-riding postmen transmitted incoming documents to the next 
stations.18 The Song system, in contrast, was designed to prioritize speed. Its yi stations were 
located 60 li (30 km) apart and contained accommodation facilities only. Making up for the 
widened distance between yi stations was a new type of station known as pu 舖 (what I translate 
as post stations in the Ming context), where transport animals and postmen were stationed. Set 
up at intervals of about 10-25 li, the Song pu stations served as combined postal-relay facilities 
where travelers changed their horses and documents changed hands. The documents were 
delivered by postmen who traveled either by foot or by horse.19 Compared to the Tang 
arrangement, the shorter distance between pu stations allowed each horse and postman to run a 
shorter distance and presumably at a faster speed.
18. Most studies on the Tang postal-relay system focus primarily on the relay component. For studies that
also discuss the postal component, see Aoyama Sadao 青山定雄, Tō Sō jidai no kōtsū to chishi chizu 
no kenkyū 唐宋時代の交通と地誌地図の研究, (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1963), 51-126; Arakawa 
Masaharu 荒川正晴, “Tōdai ekiden seido no kōzō to sono unyō 2” 唐代駅伝制度の構造とその運用 (II), 
Turfan shutsudo bunbutsu kenkyū kaihō 80 (1992), 2-4. Fragmentary evidence suggests that the late-
Tang state may have set up special facilities that specialized in postal delivery, but little is known 
about the specifics of their arrangement. On the late-Tang developments and the transition from Tang 
to Song, see Aoyama Sadao, Tō Sō jidai no kōtsū, 74-82; Huang Zhengjian 黄正建, “Tangdai de 
‘chuan’ yu ‘di’” 唐代的’传’与’递’, Zhongguoshi yanjiu (1994.4), 79-80; Cao Jiaqi, “Tang Song 
yichuan zhidu bianji tanlüe,” 37-47.
19. Superseding most earlier studies on the Song postal-relay system is Cao Jiaqi 曹家齐, Songdai 
jiaotong guanli zhidu yanjiu 宋代交通管理制度研究, (Kaifeng: Henan daxue chubanshe, 2002). See 
especially pp. 11-15 (distance between yi and pu stations), 21-25 (evidence that yi stations had no 
horse), and 95-97 (distribution of mounted deliverers and foot deliverers at pu stations). For 
additional discussions on aspects of the Song system not directly addressed by Cao, see also Golas, 
“The Courier-Transport System”; Aoyama Sadao, Tō Sō jidai no kōtsū, 161-211.
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The Ming system, in this context, can be seen as an arrangement that prioritized cost 
reduction. As Figure 2.3 shows, the Ming was the only time when no horse was stationed at the 
same places where the postmen were stationed. As far as I can think of, the only plausible 
explanation for such an arrangement is that designers of the Ming system felt a need to limit the 
use of horses. Since a horse was much more precious than a man,20 they may have reasoned, it 
was more economical to limit their use to relay transportation (where horses were essential), 
rather than allowing their simultaneous use in postal delivery (where horses were helpful but not 
required). Accordingly, the Ming did not equip pu stations with horses or other transport animals,
placing these resources exclusively in yi stations instead. With the horses gone, pu stations 
(hereafter post stations) came to specialize exclusively in postal delivery, while yi stations 
(hereafter relay stations) became the only facilities that handled relay transportation. By 
eliminating horses from postal delivery and by stationing them at much longer intervals, the 
Ming managed to significantly reduce the overall number of horses that needed to be allocated to
its postal-relay system as a whole. 
But despite the overall reduction of cost, the Ming postal system made only slight 
concessions on speed. The Song system, for example, operated with three major tiers of delivery 
speed: 200 li/day for delivery by foot; 300-400 li/day for delivery by horse; and 400-500 li/day 
for a special delivery method known as "express running delivery" (jijiao di 急腳遞), which 
apparently employed both mounted postmen and foot runners.21 In contrast, the Ming postal 
system had a uniform speed requirement of 300 li/day. The Ming postmen, traveling entirely by 
foot, were therefore expected to run almost as fast as their Song horse-riding counterparts. Such 
20. On the perceived value of horses relative to men, see p. 74. For related discussions, see also Morris 
Rossabi, “The Tea and Horse Trade With Inner Asia During the Ming,” Journal of Asian History 4.2 
(1970), 136-142 (on the difficulty of obtaining war horses); Hoshi Ayao, Min Shin jidai kōtsūshi no 
kenkyū, 54-80, 125-161 (on the procurement and financing of relay horses). 
21. Cao Jiaqi, Songdai jiaotong guanli, 110-20.
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a high speed may seem quite impossible to achieve (and it was, as I discuss later), but to the 
Ming founder and his advisors, the requirement probably seemed reasonable for two reasons. 
First, horses were likely to have trouble running at maximum speed in some mountainous areas 
and at night, so a mounted postman was not necessarily faster than a foot runner at all times. This
also explains why the Song apparently employed many foot runners in express running delivery, 
which had a higher speed requirement than standard horse delivery.22 Second, the Ming pu 
stations were (ideally) established at intervals of 10 li, slightly shorter than the 10-25 li intervals 
that separated Song pu stations. Designers of the Ming postal system therefore expected each 
postman, on average, to run a shorter distance between stations. If we assume that one li was 
equal to 500 meters, a speed requirement of 300 li/day meant that each postman was expected to 
complete a 5 kilometer walk within 48 minutes, an easily achievable task on a level and well-
maintained road. Obviously, not all postal roads were in optimal conditions (and some stations 
were placed more than 10 li apart), but such inhibiting factors may not have crossed the mind of 
the early-Ming designers.23
In sum, the communication system created in the early Ming was expected to be low-cost
and high-performance. By making slight concessions on speed and by replacing expensive 
horses with cheaper human labor, the new design seemed to achieve a significant reduction of 
cost. In reality, however, a number of factors combined to make the ambitious speed requirement
of 300 li/day utterly impossible to achieve. We now move on to see why this was the case.
22. Similar arguments have been made in Golas, “The Courier-Transport System,” 5-7; Cao Jiaqi, 
Songdai jiaotong guanli, 18-19. 
23. Most post stations were indeed spaced 10 li apart, but some were separated by longer distances. For 
related discussions, see Su Tongbing, Mingdai yidi zhidu, 186-95.
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The Ming Postal System in Reality
If the Ming postal system had functioned the way its architects had anticipated, it might 
have met most communication needs of the Ming state. Its delivery speed would have been 
slightly slower that of the Song, but traveling at a speed of 300 li/day, a document dispatched 
from Beijing would have reached Nanjing in 9 days, Nanchang in 11 days, Chengdu in 16 days, 
Guangzhou in 19 days, and Yunnan (Kunming) in 20 days.24 We have no way of knowing 
whether such a speed was ever achieved in the early Ming, but by the sixteenth century, the 
slowness of postal delivery was being noted throughout the empire. Writing some time in 
1512-13, the regional inspector of Shaanxi complained that documents from his areas of 
jurisdiction took months to arrive when they should have taken just a few days. Around 1558-61,
the magistrate of Chun'an (Yanzhou Prefecture, Zhejiang) noted that official letters could take 
4-5 days to reach the prefectural seat (140 li away) and sometimes a month or longer to reach the
provincial seat (450 li away). Some time in 1574-75, a vice commissioner of surveillance in 
Guangdong observed that letters from 300-400 li away could take over 10 days to arrive, while 
those from 800-900 li away often took as long as a month.25 Rather than traveling 300 li a day, in
the worst cases some documents seem to have traveled 300 li a month.
24. The calculation is based on distances given in Qing huidian zeli 清會典則例 (Qianlong edition), 
"Youzheng" 郵政, 121.9b-12b (Nanjing: 2,557 li), 15a-b (Nanchang: 3,225 li), 28a-29b (Chengdu: 
4,675 li), 29b-31a (Guangzhou: 5,670 li), 31b-34b (Yunnan: 5,930 li). The distance to Beijing can 
also be found in most Ming gazetteers, but they calculate the distance based on the water routes 
(usually used for human travel), which were sometimes much longer than the more direct land routes 
that postal delivery would have taken.
25. Wang Tingxiang 王廷相, Junchuan gongyi ji 浚川公移集, [Wei jikao gongwen shi 為稽考公文事], 
1.1a-2a (Shaanxi, 1512-13); Hai Rui 海瑞, Hai Rui ji 海瑞集, "Xingge tiaoli" 興革條例, 102 (Chun'an, 
1558-61); Li Cai 李材, Bingzheng jilüe 兵政紀略, "Qingli pudi jicheng" 清理舗遞稽程, 24.4b-5b 
(Guangdong, 1574-76). For the distance from Chun'an to Yanzhou and from Yanzhou to Hangzhou, 
see Chun'an xianzhi 淳安縣志 (1524),1.4b; Yanzhou fuzhi 嚴州府志 (1613), 1.9a.
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What led to the dysfunction of a system that on surface was so intricately designed? 
Whereas the troubles of the Ming relay system have been well known, the drastic decline of its 
postal service remains mostly unnoticed.26 The only exception is Su Tongbin's brief study of 
Ming post stations, where Su cites the words of a contemporary critic and attributes the reason 
for postal decline to inattentive management by local officials.27 But the rhetoric of official laxity
often concealed deep-rooted institutional problems that contemporaries either failed to recognize 
or were unwilling to acknowledge. As much as Ming writers liked to complain about failing 
morale or rampant corruption, institutional failure needs to be explained not by the lack of 
human effort (a factor that may well remain constant) but by the institution's design itself (a 
factor that is alterable). In the case of the Ming postal system, the departure from early-Ming 
ideals can be explained by two factors that its architects failed to account for: the cost of human 
labor, and the postal system's hidden potential for delay which I call postal friction.
When Emperor Hongwu first established the postal system in 1368, the cost of human 
labor seemed negligible to him. In his original design, all postmen were to be drafted from 
nearby households as part of their service levy, a category of taxes that supplied the labor and 
materials needed for the local governments' daily operations. Unlike the regular land tax 
collected in grain (and later in silver), the service levy was hard to quantify because it was 
collected in kind and as corvée duties. Such an arrangement made the cost of postmen somewhat 
invisible to Emperor Hongwu and his advisors, who apparently assumed a relatively abundant 
supply of local labor. For example, early Ming regulations required each relay horse to be 
provided by a household that paid 60, 80, or 100 piculs of rice in yearly land tax (with each 
26. Late-Ming relay stations suffered from passenger abuse as well as cost-reduction campaigns that 
reduced their overall number. See Harris, “The Nature of the Relay and Post Station Systems,” 19-20;
Hoshi Ayao, Min Shin jidai kōtsūshi no kenkyū, 164-208.
27. Su Tongbing, Mingdai yidi zhidu, 191-92. Su's argument is based on an anonymous text quoted in 
Zhang Xuan 張萱, Xiyuan wenjian lu 西園聞見錄, 72.13b.
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category reflecting the horse's designated grade), whereas each postman was to be drafted from a
household that paid between 1.5 and 2 piculs.28 Compared to that of supplying a horse, the duty 
of supplying a postman was considered a much lighter burden, and the early Ming government 
showed no sign of concern that drafting this labor would turn out to be difficult. But during the 
early sixteenth century, the Ming fiscal structure underwent an important transformation: many 
localities started to commute service levies into silver payments, a complex process driven by the
expansion of local administrative expenditure and the difficulty of allocating service duties in an 
equitable fashion.29 Rather than drafting unpaid postmen, the government now collected silver 
payments from all local households, which in turn were used to pay wages of the drafted 
postmen.
The effect of this transformation was that the cost of postmen's labor now became visible.
Even though postmen's wages only constituted a small fraction of all service levies,30 like all 
other administrative expenses they became the target of occasional cost-reduction campaigns. 
Usually initiated at the provincial level or above, such campaigns were common ways for the 
Ming government to pay for newly-arising expenses without directly raising taxes, which was 
considered harmful to the people and was avoided at all costs. From the county government's 
perspective, however, such campaigns were problematic because they tended to make small cuts 
on a wide variety of expenses even though some were essential to the proper functioning of the 
28. Ming shilu (Taizu) Hongwu 1/1/29 gengzi.
29. Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance, 34, 109-122.
30. For example, a 1547 gazetteer of Jiangyin County (South Zhili) records that the county's annual 
service levies included, among other items, 222 taels for the wages of thirty-seven postmen, 2,880 
taels for the wages of four hundred militiamen, 1,095 taels for the wages of three hundred and sixty-
five waterworks laborers, and 1,844 taels for the purchase of forty-six horses to be used in relay 
stations of four outside prefectures. See Jiangyin xianzhi 江陰縣志 (1547), 5.30b-31b. By this time it 
was common practice for relay stations of poor areas to receive monetary assistance from wealthier 
areas such as Jiangyin. On the development of this practice, see Hoshi Ayao, Min Shin jidai kōtsūshi 
no kenkyū, 125-63.
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local government.31 Since the wage of postmen kept rising, the only way to cut postal expenses 
was to reduce the number of postmen.32 Evidence from local gazetteers shows nation-wide 
31. My account here is a simplified version of arguments made most prominently by Ray Huang and Iwai
Shigeki, who argue that the basic problems in Ming-Qing fiscal management arose from the 
discrepancy between the official rhetoric of low taxation and the reality of much higher 
administrative costs. See especially Huang, Taxation and Governmental Finance, 46-49 (tax ceilings),
273, 277-78 (the practice of transferring small sums from existing budgets to fund larger projects); 
Iwai Shigeki, Chūgoku kinsei zaiseishi no kenkyū, 26-79.
In the case of Ming post stations, it appears that some of the reductions were initiated by local 
officials who genuinely thought that there were too many postmen, such as when a magistrate in 
Fujian "saw that official communications were few" (見文移稀少) and requested permission to 
eliminate one postman from each of the county's six post stations. (Jianning xianzhi 建寧縣志 (1546), 
2.8a-b.) But local records suggest that more often, the reductions were imposed from the above 
irrespective of local need:
• Some time around 1600, two counties in Quanzhou Prefecture (Fujian) made cuts to their 
postmen upon receiving a series of "communication from superior offices" (奉文). Quanzhou 
fuzhi 泉州府志 (1612), 6.32a-b, 40b-41a.
• In 1630, Shouning County (Fujian) received "communication from superior offices regarding an 
imperially-sanctioned matter" (奉文為欽奉明旨事), which ordered reductions of 21.6 tales from 
the budget for postmen's wage and 3.6 tales from the budget for post station maintenance. It is 
not recorded whether or not the budget reduction translated to any reduction in the postmen's 
number. Shouning xianzhi 壽寧縣志 (1637), 2.13a-b.
• The 1573 gazetteer of Yanzhou Prefecture (Shandong) records two figures for postmen's wage: 
the officially-sanctioned wage and the actual wage. Whereas the officially-sanctioned figure was 
4 taels per person in all counties except for one (where the official wage was 3.4 taels), the actual
wage was anywhere from 50% to 125% higher than the official figure. The discrepancy suggests 
that the official wage had been fixed by an earlier cost-reduction campaign, the figure of which 
either ignored the actual cost of postmen or had since become too low due to inflation. 
(Presumably, the county magistrates paid the difference by making cuts elsewhere on the local 
administrative budget.) The case shows that the county governments in Shandong experienced a 
pressure from upper bureaucracy to keep administrative costs low, even though the actual costs 
may have been higher. Yanzhou fuzhi 兗州府志 (1573), 26.11a-64b.
• In 1604, the magistrate of Xinning County (Huguang) reported that two of the county's post 
stations were located 20 li apart, making this segment of the postal route so onerous that the 
postmen were reluctant to cover it. The obvious solution was to set up a new station in between, 
but for a long time the county had been unable to do so because it would have been "difficult to 
collect additional taxes to cover [the postmen's] wage" (工食又難加派). In the end, the provincial 
government approved the magistrate's suggestion to cover the new cost by reducing the 
postmen's wages at the other stations. This case shows that once the postal budget had been 
reduced, it was very difficult to increase it again even if local circumstances called for it. Xinning
xianzhi 新寧縣志 (1606), 7.11b.
32. See Table 2.1 for examples of postmen's wages. The figures show a nation-wide rise of wages over 
time.
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reductions to postmen's quotas throughout the sixteenth century, probably continuing a trend that 
had already started (but went unrecorded) during the fifteenth century.33 By the early sixteenth 
century, the postmen's number had already fallen far below the standard set by the Ming founder,
who expected each busy station to be staffed with 11 postmen (10 ordinary postmen and 1 station
master) and a lesser station staffed with 5-6 postmen (4-5 ordinary postmen and 1 station 
master).34 As we can see from Table 2.1, with very few exceptions the actual number of postmen 
per station ranged from 1 to 6 (including the station master). Whereas early Ming regulations 
required all documents to be transmitted nonstop day and night, such an arrangement was clearly
difficult to achieve in stations with just two or three persons (not enough people to cover a full 
day's shift) and all but impossible in stations that had one person only (post station empty when 
postman left for deliveries).
In effect, what started as a low-cost system evolved to become an ultra-low-cost one. 
Because the cost of human labor was not initially given a formal budget, local governments had 
no institutional justification to increase postal expenses when it later became clear that the actual 
costs were much higher. In fact, the Ming approach to postmen's recruitment was very different 
from that of the Song, which treated postmen more like paid soldiers. The Song postmen were 
recruited first from the county where a station was located, but they could also be hired from 
nearby counties if local supplies were few. When the number of postmen fell below the official 
quota, the station reported it to the local government, which in turn petitioned the central 
33. In Changzhou Prefecture of South Zhili, the total number of postmen fell from 342 in 1569 to 251 in 
1600. In Liangxiang County near Beijing, the number of postmen was reduced from 47 to 32 some 
time before 1593. In Dehua County of Fujian, the county paid 6 postmen at 3 taels per person in 
1531, whereas in 1612 it paid 4 postmen at 5 taels per person. The last example suggests that rising 
wages may have further contributed to the postmen's reduction. See Changzhou fuzhi 常州府志 (1618),
5.90a-b; Shuntian fuzhi 順天府志 (1593), 2.50a, 3.29a; Dehua xianzhi 德化縣志 (1531), 4.22b-23a; 
Quanzhou fuzhi 泉州府志 (1612), 6.75a.
34. Ming shilu (Taizu), Hongwu 1/1/29 (gengzi).
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government to dispatch replacements from other regions or from a nearby militia unit. Song 
postmen received regular payments in cash, grain, and cloth, in addition to occasional bonuses 
for those who staffed particularly busy routes or worked in hostile conditions.35 In contrast, 
postmen of the Ming were drafted entirely from within the county where the stations were 
located. It was the magistrate's own responsibility to draft enough people to staff the stations, and
there was no central coordination of the type that occurred in the Song. Even though the postmen
received a wage, fiscal pressure sometimes left them direly underpaid.36 By making local 
governments entirely responsible for the system's financing and management, the Ming court 
effectively pushed the problem of postal expense out of sight and out of mind, rendering any 
nationwide reform hard to initiate and even harder to carry out.
Another problem that remained out of the central government's sight was that of postal 
friction. By postal friction, I refer to certain delays that resulted inevitably from the process of 
postal delivery. For a prime example, we can turn to a case of delayed delivery from Sichuan 
province. On 12/4 of 1550, the Sichuan Provincial Administration Office dispatched a package of
documents—three public announcements and an official letter—addressed to Kuizhou 
Prefecture, located some 1,800 li (900 km) away from the provincial seat in Chengdu.37 Some 
time before 3/19 of 1551, the Office noticed that it had not received a response from Kuizhou, 
whereupon it decided to launch an investigation into the package's whereabouts. The provincial 
government dispatched a clerk to audit the logbooks of all post stations that lay between 
Chengdu and Kuizhou, and based on fragmentary records of the ensuing investigation, we can 
35. Cao Jiaqi, Songdai jiaotong guanli, 99-103; Golas, “The Courier-Transport System,” 10-13.
36. Shen Bang 沈榜, Wanshu zaji 宛署雜記, 5.33 (no wage disbursed in intercalary months); Leizhou fuzhi 
雷州府志 (1614), 39a (no wage disbursed in the tenth month).
37. The distance between Chengdu and Kuizhou was 1,820 li according to Kuizhou fuzhi 夔州府志 (1746),
2.2a.
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reconstruct the movement of the package as it traveled slowly over a period of a month and a 
half (Figure 2.4).38
Figure 2.4: Sichuan Delivery Case, 1550-51
As it turned out, after the package had left Chengdu on 12/4, it traveled for a month (we 
have no records for this portion of the trip) before reaching the border of Ba County on 1/4 of the
following year. Within Ba County it passed through four stations, at each of which the postman 
tasked with its delivery failed to depart immediately toward the next station. Instead, the package
sat for 2 days and 16 hours at the first station, 12 hours at the second station, 14 hours at the third
station, and 1 day and 14 hours at the fourth station, finally reaching the border of the adjacent 
county on 1/10. The next time the package appears in the records, it had reached the border of 
Wan County at around 6PM of 1/13. Here it ran into a different kind of problem. The package 
progressed rather smoothly through three subsequent stations, arriving at the fourth station by 
38. Sichuan difang sifa dang'an 四川地方司法檔案, 221-22, 254-55. The Sichuan provincial boundary is 
based on T. S. Baker, "1389 Ming Boundaries," vector layer on WorldMap.
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around midnight of the same day. But the postman at this station—whose name was Yang Sitong 
楊思通—observed damage on the package and refused to deliver it to the next station located at 
the county seat. The damage itself had been observed and recorded when the package first 
entered Wan County, and the earlier postmen apparently had no problem delivering it. Most 
likely, Yang was afraid of possible punishment from the postmaster and/or county magistrate, 
who usually resided at the county seat. So instead of delivering the package forward, Postman 
Yang decided to deliver it backward (!), and the other postmen followed suit. When the package 
made it back to the border of Wan County, a postman named Zhang Biao 張表 delivered it 
further back toward the adjacent Liangshan County, but the postmen there refused to accept it. 
Now Zhang Biao was stuck with a package that no one was willing to accept, and he apparently 
spent a day or two trying to figure out what to do. Not daring to either discard it or keep it any 
longer, on 1/16 Zhang delivered the package directly to the county seat (skipping three stations 
in between), where he was punished and the documents were repackaged and dispatched for 
further delivery.
If we recall the three checks on postal performance that the early-Ming architects had 
built—supervision, tracking, and legal punishment—we find that none had performed its 
intended function in the case examined here. As to legal punishment, all postmen who 
contributed to the delay eventually received punishments (mostly beatings) at the conclusion of 
the provincial investigation, but it is noteworthy that no one except Zhang Biao had received any
punishment over the three-month period before the provincial investigation reached the county 
level.39 With regard to tracking, the station masters seem to have kept their logbooks diligently, 
for it was based on these logbooks that the government was later able to reconstruct the arrival 
39. The clerk dispatched by the Provincial Administration Office arrived in Wan County on 4/6. The 
records do not show when he arrived in Ba County.
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and departure times of the package. But given the consistent delay by each of Ba County's 
postmen, their meticulous records apparently did not help deter chronic delays on the postmen's 
part. As to supervision, the station masters seem to have lacked either the authority or the 
motivation to make the other postmen work harder, and the postmasters either did not notice the 
delays or they turned a blind eye to them. In all, one gets the impression that if the the provincial 
investigation had not been launched, such minor transgressions would never have come to the 
magistrate's attention, and no one except Postman Zhang would have been punished.
These failures in management can be explained by postal friction, which arose from a 
diffusion of responsibility. Because a document passed through many hands before reaching the 
destination, the responsibility for its speed as well as delay fell collectively on all postmen as a 
group. From an individual postman's perspective, he had nothing to gain by running faster than 
his peers, and he was unlikely to be punished for slow delivery as long as all other postmen were 
also slow. By their very nature, therefore, postal systems had a tendency to condone poor 
performance while making good performance not worthwhile. One way to counteract this 
tendency was to be consistent in punishing every postman who failed to meet the regulations, but
this approach was impractical to the Ming magistrate for two reasons. First, most officials 
recognized that it was impossible to achieve a speed of 300 li/day in many regions, due variously
to failing infrastructure, bad road conditions, and the dangers of making deliveries at night.40 
Since the court never issued a more reasonable speed requirement, local officials had no hard 
standard against which to hold the postmen accountable. As the editor of a Fujian local gazetteer 
40. Shen Bang 沈榜, Wanshu zaji 宛署雜記, 5.33 (post stations left in ruins and postmen forced to stay 
elsewhere); Xinning xianzhi 新寧縣志 (1606), 7.11b (tortuous mountain road; postmen afraid of 
bandits); Rugao xianzhi 如皋縣志 (1560), 6.5a (postman eaten by a tiger while making delivery at 
night); Hangzhou fuzhi 杭州府志 (1579), 96.22b (story of a postman who was making delivery at night
and killed a beggar whom he had mistaken for a snake; the beggar was reborn as a boy, who later 
killed the postman by accident).
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put it, some postal routes were so dangerous that "even if the postmen were skilled in flying 
steps, it would still be difficult to hold them accountable to the speed regulations" (遞人即善飛
步。亦難以程限責之也).41 Second, if the magistrate resorted too quickly to heavy punishments 
such as beatings, he would have not only rendered the postmen temporarily incapable of 
performing their duties, but also made their positions less desirable and their labor even more 
difficult to draft. Since punishing every transgression would have been too harsh, the local 
governments had no choice but to tolerate some degree of delay until it caused an exceptionally 
serious administrative problem, such as the Sichuan case of 1551. 
Another way to reduce postal friction was to selectively punish a few postmen who 
caused the most serious delay, but this strategy too was hard to implement. To correctly identify 
the responsible postmen, the postmaster would have had to visit each station individually and go 
through all tracking records. But as with the case of most other clerks, postmasters were often 
more interested in supplementing their meager pay with extortions from the ordinary people, and
they had little incentive to place the government's interest first.42 The magistrate, on the other 
hand, could ill afford to oversee such time-consuming investigations personally. Without the 
administrative resources to conduct thorough investigations, the usual way in which local 
governments carried out selective punishment was by punishing whichever person brought in a 
damaged or delayed document. In this light, the seemingly inconceivable decision of Postman 
Yang—to deliver a damaged package backward—followed a perfectly understandable logic. 
Rather than risk taking the blame for someone else's mistake, Yang insisted that whoever had 
caused the damage take care of the problem himself. In his calculation, the county was more 
41. Yongfu xianzhi 永福縣志 (1612), 34b.
42. Leizhou fuzhi 雷州府志 (1614), 39a (postmasters extracting money from people who hired others to 
fulfill the corvée duties in their place); " Wang Tingxiang 王廷相, Junchuan gongyi ji 浚川公移集, 
1.1a-2a [Wei jikao gongwen shi 為稽考公文事], 1.1a (postmaster not checking delivery speed).
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likely to punish the person who brought in the damaged package than to launch a costly 
investigation to find out who had actually damaged it. His judgement turned out to be correct, for
when Postman Zhang finally delivered the package to the county seat, Zhang was apparently 
punished on the spot whereas Yang managed to escape punishment until his actions finally came 
under scrutiny months later, a development which he surely did not expect initially.
Postman Yang was not alone in prioritizing self-protection over delivery speed. When 
Ming postmen saw that the government could not (or would not) identify where the 
responsibility for mistakes lay, they often took matters into their own hands, engaging in self-
defense tactics that ultimately slowed down the delivery process. A late-Ming magistrate's 
handbook recounted a perfect example of such foot-dragging. According to its author, whenever 
a document experienced considerable delay at an earlier segment of the postal route, postmen at 
later stations became reluctant to accept it lest they be held personally responsible. In such 
situations, some postmen resorted to forcibly dragging the man who had brought the delayed 
document, "delivering" him to the next station along with the document itself. In the worst cases,
the man would be hauled along through the subsequent stations for weeks until he and the 
document were both safely "delivered" to the destination.43 Such measures clearly exacerbated 
the initial delay, but to the postmen, it was far more important to have someone available to take 
the blame when the document finally reached the recipient. The additional delay that resulted 
from their actions apparently mattered little to them as long as they were not held personally 
responsible.
A final way to eliminate friction was to align the interests of each relevant party with the 
interests of the central state, either by giving postmen and their supervisors wages high enough 
that they feared losing their jobs, or by making good performance directly profitable for them, or 
43. Yu Ziqiang 佘自強, Zhi pu 治譜, "Bensheng gesheng youdi" 本省隔省郵遞 10.41a-b.
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both. A contemporaneous example was the postal system of the Holy Roman Empire, in which 
each post office acted as a semi-private business. Because the postal service delivered private 
letters for a fee, its reputation for reliability and speed contributed ultimately to the profit of each
post office, giving the post office director an incentive to encourage good performance from the 
postmen he managed. The postmen in turn were motivated by monetary rewards, and those who 
failed to meet speed requirements or lost their packages were either fined or fired.44 Clearly, such
arrangements were incompatible with the basic structure of the imperial Chinese government, in 
which postal systems existed solely to serve the needs of the state, not to make profits by 
offering services to the public. Nor could the state pay wages high enough to make postmen's 
positions attractive, so performance was motivated not by the lure of monetary compensation but
by the threat of corporal punishment. Since everyone from the postmaster down to the ordinary 
postman was seriously underpaid, it was impossible to align the central state's priority with those
of the grassroots personnel.
In fact, not even county magistrates necessarily shared the central state's objectives. 
Whereas the Ming state as a whole would have benefited from a well-maintained postal network 
that covered the entire empire, some county magistrates saw no reason for actively maintaining 
sections of the network that they themselves did not need. The impact of their selective 
negligence was felt especially strongly by counties located at end branches of the postal network,
44. The most comprehensive study on the Holy Roman Empire's postal/relay system is Wolfgang 
Behringer, Thurn und Taxis: Die Geschichte ihrer Post und ihrer Unternehmen (München: Piper, 
1990). Because I cannot read German, my understanding on this subject is based on the following 
synthetic studies that cite heavily from Behringer: Yamamoto Fumihiko 山本文彦, “Kinsei Doitsu ni 
okeru teikoku yūbin” 近世ドイツにおける帝国郵便, in Rekishi no tanjō to aidentiti 歴史の誕生とアイデ
ンティティ, ed. Takada Minoru 高田実 and Tsurushima Hirokazu 鶴島博和 (Tokyo: Nihon keizai 
hyōronsha, 2005); Shibutani Akira 渋谷聡, “Kōiki jōhō dentatsu system no tenkai to Thurn und Taxis 
ke: 16, 17 seiki ni okeru teikoku ekitei no kakujyū o chūshin ni” 広域情報伝達システムの展開とトゥル
ン・ウント・タクシス家—16, 17世紀における帝国駅逓の拡充を中心に, in Komyunikēshon no shakaishi 
コミュニケーションの社会史, ed. Maekawa Kazuya 前川和也 (Kyoto: Minerva shobō, 2001). For a 
brief English-language overview, see also Wolfgang Behringer, “Communications Revolutions: A 
Historiographical Concept,” German History 24.3 (2006), 340-49. 
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such as Shouning County of Jianning Prefecture, Fujian. Shouning was separated from its 
neighbor Zhenghe by thirteen post stations, five of which were located within Shouning and 
eight of which were located in Zhenghe (Figure 2.5).45 This meant that the eight stations 
managed and financed by Zhenghe actually served the needs of Shouning alone: whereas 
Shouning needed to send and receive documents through all thirteen stations to communicate 
with the prefectural government, Zhenghe had no need for these stations since lateral 
communication between counties occurred much less frequently. In a county gazetteer published 
in 1637, the magistrate of Shouning complained about the troubles created by this imbalance of 
demand. Because the eight stations under Zhenghe management were not important to it, 
Zhenghe did not supervise them closely and condoned their rampant delays. But since the 
stations were outside Shouning's jurisdiction, Shouning found it hard to demand a better 
performance from them either. The resulting delays sometimes became so severe that postmen at 
later stations (presumably the stations between Zhenghe County and Jianning Prefecture) 
worried about taking the blame for missed deadlines and refused to accept those letters that had 
been substantially delayed. During the magistrate's short tenure of less than three years, he had 
dozens of letters returned to him in this way (probably through reverse-deliveries akin to the 
Sichuan case), leaving him no option but to resend the letters using new envelopes inscribed with
new dates.46
45. Shouning xianzhi 壽寧縣志 (1637), A.26a-28b.
46. The magistrate and gazetteer compiler was the famous writer Feng Menglong 馮夢龍, who arrived in 
Shouning in 1634. For Feng's arrival year, see Shouning xianzhi (1637), B.26a.
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Figure 2.5: Postal Route Between Shouning and Zhenghe Counties, Fujian47
We can see, then, that diffused responsibility produced two types of postal friction: when 
the postmen believed that each person was equally responsible for a document's delay, they felt 
comfortable contributing minor and chronic delays of their own; when they believed that 
someone else was singularly responsible for a major mistake, they felt a need to defend 
themselves against unfair punishment, causing occasional but major delays as a result. Not even 
government officials were immune from the natural instinct to place their own interest above 
those of the collectivity. Because postal management constituted only a minor part of the county 
magistrate's many responsibilities, some magistrates apparently felt comfortable condoning poor 
performance as long as the resulting problems did not directly threaten their own careers. In 
theory, friction existed in any postal system, but the Ming state's low-cost ideal intensified it. Not
only were Ming postmen underpaid compared to their Song counterparts, but the distance 
separating Ming post stations was shorter than the distance between pu stations of the Song. 
47. Prefectural boundary is based on CHGIS, Version 4.
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Whereas architects of the Ming postal system probably chose this arrangement to compensate for
the removal of horses from post stations, what they did not realize was that such an arrangement 
also forced each document to pass through more hands, making responsibility more diffuse and 
postal friction more severe. Given the serious delays that plagued the Ming postal system, the 
little speed (if any) gained by the shortened distance seems to have been outweighed by the 
substantial increase in postal friction that resulted from it.
Reforming Postal Delivery
By the sixteenth century, it became clear to all Ming officials that the postal system was 
not functioning as it had originally been designed. Many officials accepted the dysfunction as an 
unfortunate reality. They blamed postal delay on material factors such as failing infrastructure 
and bad road conditions, and showed sympathy toward the postmen who had to carry out 
difficult delivery assignments despite adverse conditions. Other officials found the causes of 
trouble in the corruption and laziness of local officials, clerks, and postmen who, according to 
their gravely idealistic logic, should have worked diligently toward the common good of the 
empire as a whole. Differing from both the realistic conformists and the idealistic critics was a 
final group of pragmatic officials who sought to improve postal performance not necessarily by 
enforcing the regulations more rigorously, but by fundamentally changing the way postal 
delivery was carried out. We know relatively little about these efforts because they were 
introduced as ad-hoc fixes unrecorded in formal institutional histories, but a few examples can be
reconstructed based on fragmentary evidence. Perhaps not surprisingly, a common feature of 
these reforms was the effort—whether conscious or subconscious—to reduce postal friction by 
redistributing responsibility in a way that made it more trackable.
One way this was done was by lengthening the distance traveled by each postman. An 
example of this approach is found in Yanzhou Prefecture of Zhejiang. Some time before the mid-
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sixteenth century, a county magistrate suggested pulling all postmen out of the post stations and 
stationing them at the county seat instead. Under this arrangement, each postman would take 
turns delivering mail all the way to the the next county seat, skipping all post stations in between.
This meant that instead of walking the standard 10 li (5 km) between post stations, each postman 
would now walk about 100 li (50 km) in one run.48 Clearly, the postman would have walked at a 
speed much slower than if he were to walk 10 li at maximum speed. But the advantage of the 
new arrangement lay in its ease of supervision: because documents changed hands much less 
frequently and only at the county seat, responsibility became less diffuse, and the magistrate 
could keep a closer eye on the the crucial moments when responsibility transferred from one 
postman to another. The new arrangements turned out to be quite successful in eliminating postal
delay, although they were later terminated for unknown reasons. (It is not clear whether the 
reform affected only the magistrate's own county, the entire prefecture, or the entire province.) 
Nevertheless, the reform was reportedly effective enough that decades later, a different 
magistrate of a nearby county contemplated reviving a modified version of it.49 Whether or not 
they thought in those terms, some local officials undoubtedly saw the importance of reducing 
postal friction even at the expense of lowering each postman's theoretical maximum speed.
A similar but more costly way to reduce postal friction was to deliver documents through 
relay stations instead. In addition to lengthening the distance traveled by each postman, this 
arrangement re-introduced horses into postal delivery, significantly improving the postman's 
speed. The most well-documented examples of this approach come from Guangdong province. 
Some time during the Zhengde reign (1506-21), a regional inspector reportedly became 
48. For example, the prefectural seat of Yanzhou and its neighbor Chun'an County were separated by a 
distance of 130 li and 12 post stations. Yanzhou and its other neighbor Tonglu were separated by a 
distance of 100 li and 9 post stations. See Yanzhou fuzhi 嚴州府志 (1613), 4.32a-36a.
49. Hai Rui 海瑞, Hai Rui ji 海瑞集, "Xingge tiaoli" 興革條例, 102.
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frustrated by local postmen who obstructed official documents and ordered all official documents
to be delivered through relay stations instead.50 Around 1535, a different regional inspector 
further formalized the reform by setting up a new speed requirement of about 180-270 li/day and 
by allowing each relay station to hire up to ten persons who specialized in document delivery.51 
To make room for the new expense, local governments quickly cut back on the number of 
postmen working at the regular post stations. In one subprefecture in 1539, 17 out of the 44 post 
stations had no postman stationed at all, and the remaining stations only retained a few postmen 
"to preserve the [appearance of] official institutions" (量留以存制).52 In another subprefecture in 
1640, only one postman was retained at the subprefectural seat to deliver documents to the 
nearest relay station.53 
Guangdong may have been somewhat special in transferring most of the postal work to 
relay stations, but in other provinces too, relay stations gradually absorbed some of the burden 
initially born by post stations.54 Even while post stations continued to deliver most government 
documents, fragmentary evidence shows that from as early as the late fifteenth century, Ming 
officials sent the more urgent documents through relay stations instead. To distinguish this 
delivery method from regular postal delivery, I will call it mounted postal delivery hereafter. The
50. Qinzhou zhi 欽州志 (1539), 7.4b.
51. Guangdong tongzhi chugao 廣東通志初稿 (1535), "Ge yaobian tieyi yishi pubing" 革徭編貼驛驛使舖兵,
26a-b. The new speed regulation required each document to travel 3 stations each day when the 
distance between stations was 60-90 li (180-270 li/day), and to travel 2 stations each day when the 
distance was 90 li or longer (180+ li/day). These requirements show that Ming officials had much 
lower expectations for delivery speed by this time. Even with the help of horses, the mounted 
postmen were expected to travel at a speed slightly slower than the 300 li/day requirement for early-
Ming foot runners.
52. Qinzhou zhi 欽州志 (1539), 7.3a-4b.
53. Zhaoqing fuzhi 肇慶府志 (1640), 11.57b.
54. This means that technically, the yi stations of the later Ming should not be translated as "relay 
stations" and should more accurately be called "postal-relay stations" instead. For the purpose of 
stylistic simplicity, however, I will continue to refer to them as "relay stations."
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earliest reference to the practice is found in a famous treatise on government institutions first 
published in 1488. In a discussion of famine relief, the author suggests using three different 
modes of communication to report news of natural disasters to the court: mounted postal delivery
(chichuan 馳傳) for a serious disaster; dispatching a special messenger (chairen 差人; more later 
on this delivery method) for an average disaster; and regular postal delivery (rudi 入逓) for a 
lesser disaster.55 A century later in 1575, the use of the mounted post apparently became so 
common that the court specifically issued a regulation prohibiting it, reiterating that all 
government documents had to be delivered through post stations (pudi 鋪遞) rather than through 
special messengers (chairen) or through "mounted express delivery" (mashang feidi 馬上飛遞)—
presumably referring to postal delivery through relay stations.56 But despite the prohibitions, 
some officials continued to send urgent documents through relay stations. Nearly another century
later, in 1641, the Grand Coordinator of Yingtian (Nanjing) wrote to his subordinates that 
documents dispatched through the mounted post (mashang feidi) were the most critical of all 
documents, and that local governments should work extra hard to ensure their prompt delivery.57 
A magistrate's handbook published around the same period noted—apparently as a matter of 
fact—that before starting each day's business the magistrate should summon a postman and a 
horse manager to receive letters bound for the regular post and the mounted post respectively (喚
舖兵領舖遞公文。馬頭領馬上飛遞公文).58 Although much remains unknown about the logistics 
of the mounted post—in which regions it was available, who were the postal personnel, how 
mail tracking was done, and so on—the existing evidence suggests that it emerged gradually as 
55. Qiu Jun 邱濬, Daxue yanyi bu 大學衍義補, 16.32a. The wording chichuan 馳傳 usually refers to 
persons (not documents) traveling through relay stations, but in this context I take it to mean postal 
delivery through relay stations, since otherwise it is unclear how this method was different from that 
of dispatching special messengers (chairen).
56. Ming huidian (Wanli edition), "Jidi pu" 急遞舖, 149.2086a.
57. Huang Xixian 黃希憲, Fu Wu xilüe 撫吳檄略, [Wei dufu difang shi 為督撫地方事], 7.17a-b.
58. Yu Ziqiang 佘自強, Zhipu 治譜, "Touwen huike cixu" 投文會客次序, 3.3b.
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an informal but customary practice, the utility of which paved the way for its formal adoption 
later under the Qing.59 
Finally, some officials tried to speed up postal delivery by creating new institutions 
instead of fixing the existing ones. To facilitate transmission of urgent military documents, some 
late-Ming officials established special post stations outside the regular postal system, what might
be called military post stations (usually appearing in the sources as tang 塘 or tangbo 塘撥).60 It 
59. To my knowledge no scholar has discussed the transition of postal institutions from Ming (foot-
runner delivery through pu stations only) to Qing (both foot-runner delivery through pu stations and 
mounted delivery through yi stations). The scattered evidence presented here suggests that the 
transition was less an institutional innovation by the Qing and more a formalization of practices that 
were already widespread in the late Ming, but more research is needed to determine whether this is 
true. On the Qing postal-relay system in general, see Liu Wenpeng, Qingdai yichuan.
60. The provenance of the character tang 塘 is unclear. Even a late-Ming scholar had to speculate about it 
(Hagihara, 464 and Yin, 142; cited below), and the many arguments put forward by modern historians
are either under-supported or inconclusive. Like the many words that denote relay/postal institutions 
of one form or another (footnote 15), this is a case where it is less productive to look for the 
character's "original meaning" than to identify its many usages at different times and in different 
contexts. During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the character tang had at least two 
different but overlapping usages: a narrow usage that denoted the military post and the personnel and 
facilities associated with it (eg. tangbing 塘兵 or military postmen, tangma 塘馬 or military post 
horses), and a broader usage that simply denoted "military" or "express." The methodological 
challenge is that we cannot always tell in which sense the word is being used at a given moment. For 
example, tangbao 塘報 (military reports) were often delivered by military post stations, but they could
also be delivered by single messengers in some instances (Ma 1987). Similarly, we still do not know 
what were the exact responsibilities of the position known as titang 提塘 (military communication 
intendant?), references of which appear increasingly in late-Ming sources. 
For this reason, my discussion of "military post stations" that follows does not refer to an institution 
that had a formal name in late-Ming sources. Instead, I discuss a set of arrangements that, while 
lacking a common name in the sources that describe them, I believe to share several particular 
features that warrant inclusion in a single analytical category. For discussions on the meaning of the 
tang character and other derivative terms (all in the context of studies on military reports or tangbao),
see Ma Chujian 馬楚堅, “Mingdai tangbao zhi chuangsheng ji qi bianzhi” 明代搪報之創生及其編制, 
Xianggang zhongwen daxue Zhongguo wenhua yanjiusuo xuebao 17 (1986), 203-07; Hagiwara 
Junpei 萩原淳平, “Min Shin jidai no tōhō ni tsuite” 明清時代の塘報について, in Tamura hakushi shōju 
Tōyōshi ronsō 田村博士頌寿東洋史論叢 (Kyoto: Tamura hakushi taikan kinen jigyōkai, 1968); Yin 
Yungong 尹韵公, Zhongguo Mingdai xinwen chuanbo shi 中国明代新闻传播史, (Chongqing: 
Chongqing chu ban she : Xin hua shu dian jing xiao, 1990), 142-46; Zhu Chuanyu 朱傳譽, Xian Qin 
Tang Song Ming Qing chuanbo shiye lunji 先秦唐宋明清傳播事業論集, (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshu
guan, 1988), 449-53. For additional studies on military reports, see also Ma Chujian 馬楚堅, “Mingdai
tangbao de yunzuo yu gongneng” 明代搪報的運作與功能, Xianggang zhongwen daxue Zhongguo 
wenhua yanjiusuo xuebao 18 (1987): 83-117; Sakurai Toshirō 櫻井俊郎, “Minmatsu ni okeru tōhō no 
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is hard to say when these stations started appearing, but their existence can be confirmed in a 
number of provinces throughout the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries (Figure 2.6).61 
The military post differed from the regular postal system in some important ways. Like the 
regular post, the military post consisted of a series of stations separated by distances of about 10 
li.62 But unlike regular post stations, military post stations were staffed by soldiers, not civilian 
draftees. Some stations (especially those in north China) were equipped with horses, which 
brought their theoretical maximum speed far above those of the regular post (no horse available) 
and mounted postal delivery (horses available but longer distances between stations). Most 
importantly, military post stations existed only in certain areas of strategic importance, often for 
a limited period of time. They were meant to speed up communication at times of intense 
military activity, not to permanently replace the regular post.
dentasu: Daidō hengai kara Pekin e” 明末における塘報の伝達—大同辺外から北京へ, Osaka furitsu 
daigaku kiyō (jinbun shakaigaku) 56 (2008): 15-32.
61. Ma Chujian argues convincingly that the military post probably originated from a common strategy 
for detecting enemy movement on the battlefield, in which small groups of vanguard troops moved 
toward the enemy while maintaining a constant distance between one group and another. Ma makes a 
distinction between this type of tang where the messengers moved ahead of an advancing army, and 
the tang that developed later (what I call military post stations), in which the messengers were 
stationed at fixed locations and conveyed documents between an army and the regional commander. 
Because contemporary sources refer to both arrangements using the same name, it is hard to tell when
the latter arrangement first started appearing. See Ma Chujian, “Mingdai tangbao zhi chuangsheng.”
62. For examples, see footnote 63: B, D, F.
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Figure 2.6: Locations of Known Military Postal Routes63
63. The map is created based on the following sources. Provincial boundaries are based on T. S. Baker, 
"1389 Ming Boundaries," vector layer on WorldMap.
A. Established by Song Yingchang as Military Commissioner in charge of the Korea campaign, 
1592. A set of routes connected Beijing and Liaodong to facilitate court-frontline communication
during the Imjin War. Song Yingchang 宋應昌, Jinglüe fuguo yaobian 經略復國要編, "Jiao 
Liaodong Jizhen Baoding san zongbing" 檄遼東薊鎮保定三總兵, 2.24b-25a.
B. Coordinated establishment between the Ministry of War and several supreme commanders and 
grand coordinators. The routes connected the frontier defense zones of Xuanfu, Juyong Pass, and
Miyun. Neige daku dang'an 內閣大庫檔案, #201564-001 (document date and title missing).
C. Mentioned by Lü Kun, Grand Coordinator of Shanxi in 1591-93. Arrangement details are 
lacking. Lü Kun 呂坤, Shizheng lu 實政錄, "Yan Mazheng" 嚴馬政, 8.42a-b.
D. Established by Lu Xiangsheng, Grand Coordinator of Yunyang around 1634-35. The route 
connected Yunyang and Xiangyang prefectures. Lu Xiangsheng 盧象昇. Ming dasima Lu gong 
zouyi 明大司馬盧公奏議, "Tianshe tangbing" 添設塘兵, 2.47a-b.
E. Mentioned by Wang Zaijin, Assistance Surveillance Commissioner of Fujian around 1600. 
Arrangement details are lacking. Wang Zaijin 王在晉, Haifang zuanyao 海防纂要, "Zhong 
lingyuan" 重鄰援, 8.9a.
F. Established by Sheng Wannian, Vice Administrative Commissioner of Guangdong around 1602. 
The route connected Gaozhou Prefecture with nearby coastal guards. Sheng Wannian 盛萬年, 
Lingxi shuilu bingji 嶺西水陸兵紀, [Tangbao 塘報] A.201.
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This specificity of purpose explains why military posts managed to achieve higher 
delivery speeds despite their superficial similarity to the regular postal service. As we have seen, 
both systems required documents to change hands at relatively short intervals, making them 
susceptible to the same problems of diffused responsibility. But at the managerial level, the two 
systems differed fundamentally in the structures of responsibility. Whereas regular post stations 
were passively maintained by local governments at the order of the central court, military post 
stations were actively established by provincial-level officials who oversaw military affairs of an 
entire region. Whether the purpose was to speed up communication between the court and a 
frontier war zone (Figure 2.6: A) or to facilitate intelligence-gathering within one's own area of 
jurisdiction (Figure 2.6: D, E, F), officials who established military posts had keen interests in 
ensuring that information arrived securely and quickly. To this end, they staffed the stations with 
soldiers under their direct command or under the command of their own subordinates.64 Although
direct evidence is lacking, we can also assume that they instilled strict supervisory mechanisms 
to ensure that the postal soldiers worked diligently, or the officials themselves could be held 
responsible for any failure that resulted from the ensuing delay.
By contrast, in the regular postal system the chain of responsibility went up from the 
postman to the county magistrate, who in turn answered to the central state, not the sender or 
recipient of a document. Although post stations were operated and financed by individual 
counties, they were expected to deliver all documents that passed through them, not just the ones 
dispatched or received by their home county. If we recall the predicament of Shouning County—
64. For example, in Figure 2.6-A, Military Commissioner Song Yingchang delegated the task of 
establishing the stations to three regional commanders (zongbing 總兵) under his command. In Figure 
2.6-D, Grand Coordinator Lu Xiangsheng staffed the stations with soldiers of the Yunyang and 
Xiangyang Guards as well as soldiers under his direct command.
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whose letters were consistently delayed by the neighboring county's post stations—it is easy to 
understand why some provincial officials found the need to establish separate communication 
systems of their own: whereas the regular post did not allow a document's sender or recipient to 
supervise its delivery process, in the military post its founder and ultimate supervisor was also 
the one who benefited the most from it. Seen in this light, the late Ming appearance of military 
post stations represented a territorialization of state communication. When the public 
communication system failed to meet the performance expectations of some provincial officials, 
they addressed the problem by establishing separate communication systems designed 
specifically to serve their own needs. Since the Ming postal system was not structured in a way 
that made good performance profitable to its supervisors, the military post offered another way to
counter postal friction by having the supervisor himself become its direct beneficiary.
By the dynasty's end, the postal system as envisioned by the early-Ming architects had 
been all but undone, if not in actuality then certainly in spirit. In their efforts to minimize postal 
delay, Ming officials adopted various arrangements that directly undermined the essence of the 
early-Ming ideal, including the assumption that shortening the walking distance increased a 
postman's speed, the hope that a horseless system could lower postal costs, and the belief that all 
local officials and civilian subjects would (or should) work diligently toward the shared interest 
of the Ming state. Eventually, some officials managed to achieve higher delivery speeds by 
lengthening each postman's travel distance or by creating separate postal systems of their own, 
both of which made responsibility more visible and trackable. It should not be surprising, 
therefore, that some officials went one step further to abandon postal delivery in favor of 




So far I have analyzed the Ming postal system from the perspective of officials who 
managed it, whose primary objective was to achieve high delivery speeds while keeping the 
costs low. But from the perspective of officials who sent the documents, speed was only a 
secondary concern compared to the more basic need to get the document securely delivered. 
From the sender's perspective, a document traveling across multiple provinces had to be handled 
by hundreds of postmen before reaching its destination, and its security could be compromised 
by a single mistake or act of sabotage within a long chain of delivery over which he had no 
supervisory control. Considering how often contemporaries complained about problems such as 
interception and information leakage, entrusting a confidential document to the postal service 
was a risky undertaking.65
The problem of trust, combined with serious delays in the postal system, encouraged 
Ming officials to rely increasingly on an alternative delivery method: entrusting documents to 
single messengers who carried them all the way from sender to recipient. When the distance 
involved was relatively short, single-messenger delivery simply meant walking or riding a horse 
to somewhere within a few days' distance. In the early 1510s, for example, a regional inspector 
of Shaanxi became so frustrated with the slowness of postal delivery that he ordered all counties,
when submitting reports to his office, to stop using the postal system and to dispatch special 
messengers instead.66 In a magistrate's handbook completed around 1556, the author advised 
65. Cheng Renqing 程任卿, Sijuan quanshu 絲絹全書, [gongzhuang 供狀], 6.32b (documents intercepted 
and opened by local strongmen); Leizhou fuzhi 雷州府志 (1614), "Wanli sishi nian bing pu gui ying yi 
jielüe" 萬曆四十年併舖歸營議節略, 35a (information leaked due to damaged envelopes); Juguan biyao 
weizheng bianlan 居官必要為政便覽, [Qianya yongyin 簽押用印], A.4a (trick for taking letters out of 
envelopes without breaking the seal).
66. Wang Tingxiang 王廷相, Junchuan gongyi ji 浚川公移集, [Wei jikao gongwen shi 為稽考公文事], 
1.1a-2a.
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novice officials to deliver the most crucial documents either personally or through secret 
messengers so as to avert "the troubles of delay, obstruction, and unauthorized opening [of sealed
envelopes]" (停攔開拆之患) that sometimes plagued the postal service.67 
Eventually, single-messenger delivery became so prevalent that some local governments 
even set aside a budget for the messengers' wage. In 1538 one county in Fujian had a budget for 
two "document deliverers" (遞送公文夫) in addition to the thirty-eight postmen who staffed the 
county's nine post stations.68 In 1637 Shouning County—the county whose letters were always 
delayed by its neighbor—had thirty-six militiamen working at the county office, whose primary 
responsibilities were to transport criminals and to "deliver crucial documents" (投遞緊要公文).69 
Most indicative of this trend was Renhe County in Hangzhou Prefecture (Zhejiang), where a 
1475 gazetteer reported a quota of 99 postmen for its thirteen post stations, whereas a later 
gazetteer of 1579 listed only 50 postmen working in the same stations. Making up for the 
apparent reduction were 40 additional "postmen" who now belonged not to a regular post station 
but to various government offices located in the city of Hangzhou (Table 2.2). Thus over the 
course of a century, Renhe had pulled about half of its postmen out of the post stations to 
perform special duties at the county seat (where the Hangzhou prefectural seat and Zhejiang 
provincial seat were also located, crowding the city with many government offices). Although 
part of their duties may have included inter-agency deliveries within the city itself, only an 
exponential growth in intra-city communication would have justified devoting nearly half of the 
postal personnel to this purpose only. The more likely supposition, therefore, is that these 
67. Wu Zun 吳遵, Chushi lu 初仕錄, 14b.
68. Ningde xianzhi 寧德縣志 (1538), 1.20a-b, 2.5a-b. The count of postmen includes station masters.
69. Shouning xianzhi 壽寧縣志 (1637), A.23b.
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postmen were primarily responsible for making direct deliveries to nearby administrative seats, 
appropriately making up for the reduced capacity of the regular post stations.
Ming officials found single messengers helpful not just for communicating between 
nearby administrative seats, but also for long-distance communication between the capital and 
the province or between one province and another. When high officials sent documents over long
distances, they usually entrusted them to low-level government personnel and gave them the 
appropriate certificates for receiving services at relay stations.70 This meant that the messenger 
traveled by relay transportation, but the document was not delivered in a postal manner since it 
stayed with the same messenger at all times. It is hard to say whether this delivery method was 
faster or slower than mounted postal delivery, which required both the horse and the messenger 
to be changed at each relay station. The latter could theoretically reach much faster speeds 
because it allowed the document to travel nonstop day and night, whereas in single-messenger 
delivery even the toughest messenger had to take time to rest and sleep at regular intervals during
his journey.71 But what single-messenger delivery lost in speed it made up in security and 
accountability. Rather than entrusting a document to hundreds of postmen of uncertain reliability,
the sender only needed to find one messenger who could be trusted. Unless the messenger was 
70. Most such messengers were identified as sheren 舍人 (military-official trainees?) or chengchai 承差 
(nature of the position unclear). Less frequently, low-level military officials such as company 
commanders (baihu 百戶) also served as messengers. For personal matters, the officials usually 
dispatched household servants whom they called housemen (jiaren 家人) or adopted sons (yinan 義男).
On the position of sheren, see Kawagoe Yasuhiro 川越泰博, “Mindai eisho no shajin ni tsuite: 
‘eisenbo’ no bunseki o tōshite” 明代衛所の舎人について —「衛選簿」の分析を通して, Chūō daigaku 
bungakubu kiyō 120 (1986): 77-107.
71. As we saw in p. 89, one writer in the late fifteenth century assumed that mounted postal delivery 
would be faster than single-messenger delivery. It is possible, however, that speed expectations were 
different at other times and in different contexts, for which we have no direct sources. Theoretically, 
regular postal delivery could also be faster than single messengers, but since it was nowhere close to 
meeting the official speed requirement, it was clear to all later-Ming officials that the regular post was
much slower than single messengers. For an example of a contemporary evaluation of the relative 
speeds of the regular post and single messengers, see the anonymous source quoted on p. 105, n. 88.
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assaulted during his travel, information-leakage was unlikely.72 In case of unexpected travel 
interruptions such as severe weather or local uprisings, the messenger could make immediate 
decisions to take an alternative route, an advantage unavailable to unaccompanied mail. Finally, 
because the messenger reported directly to the document's sender, he could be easily held 
accountable for delays in delivery.
It is understandable, therefore, that Ming officials relied increasingly on single 
messengers to deliver important documents over long distances. The earliest known example 
comes from 1444, when a regional inspector of Shanxi sent a low-level military man to carry a 
document to the neighboring province of Henan. The official was later impeached for making the
messenger also carry a family letter to his home (also located in Henan), but no one apparently 
faulted him for sending the document through a messenger instead of sending it through the 
postal system.73 By the early sixteenth century, territorial officials seem to have sent all 
memorials through single messengers by default. Their surviving memorials often conclude with 
a formulaic sentence naming the messenger who had been tasked with its delivery,74 a sentence 
72. Assaults on messengers were rare but did happen occasionally. In 1624, for example, a messenger 
dispatched by the Grand Coordinator of Yunnan was assaulted by a group of non-Chinese robbers 
near the border of Yunnan and Guangxi. The messenger lost a box of memorials and other belongings,
his clothes, and his horse. See Min Hongxue 閔洪學, Fu Dian zoucao 撫滇奏草, "Bao zouce bei jie 
shu" 報奏冊被刦疏, 5.64a-66b.
73. Ming shilu (Yingzong), Zhengtong 9/4/13 (renchen).
74. This formulaic sentence appears in memorials submitted from all regions of the Ming empire, 
regardless of the distance from the capital. For selected examples, see Qin Jin 秦金, An Chu lu 安楚錄, 
3.1a-7a (Grand Coordinator of Huguang, 1516); Huang Zan 黃瓚, Xuezhou ji 雪洲集, 12.2a-8a (GC of 
Shandong, 1517); Lin Fu 林富, Liangguang shulüe 兩廣疏略, B.1a-9a (GC of Guangdong and 
Guangxi, 1530); Xu Shi 徐栻, Dufu Jiangxi zouyi 督撫江西奏議, 1.3a-5b (GC of Jiangxi, 1571); Li 
Sancai 李三才, Fu Huai xiaocao 撫淮小草, 1.1a-2b (GC of Fengyang, 1599); Li Hualong 李化龍, Ping 
Bo quanshu 平播全書, 2.1a-9a (GC of Sichuan, 1602?); Xiong Tingbi 熊廷弼, An Liao shugao 按遼疏
稿, 4.95a-97b (Regional Inspector of Liaodong, 1610); Zhang Fengxiang 張鳳翔, Fu Ji shucao 撫畿疏
草, 1.10a-11a (GC of Baoding, 1622).
There are many other memorials that do not end with this sentence, but because formulaic phrases 
such as these tended to get removed in the process of inclusion into the authors' collected writings, 
their absence in printed versions of the memorials do not necessarily indicate their absence in the 
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which also appears in a template for memorial composition included in a government clerks' 
manual of the Wanli reign (Figure 2.7). When Mao Yuanyi wrote in the early seventeenth century
that Ming memorials never passed through the postal system, it was such a context that he had in
mind.
 
Figure 2.7: Template for Composing Memorials in a Government Clerks' Handbook75
By delivering all memorials through single messengers, the late-Ming state in effect 
chose to prioritize security of communication over speed and cost-saving. Compared to the 
military post and mounted postal delivery, single-messenger delivery required an additional 
waiting period between document composition and its dispatch. Because messengers were both 
expensive to transport (more below) and limited in number, officials sometimes waited for a 
original versions.
75. Source: Benxue zhinan 本學指南, 15b-16a. The end of the template reads: "Not daring to make 
decisions on my own, I have respectfully written a memorial and have entrusted it to messenger so-
and-so, whose official title is such-and-such" (未敢擅便。為此具本。專差某役某人齎捧). The book was 
probably an internal reference used by clerks of a specific government office. Scattered internal 
evidence suggests that it was written during the Wanli reign and was produced for use at a grand 
coordinator or regional inspector's office in southeastern China. See 5a (default use of the Wanli reign
name), 7a (envelope templates for letters by grand coordinator and regional inspector), 9b (mention of
coastal pirates). For a contextual overview and analysis of contents, see Sakurai Toshirō 櫻井俊郎, 
“Hongaku shinan no rekishiteki seikaku: Mindai gyōsei bunsho handobukku” 『本学指南』の歴史的性
格：明代行政文書ハンドブック, Jinbungaku ronshū, Osaka furitsu daigaku 15 (1997): 159-72.
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number of memorials to accumulate before sending them out in one batch. In remote provinces 
where a roundtrip to the capital took months to complete, such delays were especially significant,
as can be seen from the memorials of Min Hongxue 閔洪學, Grand Coordinator of Yunnan in 
1622-27 (Table 2.3). Among the 144 memorials Min submitted over a period of roughly four 
years, only 13 did not share a messenger with any other memorial.76 38 shared the messenger 
with other memorials written on the same day, suggesting that they were probably (but not 
necessarily) sent out immediately after composition.77 The remaining 93 were delivered by 
messengers who also carried memorials written on different days, meaning that at least one 
memorial in the same batch had to wait for some time—anywhere from seven days to two and a 
half months—between composition and dispatch.78 As a result of the uneven waiting periods and 
unstable travel conditions, communication time between Yunnan and Beijing fluctuated greatly, 
with the fastest memorials reaching the court in just forty-five days and the slowest one taking as
long as eight months.79
From the perspective of the central state, though, the problem with single-messenger 
delivery was not that it was slow (in many cases it was the fastest option available) but that it 
was costly.80 Sending a document through a messenger meant essentially that both the document 
76. Among the thirteen memorials, seven offered thanks or congratulations to the emperor (Table 2.3: 
#17, 45, 50, 78, 93, 94, 130); three reported urgent matters of personnel appointment or impeachment 
(#33, #63, #92); one reported a military victory (#57); one reported the loss of a memorial in transit 
(#58); and one was a personnel evaluation report that probably needed to be submitted within a 
specific time period (#84).
77. Table 2.3: #18-20, 51-54, 55-56, 59-62, 64-66, 70-71, 72-77, 85-91, 95-101.
78. Within any given batch, the difference between the earliest-dated memorial and the latest-dated one 
could be as short as seven days (Table 2.3: #28-32, 79-83) or as long as two and a half months 
(#42-49).
79. Table 2.3: # 80, 83 (45 days between composition and receipt of imperial response); #44 (242 days 
between composition and receipt of imperial response).
80. Other delivery methods such as the military post or the mounted post may have turned out to be 
faster, but they were not necessarily available in all parts of the empire. In many instances, therefore, 
single-messenger delivery may have been the only available alternative to the regular post.
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and the messenger had to be transported at state expense, creating additional costs in the form of 
the messenger's transportation, food, and lodging. The messengers therefore placed an extra 
burden on what many Ming officials saw as an already-overburdened relay transportation 
system. To reduce relay traffic, the court encouraged government offices to entrust the less 
urgent documents to officials and clerks who happened to be traveling to the same destination, 
what contemporary sources called "incidental-messenger delivery" (shunchai 順差, as opposed to
"special-messenger delivery" or zhuanchai 專差).81 But while incidental messengers offered a 
handy compromise between the slow and insecure postal system and the secure but more costly 
option of special messengers, they created new problems of their own. For some originally 
ineligible officials and clerks, serving as incidental messenger gave them the coveted privilege of
relay travel (or better transport animals for those already eligible), and as a result, some travelers 
intentionally stalled their departures in order to collect enough documents to qualify as incidental
messengers.82 Worse yet, some went so far as to collect documents addressed to destinations 
81. For regulations and policy discussions that encourage incidental-messenger delivery, see the 
following:
• 1468 regulation requiring official documents to be sent by special messengers, incidental 
messengers, or postal delivery "according to the urgency of the matter" (量事緩急). Da Ming 
jiuqing shili anli 大明九卿事例案例, "Zaiwai sifu weixian jihuan kanhe gongwen" 在外司府衛縣稽
緩勘合公文, [unmarked juan] 47a.
• 1469 regulation requiring urgent documents to be sent by incidental messengers so as to avoid 
postal delay. Ming shilu (Xianzong), Chenghua 5/9/5 (yiyou).
• Memorial submitted around 1521-23, suggesting that inter-provincial communications on soldier
registration be sent by special messengers, incidental messengers, or postal delivery "according 
to the distance and speed" (量其地里逺近遲速). Zhu Bao 朱豹, Zhu Fuzhou ji 朱福州集, [Wei chen 
fujian yi bi junzheng shi] 為陳膚見以裨軍政事, 5.16b-17a.
• 1539 regulation requiring outgoing documents of Beijing offices to be sent through incidental 
messengers unless the matter is extremely urgent (十分緊急), in which case special messengers 
are allowed. Ming huidian (Wanli edition), 148.2077b.
• 1558 regulation requiring outgoing documents of Beijing offices to be entrusted to provincial 
messengers on their ways back. With the exception of urgent documents, the documents were to 
be given out in batches of twenty. Later in 1574, the twenty-document requirement was dropped 
to allow quicker dispatch. Ming huidian (Wanli edition), 148.2077b.
82. The available sources are too brief to tell which categories of personnel served as incidental 
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located along the same general direction as their own, only to exchange them later with other 
travelers, subjecting the documents to risks of loss.83 As much as the court wanted to save costs 
using incidental messengers, ultimately each office was asked to make its own judgement as to 
whether a special messenger was more appropriate for any given document.84
From an analytical standpoint, however, the very notion that single-messenger delivery 
generated more cost was something of an actor's illusion. Be they special messengers or 
incidental messengers, Ming officials resorted to single-messenger delivery precisely because the
postal system had failed to meet their needs, the result of cost-reduction efforts that brought the 
speed and security of postal delivery down to an unbearable level. Thus what the Ming state 
saved by limiting its postal costs it paid in the form of additional relay costs, which in 
contemporary eyes seemed like a great burden only because they were much more visible than 
the postal costs that had been saved.
Conclusion
By the dynasty's end, Ming officials had a number of options available in their 
communications toolkit. The decision of which one to use depended on a combination of factors 
including the importance and urgency of the matter at hand, an official's position within the 
administrative hierarchy, what options were available in a given region, and the central and 
messengers at any given period. In 1495, for example, an official argued that incidental messengers 
added too much extra burden on the relay system, and suggested that each traveller be required to 
carry at least three documents to be able to qualify as incidental messenger. The underlying 
assumption was that travelers who did not serve as incidental messengers were not eligible for relay 
travel. In 1576, on the other hand, an official complained that many travelers stalled for a long time to
collect twenty documents so as to qualify for use of a "dedicated horse" (baoma 包馬; meaning and 
implication unclear). Here the official seems to suggest that the stalling travelers already had access 
to the relay system, but service as incidental messengers gave them access to better transport animals.
See Ming shilu (Xiaozong), Hongzhi 8/12/19 (wuxu); Xiang Dushou 項篤壽, Xiao sima zoucao 小司馬
奏草, [Wei xingyi kanhe chenni rijiu...shi 為行移勘合沉匿日久...事], 1.10a-12b.
83. Xiang Dushou, Xiao sima zoucao, [Wei xingyi kanhe chenni rijiu...shi], 1.11b.
84. See footnote 81, regulations of 1539 and 1558.
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regional regulations being upheld at any given moment. The military post most likely provided 
the fastest speed, but it was expensive to maintain and available in limited areas only. Mounted 
postal delivery offered a relatively fast option, but it may not have been available in all regions 
and was much less secure than single-messenger delivery. Consequently, memorials and other 
crucial documents were entrusted to special messengers, who may have been slower than the 
mounted post but offered the most secure channels of communication. Incidental messengers in 
turn delivered documents of lower importance and urgency, offering a less expensive option at 
lower speed and reliability. Meanwhile, the great majority of Ming documents probably 
continued to pass through regular post stations which, despite their notoriety for slowness and 
unreliability, cost the state much less than any other available option.
Ultimately, there was no perfect method capable of satisfying all of the Ming state's 
needs, a fact which contemporary critics never fully realized. To be sure, Ming officials knew the
advantages and drawbacks of each delivery method, and for the most part the central court gave 
individual offices some degrees of freedom in choosing the communication method that best 
suited the particular needs of any given document.85 But occasionally, the court also tried to 
revert to the early-Ming ideal by issuing regulations that discouraged costly communication 
methods, such as in 1536, when Nanjing officials were required to use the regular post instead of 
single messengers, or in 1575, when both single messengers and mounted postal delivery were 
banned in favor of the regular post.86 Although such cost-reduction efforts were clearly 
unrealistic and likely had little effect on actual practice, residing in the minds of officials who 
pushed for them was a belief in the existence of a perfect communication method that was at 
once fast, secure, and inexpensive. This was the postal system as designed by the Ming founder, 
85. See footnote 81, regulation of 1468 and memorial of 1521-23.
86. Ming huidian (Wanli edition), 149.2086a (1575 regulation; discussed in p. 90 above); 158.2213b 
(1536 regulation).
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the later decline of which, in their eyes, would not have happened if only local officials, clerks, 
and postmen had successfully resisted the evils of negligence and corruption. Even officials who 
actively sought to reform the system saw their efforts as merely expedient fixes, as was the case 
when a regional inspector of Guangdong called his adoption of the mounted post "a temporary 
measure designed to address an exceptional circumstance" (一時變通之計).87 While many Ming 
officials lost faith in the postal system of their own times, a more fundamental belief in its 
inherent potential remained. As a contemporary critic put it, "if local officials were to follow 
each of [Emperor Hongwu's] orders in their regulation of station masters and supervision of 
postmen, if all [postmen] could serve without interruption and if [documents] never stopped 
within a day, then at a speed of 300 li a day, [documents delivered through the postal system 
would be traveling] faster than special messengers."88
But belief in the superiority of postal systems was not confined to Ming statesmen. To a 
great extent, it also underlies modern scholarship on premodern state communications, in which 
the postal system has been characterized variously as a great discovery of "the fundamental rules 
of communication,"89 "the most effective way of transmitting important information,"90 and an 
agent of change that contributed to a communication revolution in early modern Europe.91 
Embedded in such claims is an implied analytical stance that sees the objective of all 
87. Guangdong tongzhi chugao 廣東通志初稿 (1535), "Pushe" 舖舍, 37.14b. Although the text is not 
signed, it most likely reflects the voice of the gazetteer compiler Dai Jing 戴璟. For more on the 
gazetteer's compilation, see Tian Liang, “Guangdong tongzhi chugao.”
88. Zhang Xuan 張萱, Xiyuan wenjian lu 西園聞見錄, 72.13b (quoting an anonymous commentator): "假令
為有司者。一一如高皇帝約束。整頓舖司。督率舖兵。常川應役。日無停晷。毎晝夜行三百里。速于專差矣。
"
89. Liu Guangsheng, Zhongguo gudai youyi shi, 1, 12: "通信基本规律".
90. Silverstein, Postal Systems in the Pre-Modern Islamic World, 1. Silverstein's remark does not make a 
distinction between post and relay, and presumably refers to both.
91. Behringer, “Communications Revolutions.” Behringer's observations concern postal-relay systems as 
a whole, but place a greater emphasis on the postal components.
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communication systems as maximizing speed. Because postal systems allowed pre-industrial 
societies to speed up movement without waiting for improvements in transportation technology, 
it is indeed tempting to see polities that adopted postal systems as somehow more complex, 
advanced, and efficient. 
Yet as the Ming example shows, the familiar association between postal systems and 
communicative efficiency cannot be taken for granted. Whereas earlier historians have tended to 
see postal delivery as a natural solution to the problem of premodern communication, my 
analysis suggests that it was a double-edged sword. To realize a postal system's potential for 
speed, one had to first reduce or eliminate the friction that was inherent to it, a task that could 
only be achieved by investing enough resources in supervision of its personnel. In the case of the
Ming, the state's explicit objectives of speed and security were undermined by its tacit but 
constant desire to reduce cost, eventually making the postal system even slower and less secure 
than non-postal methods of communication. The Ming experience, then, pushes us to look at all 
other communication systems with a new perspective. Some premodern communication systems 
may have functioned better than their Ming counterpart, but rather than attributing their success 
to the adoption of postal delivery, the more productive approach would be to ask why such 
achievements were possible in spite of it.
- 106 -
Chapter 3: Personnel Management and the Cost of Centralization
Introduction
Chen Jifang 陳繼芳, vice commissioner in the Provincial Surveillance Office of Yunnan, 
temporarily left his post in the 4th month of 1622. His provisional new job was to deliver the 
Office's congratulatory memorial for the emperor's birthday, the ceremony for which took place 
in Beijing on 11/14 of that year. Having safely delivered the memorial and participated in the 
ceremony, Chen now had to report back to his original post by 5/10 of 1623, a reasonable 
deadline that gave him roughly six months to travel back to the remote southwestern province. 
Yet for reasons that are unknown, Chen not only missed his deadline but apparently had not 
returned to Yunnan as late as 11/12 of 1623, when the grand coordinator of Yunnan finally 
decided to submit a memorial impeaching him. The memorial pointed out that the post held by 
Chen was a crucial position in subprovincial administration, which could not function for even 
one day without an intelligent and able official dedicated specifically to the assignment (不可一
日無精明廉幹之専官). Chen's long absence left the post in a precarious status of being neither 
filled nor unfilled, wrote the grand coordinator, who requested the court to punish Chen by 
permanently removing him from civil service and to select a replacement for the newly vacant 
post.1
We may never find out the full story of Chen Jifang's case: why his return had been 
delayed for so long, whether he ever made it back to Yunnan, what kind of punishment he 
eventually received, and when his replacement finally arrived. But from the perspective of 
institutional history, the more important question is not the specific circumstances that 
1. Min Hongxue 閔洪學, Fu Dian zoucao 撫滇奏草, "Can daochen weixian shu" 參道臣違限疏, 3.28a-31a 
(impeachment of Chen Jifang); Ming shilu (Xizong), Tianqi 2/11/14 bingwu (record of the imperial 
birthday ceremony of 1622).
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surrounded this particular case, but the broader institutional structure that gave rise to it. If 
Chen's post was so important that it required a dedicated official at all times (if we take the grand
coordinator's assertion at face value), why then did the Provincial Surveillance Office make Chen
travel all the way to Beijing to deliver a memorial, something that we may assume could have 
been delegated to a lower-level official or clerk? If it was such a big problem that Chen had not 
returned six months after his deadline, what about those initial thirteen months when Chen's 
absence from his post was perfectly legitimate?
This chapter examines an implicit value that underlay the Ming approach to territorial 
personnel management: what might be called a commitment to immediacy. By immediacy, I 
refer to territorial officials' traveling to the capital to perform tasks that could in principle have 
been done remotely. For example, it was theoretically possible to send congratulatory memorials 
through non-official messengers and to celebrate the emperor's birthday through remote 
ceremonies (which took place in all administrative seats across the empire), but Ming regulations
still required each provincial office to dispatch a highly-ranked official such as Chen to travel 
personally to the capital as a show of respect. Like the principle of replication (Chapter 1), the 
commitment to immediacy cost a great deal in material resources and time spent on the road. But
unlike the principle of replication, the commitment to immediacy was not upheld with equal 
intensity by all late imperial dynasties, but is most strongly observable in the Ming. Whereas the 
principle of replication was an unavoidable precondition for long-distance bureaucratic 
communication, the commitment to immediacy was a choice—albeit not necessarily deliberate—
that revealed a specific approach to territorial governance and differentiated the Ming from other 
late imperial dynasties.
The first three sections of this chapter will examine three examples of routine 
administrative practices that most clearly reveal the Ming commitment to immediacy: the third 
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year review (kaoman 考滿), the triennial audience and evaluation (chaojin kaocha 朝覲考察), 
and congratulatory memorials (hebiao 賀表). Although the Ming state relaxed some of its initial 
regulations as the dynasty progressed, its fundamental commitment to immediacy never receded 
completely. The final section will therefore offer a theoretical explanation for why the Ming state
valued immediacy so much. I argue that frequent movement of officials, although seemingly 
excessive, allowed the Ming state to maintain the appearance of a centralized bureaucracy at a 
time when actual administrative authority became increasingly concentrated at the provincial 
level. Seen in this light, the Ming commitment to immediacy was another example of the costs 
for maintaining a bureaucratic empire, albeit a different type of cost from those of dynasties that 
preceded and followed it.
The discussions that follow will mention many types of offices and officials. To 
understand the functions and importance of each, it is useful to briefly examine the structure of 
Ming territorial administration. Figure 3.1 is a conceptual map of the Ming territorial 
government in its mature form of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.2 At the risk of 
grave simplification, the territorial government can be divided into three major administrative 
levels: provinces (sheng 省), prefectures (fu 府), and counties (xian 縣).3 By the end of the 
dynasty, the Ming empire consisted of 13 provinces and 2 metropolitan regions (one containing 
the primary capital of Beijing and the other containing the secondary capital of Nanjing), 162 
prefectures, and 1,173 counties.4 This basic hierarchical structure, however, becomes somewhat 
2. The chart contains many omissions and exceptions, but it offers a holistic if imprecise overview for 
the purpose of this discussion. For more details on the structure of Ming territorial government, see 
Charles O. Hucker, “Governmental Organization of the Ming Dynasty,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic 
Studies 21 (1958): 1-66; Wang Tianyou 王夫有, Mingdai guojia jigou yanjiu 明代国家机构研究, 
(Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1992), 213-43; Zhao Yongfu 赵永复, “Mingdai difang xingzheng 
zhidu kaoshu” 明代地方行政制度考述, in He he ji 鹤和集 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 
2014).
3. To avoid complicating the discussion, I do not consider the case of subprfectures (zhou 州), some of 
which acted more like prefectures and others of which acted more like counties.
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complicated when we zoom in closer to the provincial level. First, whereas each county and each
prefecture (the spatial area) was governed by a single government office (also known as the 
"county" and the "prefecture"), administration of a province (the spatial area) was divided among
three different offices. These were the Provincial Administration Office 布政司, which handled 
everyday administration such as taxation and famine relief; the Provincial Surveillance Office 按
察司, which handled judicial matters and surveillance of provincial personnel; and the Regional 
Military Commission 都司, which supervised lower military units stationed within the province. 
Because the military sector followed a different set of procedures from the civil sector, it is 
excluded from both the diagram and most of my subsequent discussions. 
Second, between the provincial and prefectural levels existed an additional "virtual" 
administrative layer known as circuits (dao 道).5 I call them virtual because the Ming 
administrative language did not recognize circuits as formal offices; rather, each circuit is better 
understood as a range of duties assigned to a vice commissioner or assistant commissioner who 
nominally belonged to the Provincial Administration or Surveillance Office. Some circuits had 
province-wide jurisdiction over a special area of administration (such as the Tax Intendant 
Circuit 督糧道 or the Education Intendant Circuit 提學道), while others divided a province into 
several subprovincial regions that usually contained two to three prefectures each (examples 
include the General Administration Circuits 分守道 under the Provincial Administration Office, 
4. Guo Hong 郭红 and Jin Runcheng 靳润成, Zhongguo xingzheng quhua tongshi: Mingdai juan, 12. In 
addition, there were 34 higher-level (prefecture-like) subprefectures and 221 lower-level (county-like)
subprefectures.
5. Overviews include Hucker, “Governmental Organization of the Ming Dynasty,” 43-44, 54; Fang 
Zhiyuan 方志远, Mingdai guojia quanli jiegou ji yunxing jizhi 明代国家权利结构及运行机制, (Beijing: 
Kexue chubanshe, 2008), 304-26. For detailed studies, see Ogawa Takashi 小川尚, Mindai chihō 
kansatsu seido no kenkyū 明代地方監察制度の研究, (Tokyo: Kyūko shoin, 1999), 91-108; Ogawa 
Takashi 小川尚, Mindai tosatsuin taisei no kenkyū 明代都察院体制の研究, (Tokyo: Kyūko shoin, 2004),
173-300; Xie Zhongzhi 謝忠志, Mingdai bingbei dao zhidu: yi wen yu wu de guoce yu wenren zhibing 
de shilian 明代兵備道制度: 以文馭武的國策與文人知兵的實練, (Taipei: Huamulan chubanshe, 2011).
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and the General Surveillance Circuits 分巡道 and Military Defense Circuits 兵備道 under the 
Provincial Surveillance Office). Historians of the Ming are only beginning to understand the 
functions of circuits in everyday administration. For the purpose of the current discussion, it 
suffices to note that most officials who served under the Provincial Administration/Surveillance 
Offices did not simply assist in general administration, but held jurisdictions over discrete duties 
or subprovincial regions that were often located away from the provincial seat.
Third, another "virtual" administrative layer separated the provincial and central 
governments. These were the grand coordinators (xunfu 巡撫) and regional inspectors (xun'an 巡
按), who both traced their origins to the Ming founder's reign and grew substantially in 
importance over the course of the fifteenth century.6 The grand coordinators were originally 
central officials dispatched on ad hoc bases to handle military affairs that required coordination 
among the three provincial offices or across provincial boundaries. The positions had gradually 
turned into stable assignments by the mid-fifteenth century, with one grand coordinator each 
allocated to most of the thirteen provinces in addition to some others who were assigned to 
special sub-provincial and trans-provincial regions. Also belonging to this layer and 
unrepresented in Figure 3.1 were the supreme commanders (zongdu 總督), who supervised 
several grand coordinators on military matters that required inter-provincial coordination. 
Because supreme commanders did not usually handle routine administrative matters, they will be
mentioned only occasionally in the following discussions. The regional inspectors were 
6. On grand coordinators, see Hucker, “Governmental Organization of the Ming Dynasty,” 39-41; Fang 
Zhiyuan, Mingdai guojia quanli jiegou, 285-303; Chang Jer-lang 張哲郎, Mingdai xunfu yanjiu 明代巡
撫研究, (Taipei: Wenshizhe chubanshe, 1995); Okuyama Norio 奥山憲夫, “Mindai junbu seido no 
hensen” 明代巡撫制度の變遷, Tōyōshi kenkyū 45.2 (1986): 241-66; Jin Runcheng 靳润成, Mingchao 
zongdu xunfu xiaqu yanjiu 明朝总督巡抚辖区研究, (Tianjin: Tianjin guji chubanshe, 1996). On regional
inspectors, see Hucker, “Governmental Organization of the Ming Dynasty,” 50-51; Hucker, The 
Censorial System of Ming China, 86-94; Ogawa Takashi, Mindai chihō kansatsu seido no kenkyū, 
19-35. 
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representatives of the central court who each spent a year "inspecting" a province and reported 
back on local conditions. Because their duties included that of impeaching official wrongdoers, 
regional inspectors eventually gained great power over other territorial officials even though they
were outranked by most of them. Technically speaking, grand coordinators and regional 
inspectors were capital officials belonging to the central surveillance office known as the 
Censorate 都察院. But by the late sixteenth century, for all practical purposes the grand 
coordinator had become the de facto provincial governor while the regional inspector also 
became a provincial supervisor of sorts, giving rise to another virtual layer of territorial 
administration.
In order to differentiate the various types of officials with precision, I use an 
unconventional nomenclature (Figure 3.1, left side) while occasionally borrowing terminology 
used in the Ming administrative language (Figure 3.1, right side). Within any province, 
"superprovincial officials" refers to the top administrative layer consisting of the supreme 
commander, grand coordinator, and the regional inspector. "Provincial officials" refers to 
commissioners of the Provincial Administrative/Surveillance Offices, "subprovincial officials" 
refers to vice commissioners and assistant commissioners who held jurisdiction over one or more
circuits, and "local officials" refers to all officials who served at the prefectural and county 
levels. All these officials—from the superprovincial level down to the local level—made up what
I call the "territorial government." 
Finally, the Ming government made further distinctions between different types of 
officials who served within a single office. Within any office, the highest-ranking official was 
known as the "head official" (zheng guan 正官), under whom worked a small number of 
"supporting officials" (zuoer guan 佐貳官). Below the supporting officials were the "staff-
supervising officials" (shouling guan 首領官), whose primary responsibilities were to handle 
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administrative documents. Often lowly-ranked or unranked, staff-supervising officials performed
tasks that had much in common with the low-status clerks whom they supervised, giving them an
ambiguous position at the bottom of the Ming administrative hierarchy. Additionally, prefectures 
and counties supervised a number of offices that performed very specific tasks, such as relay 
stations and constable's offices (unrepresented in Figure 3.1). Officials serving under these 
offices, usually lowly-ranked or unranked, were known as "miscellaneous officials" (zazhi guan 
雜職官).7 Within any administrative level, I use the term "regular officials" to refer to all officials
who were not staff-supervising or miscellaneous officials (i.e. the head official and all supporting
officials). Technical as they are, these categories will be helpful for assessing the scale and 
impact of personnel regulations that affected certain subsets of the territorial bureaucracy, as we 
will soon see.
7. For an overview of these distinctions at the county level, see He Zhaohui, Mingdai xianzheng yanjiu, 
13-15. For recent studies on supporting officials, and staff-supervising officials and miscellaneous 
officials, see Wang Quanwei 王泉伟, “Mingdai zhouxian shouling guan yanjiu” 明代州县首领官研究, 
(MA thesis, Nankai daxue, 2011); Yuan Guiling 苑桂玲, “Mingdai xianji zuoer guan ji shouling guan 
de yanjiu: yi Shandong gexian wei li” 明代县级佐贰官及首领官研究—以山东各县为例, (MA thesis, Qufu
shifan daxue, 2007); Wu Daxin 吳大昕, “Cong wei ruliu dao bu ruliu: Mingdai zaguan zhidu yanjiu” 
從未入流到不入流─明代雜職官制度研究, (PhD diss., Guoli Taiwan shifan daxue, 2013).
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The Ming commitment to immediacy is most clearly observed in its procedures for 
personnel evaluation, which included two complementary and somewhat conflicting systems. 
This section discusses a diachronic system known as kaoman 考滿 (literally: evaluation upon 
completing a term), which I translate as the "third year review." The next section will examine a 
synchronic system known as chaojin kaocha 朝覲考察 (literally: audience and evaluation), which
I translate as the "triennial audience and evaluation." Previous studies on Ming personnel 
evaluation have focused mostly on the criteria and procedures of the evaluation process, but few 
have examined the large-scale movement of officials that formed an integral part of it.8 My 
objective, therefore, is not to offer a comprehensive summary of the personnel evaluation 
system, but to highlight components of it that necessitated movement between the capital and the
locality.
In its originally-conceived form, the third-year review was a periodic assessment of an 
official's achievements. According to early regulations issued up to 1402, each territorial official 
8. Existing studies place a greater emphasis on the triennial audience and evaluation, which had a more 
substantial impact on the careers of Ming officials. For overviews on the Ming personnel evaluation 
systems in general, see Wang Xingya 王兴亚, Mingdai xingzheng guanli zhidu 明代行政管理制度, 
(Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe, 1999), 170-96; Liu Haisong 柳海松, “Mingdai guanli kaoke 
zhidu de jianli yu yanbian” 明代官吏考课制度的建立与演变, Shehui kexue jikan 67 (1990.2): 77-82; 
Hucker, The Censorial System of Ming China, 94-97. For detailed studies that focus primarily on the 
triennial audience and evaluation, see Wada Masahiro 和田正広, Min Shin kanryōsei no kenkyū 明清官
僚制の研究, (Tokyo: Kyūko shoin, 2002), 363-637; Cha Hye-won 車恵媛, “Mindai ni okeru kōka 
seisaku no henka: kōman to kōsatsu no kankei o chūshin ni” 明代における考課政策の變化: 考滿と考察
の關係を中心に, Tōyōshi kenkyū 55.4 (1997): 657-96; Yu Jindong 余劲东, “Mingdai daji kaoyu xu shi 
tanyin” 明代大计考语“虚”、“实”探因, Jiangnan daxue xuebao (renwen shehui kexue ban) 15.4 (2016): 
50-56. The only studies that focus on the movement of officials are Yu Jindong 余劲东, “Mingdai 
chaojin kaocha daolifei yanjiu” 明代朝觐考察道里费研究, Shilin (2015.6): 71-79; Yu Jindong 余劲东 
and Zhou Zhongliang 周中梁 “Mingdai chaojin kaocha chengxian zhi yanjiu: yi Tongma bian wei 
zhongxin de tantao” 明代朝觐考察程限之研究——以《铜马编》为中心的探讨, Lishi jiaoxue wenti 
(2015.6): 26, 69-73.
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was given a term of nine years, during which time he underwent reviews at the conclusion of his 
third, sixth and ninth years in the post. In preparation for the review, the official prepared several 
booklets following a pre-determined format, which documented his accomplishments during the 
past three years. He then received an evaluative comment from his superior official, which was 
forwarded to the Provincial Surveillance Office for confirmation and then submitted to the 
Ministry of Personnel, the capital office that handled personnel appointments. Meanwhile, the 
official personally carried all of his booklets to the Ministry of Personnel, where he received a 
final rating as either "satisfactory," "ordinary," or "unsatisfactory." The same procedures were 
repeated every three years until the ninth year, when the official's promotion or demotion was 
determined based on a comprehensive evaluation that took into account the results of all three 
reviews.9
The Ming was not unique in carrying out periodic evaluation of government personnel, 
nor in requiring territorial officials to travel to the capital to undergo their reviews. What set the 
Ming apart from its predecessors, however, was its rigidity in requiring all officials to undergo 
reviews every three years. For example, Song officials also received annual evaluations by their 
superiors, but they only traveled to the capital for comprehensive reviews at the conclusion of 
their terms, the lengths of which were ideally set to be three years but in reality differed 
according to the type of post and changed as the dynasty progressed.10 The Ming review process, 
on the other hand, tended either to interrupt or terminate the natural terms of territorial officials. 
Those who managed to complete their nine-year terms (a rarity after the mid-fifteenth century) 
9. Zhusi zhizhang 諸司職掌, "Kaohe" 考覈, 3.82a-83b, 85a-b; Ming shilu (Taizu), Hongwu 14/10/21 
renshen. For a summary of the complex evaluative criteria described in early-Ming regulations, see 
Wada Masahiro, Min Shin kanryōsei no kenkyū, 364-367, 400-402..
10. Miao Shumei 苗书梅, Songdai guanyuan xuanren he guanli zhidu 宋代官员选任和管理制度, (Kaifeng: 
Henan daxue chubanshe, 1996), 256-268, 371-376; Ding Jianjun 丁建军, Songchao difang guanyuan 
kaohe zhidu yanjiu 宋朝地方官员考核制度研究, (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2014), 151.
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were compelled to leave their posts twice within a term, generating extra travel costs and 
compromising the continuity of territorial government. Even more problematic were two 
fifteenth-century developments that considerably shortened the terms of officials nation-wide. 
First, it became common for officials to receive new assignments after every review, in effect 
shortening their formal terms from nine to three years. Second, the court frequently promoted, 
demoted, or transferred territorial officials outside the context of the regular review, either to fill 
unexpected vacancies or as the result of the triennial evaluations (more in the next section), in 
effect shortening the actual term to less than three years.11 Most importantly, such irregular 
transfers did not always reset an official's review cycle. This meant that someone who had only 
recently transferred to a new post still had to undergo his review whenever three years had 
passed since the last one.12 No longer a periodic event that punctuated a long and fixed term, the 
third year review became a troublesome disruption to the service of territorial officials, often 
compelling them to leave a post soon after arriving there—either temporarily or permentantly, 
depending on its outcome.
Ming rulers and officials were not unaware of such inconveniences. As the official Wang 
Qiong 王瓊 commented in the early sixteenth century,
When an official travels to the capital to undergo his review, it not only wastes 
labor and resources on both ways, but also undermines official business. The only 
[solution] is to allow [territorial officials] to undergo reviews locally, which will 
hopefully provide some convenience [to all].
一官赴京考满。徃回勞費。且誤公務。惟許令本處考覈。庶爲使也。13
11. For example, the would-be Minister of Personnel Wang Qiong 王瓊 pointed out in the early sixteenth 
century that many officials were promoted or demoted before the completion of their three-year 
terms. See Wang Qiong, Shuangxi zaji 雙溪雜記, 5a-b. On changes to the terms of officials, see Zhan 
Long 展龙, “Mingdai guanyuan jiuren fa yanjiu” 明代官員久任法研究, Qinghua daxue xuebao, zhexue 
shehui kexue ban 28 (2013.4): 39-53; Cha Hye-won, “Mindai ni okeru kōka seisaku,” 21.
12. For an example of the disjuncture between the official three-year term and actual terms of 
assignment, see Zhang Wenda, 張問達, Fu Chu shuchao 撫楚疏抄, "Machen xian zhixian Zhang Jian 
renman jiyou shu" 麻城縣知縣張鍵任滿給由疏, 11.38a-41a.
13. Wang Qiong 王瓊, Shuangxi zaji 雙溪雜記, 5a-b. In the translated text, I have read the character shi 使 
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The notion that the capital trips were wasteful, shared by many (though not all) Ming officials, 
prompted the state to shift gradually toward remote methods of review as the dynasty progressed.
The earliest and most radical attempt at reform occurred during the reign of the second emperor 
Jianwen (r. 1399-1402), who allowed all territorial officials to be reviewed in writing without 
traveling personally to the capital. But the reform was quickly reversed following the usurpation 
of Emperor Yongle (r. 1403-24), who condemned it as one of the many examples of Jianwen's 
disrespect for the dynasty's original institutions.14 Possibly because of Jianwen's initial failure, 
the Ming state never again granted a complete exemption to the travel requirement, preferring 
instead to grant various "exceptions" that in the long run exempted many territorial officials.
These post-Jianwen developments fell into four phases. In the first phase, spanning 
roughly from 1402 to 1456, the court granted occasional suspension of review to officials in war-
stricken frontier areas based on petitions from provincial and superprovincial officials.15 When 
the petitions were approved, officials due for their first or second reviews (never the third) were 
allowed to remain at their posts to supervise pressing administrative tasks until the military 
situation improved, at which point they presumably underwent a delayed review as usual.16 In 
as a printing mistake for bian 便. 
14. Ming shilu (Taizong), Hongwu 35/7/13 jiawu.
15. In 1427, Sichuan local officials were ordered to remain at their posts until the end of a large-scale war
agains the aboriginal people, after which they were to undergo their reviews as usual. In 1435 and 
1436, incessant frontier wars compelled the court to order most local officials of Shaanxi to delay 
their reviews for the time being. In 1450, the court suspended the reviews of all Yunan and Guizhou 
officials at the provincial level and below due to another campaign against the aboriginals. See Ming 
shilu (Xuanzong), Xuande 2/8/23 wuyin, 10/11/6 guiyou; Ming shilu (Yingzong), Zhengtong 1/9/29 
xinyou, Jingtai 1/3/3 dingwei, 1/3/19 guihai.
16. For examples at the county level and above (excluding staff-supervising and miscellaneous officials), 
see Ming shilu (Xuanzong), Xuande 2/8/23 wuyin (Sichuan), 10/11/6 guiyou (Shaanxi); Ming shilu 
(Yingzong), Zhengtong 1/9/29 xinyou (Shaanxi), Jingtai 1/3/3 dingwei (Yunnan), 1/3/19 guihai 
(Guizhou).
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some rare instances, the court also exempted certain officials from the capital trip entirely, 
allowing them to complete the reviews remotely rather than simply postponing them.17
The second phase, extending approximately from 1456 to 1493, saw the rise and eventual
disappearance of a curious arrangement by which territorial officials received travel exemptions 
in exchange for a fixed payment. This arrangement, usually granted to provinces affected by 
severe war or famine, required each official undergoing his first or second review to make a 
"donation" of grain, fodder, or silver—the choice and amount of which depended on the 
province's current needs—after which he underwent a simplified version of the review at the 
Provincial Administration Office and returned directly to his post. Though probably conceiving 
this initially as a one-time expedient measure, the Ming became increasingly reliant on it for 
three decades and a half, applying it to more categories of officials, extracting more types of 
resources, and gradually increasing the payment amount as time passed (Table 3.2). In the logic 
of its advocates, pay-for-exemption saved territorial officials from the nuisance of making capital
trips, prevented the loss of officials at times of local hardship, and most importantly alleviated 
the growing problem of funds shortage. Yet the court's readiness to grant such exemptions also 
prompted repeated opposition from some fundamentalist officials, one of whom even equated the
practice to the shameful act of selling offices and titles (賣官鬻爵).18 In the end, the 
fundamentalists seem to have won out, and no case of pay-for-exemption was recorded after 
1493.
Despite the fundamentalists' momentary victory, the end of pay-for-exemption also 
marked the beginning of a new phase, extending roughly from 1493 to 1563, which saw further 
17. Ming shilu (Yingzong), Zhengtong 1/6b/27 xinmao (three Shaanxi provincial and subprovincial 
officials), 7/1/16 wuyin (two Shandong local officials).
18. Ming shilu (Xianzong), Chenghua 6/3/20 jihai, 10/5/2 bingxu, 14/3/4 bingyin (quoted passage); Ming 
shilu (Xiaozong), Hongzhi 3/6/3 jiashen.
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institutionalization of the travel exemption. The trend included two complementary 
developments. First, grand coordinators frequently cited local hardships to petition for simple 
trip exemptions (no payment required) for their subordinates. Although such petitions did have 
precedents from as early as the first phase, they became so overused by this period that the court 
issued at least three announcements—first in 1536 and repeated in 1546 and 1575—reiterating 
that such petitions should only be submitted at times of real emergency.19 Second, the Ming state 
started to grant permanent trip exemptions to increasing categories of territorial officials, 
possibly formalizing the many exemptions that were already being granted through individual 
petitions. Some time in the 1490s, all local officials of Guizhou and Yunan provinces (except for 
prefects) received permanent travel exemptions for their first and second reviews.20 In the 1520s 
and 1530s, at least two high officials petitioned unsuccessfully to extend similar exemptions to 
officials serving in all other provinces.21 The watershed came in 1563, when the court finally 
granted permanent travel exemptions for all county-level officials and all head and staff-
supervising officials at the prefectural level.22 This meant that prefectural supporting officials 
became the only local officials who still had to make capital trips for their reviews.
The reform of 1563 marked the beginning of the final phase, lasting up to the dynasty's 
end, when no further institutional change occurred. The last recorded effort for reform occurred 
in 1593, when the chief supervising secretary of personnel Xu Hong 許弘 petitioned for a 
19. Jiajing xinli 嘉靖新例 9b-11a (1536); Ming huidian (Wanli edition), "Kaohe" 考覈, 12.20a (1546); 
Ming shilu (Shenzong), Wanli 3/3/19 wuwu (1575).
20. The Ming huidian gives the date for both provinces as 1490, whereas the Ming shilu only records the 
exemption for Guizhou in the year 1497. See Ming shilu (Xiaozong), Hongzhi 10/3/3 yisi; Ming 
huidian (Zhengde edition), "Kaohe" 考覈, 14.11b; Ming huidian (Wanli edition), "Kaohe," 12.18b.
21. In 1527, the Minister of Personnel proposed a permanent trip exemption for all county magistrates 
(not approved). In 1533, the Nanjing minister of personnel petitioned for travel exemptions of all 
Nanjing officials below the sixth grade (not approved and reprimanded). See Ming shilu (Shizong), 
Jiajing 6/11/9 guiwei, 12/6/22 guisi.
22. Ming shilu (Shizong), Jiajing 42/12/6 gengxu.
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permanent travel exemption for all prefectural supporting officials, the category left out in the 
1563 reform. In his memorial Xu pointed out the current absurdity in which prefectural 
supporting officials continued to travel to the capital when all other local officials had been 
exempted. In Xu's mind, the travel requirement for these remaining officials could only be 
understood as a wasteful performance:
When [an official] sets out, he must hire attendants; when he enters the capital, he 
must exchange gifts. All of these [are paid by] the sweat and blood of the people.23
And yet some officials petition to receive temporary leaves mid-travel, while 
others make detours to home and spend the time as they please. We superficially 
admire the appearance of comprehensive reviews, yet vastly open a loophole for 
sabotaging official duties. What I do not understand is why the court uses a mere 
vice/assistant prefect or two to camouflage our current situation.
啟行有長夫。進京有交際。皆民脂也。致令或中道乞休。或過家自便。浮慕綜覈
之名。大開曠官之竇。不知朝廷。胡取一二通判同知。妝點目前光景耶。24
Xu was probably right in calling regulations of his time a camouflage, for by this time the review
process itself had turned mostly into a sham. As an imperial edict bemoaned in 1620, almost 
every official now received the rating of "satisfactory" (as opposed to the lower ratings of 
"ordinary" or "unsatisfactory"), rendering the review process obsolete.25 Yet even if it was indeed
a mere show, the Ming state never completely dropped the travel requirement. Xu Hong's 
petition was "forwarded to relevant offices for deliberation" (下所司議), but his effort apparently 
went nowhere.26 The travel requirement continued to affect all provincial officials, subprovincial 
officials, and prefectural supporting officials for the rest of the dynasty, even though most in the 
23. Technically, officials traveling for their reviews were not allowed to use the state-run relay stations or 
to collect travel expenses from the people, but in practice, both practices seem to have been 
widespread. See Ming shilu (Shizong), Jiajing 6/11/9 guiwei (prohibition against collecting taxes to 
cover travel expenses); Li Yue 李樂, Jianwen zaji 見聞雜記, 8.61b (account of an official who did not 
tax the local population for his travel expenses, implying that others did); Xu Sizeng 徐師曾, Hushang
ji 湖上集, "Yichuan lun shang" 驛傳論上, 7.12a (contemporary observation that some officials 
inappropriately used the relay system when traveling for third year reviews).
24. Ming shilu (Shenzong), Wanli 21/8/13 jiawu.
25. Ming shilu (Guangzong), Taichang 1/8/1 bingwu.
26. Ming shilu (Shenzong), Wanli 21/8/13 jiawu.
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first two categories seem to have received near-automatic exemptions through grand 
coordinators' petitions.27
Compared to the rhetorical uniformity that surrounded the triennial audience and 
evaluation (more in the next section), debates on the third year review showed rhetorical vigor 
wielded by both supporters and critics of the travel requirement. The institutional 
fundamentalists stressed the importance of direct observation: if territorial officials underwent 
their reviews remotely, the central court could not "observe their conduct and ability [or] 
evaluate their age and appearance" (察其行能。審其年貌), so that "even when there is someone 
who is old, timid, greedy, or cruel, [the Ministry of Personnel] would not be able to tell them 
apart" (雖有老懦貪酷。無從辨驗).28 Those who sought to relax the travel requirement, as we 
saw, stressed the cost and administrative disturbance caused by it. That both sides found their 
voices shows both the importance of immediacy in Ming administrative procedures and some 
officials' readiness to compromise the commitment to immediacy in favor of what they saw as 
more important concerns. But how far the compromise could extend depended very much on the 
27. Some memorial collections of late-Ming grand coordinators contain many petitioning for travel 
exemptions. For examples from one grand coordinator, see Zhang Wenda 張問達 (grand coordinator 
of Huguang, 1607-12), Fu Chu shuchao 撫楚疏抄: 4.77a-80b (vice administrative commissioner; 
retained because he was in charge of the critical post of the Relay Transport Circuit); 7.4a-7b 
(administrate commissioner; retained to oversee famine relief); 7.8a-10b (administrate commissioner; 
retained because the position was critically important); 7.11a-14a (vice administrative commissioner; 
retained because his circuit of jurisdiction was difficult to govern); 15a-18b (vice surveillance 
commissioner; retained because an imperial tomb was under construction within his circuit of 
jurisdiction); 19a-21b (vice surveillance commissioner; retained due to prolonged natural disaster in 
his circuit of jurisdiction); 22a-25b (vice surveillance commissioner; retained because of prolonged 
natural disaster in his circuit of jurisdiction and because no one was currently in charge of the two 
neighboring circuits); 26a-28b (vice surveillance commissioner; retained due to frequent popular 
disturbances within his circuit of jurisdiction).
28. Huang Yu 黃瑜, Shuanghuai suichao 雙槐歲鈔, "Jiyou zhenji" 給由賑濟, 10.14b. For similar arguments 
that blamed travel exemptions for compromising the thoroughness of evaluations, see Ming shilu 
(Xianzong), Chenghua 6/3/20 jihai; Ming shilu (Xiaozong) Hongzhi 3/6/3 jiashen; Ming shilu 
(Shizong), Jiajing 12/6/22 guisi.
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nature of the matter at hand. An institution that turned out to be much more resistant to 
compromise was the triennial audience and evaluation, to which we will now turn.
Triennial Audience and Evaluation
Despite sharing a few superficial traits, the triennial audience and evaluation differed 
from the third year review in some important ways. Like the third year review, the triennial 
audience and evaluation required territorial officials to travel personally to the capital every three
years. But unlike the third year review, its primary purpose—at least officially—was to pay 
respects to the emperor at a celebration ceremony held on the first day of the year. Institutionally 
the practice traced its origins to Emperor Hongwu's 1376 announcement ordering territorial 
officials to attend new year's audiences at regular intervals, a practice known as chaojin 朝覲 
(literally: audience at court).29 Starting in about 1382, however, the court began adding 
evaluative components to the audience attendees' activities at court, a process that came to be 
known as kaocha 考察 (literally: evaluation and observation).30 Later in the dynasty, the 
audience-and-evaluation combination came to be known formally as chaojin kaocha ("audience 
and evaluation"), but most officials simply called it chaojin ("the audience"), attesting to the 
importance of its ceremonial functions.31 To maintain stylistic simplicity and in keeping with 
Ming usage, I will hereafter refer to the entire process as the "triennial audience," unless there is 
a need to refer specifically to the evaluative component, in which case I use the term "triennial 
evaluation."
29. Ming shilu (Taizu) Hongwu 9/12/10 jiwei.
30. Ming shilu (Taizu), Hongwu 15/9/17 guihai, 18/1/11 guiyou. On the chronology of Hongwu-era 
developments, see also Wada Masahiro, Min Shin kanryōsei no kenkyū, 368-80.
31. When referring primarily to the evaluative component of the process, many officials used the 
alternate term daji 大計 (literally: great planning).
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The triennial audience also differed from the third year review in the relative importance 
of its evaluative function. Even though its function was primarily ceremonial in theory, in 
practice its evaluative component asserted powerful influence on the careers of Ming territorial 
officials. As a number of scholars have pointed out, over the course of the Ming the third year 
review turned into a mere formality while the triennial evaluation emerged as the more important
occasion for personnel evaluations.32 This was because the two developed very opposite 
functions as the dynasty progressed: whereas the third year review was primarily an occasion to 
reward an official for his successful completion of a term, the triennial evaluation was used 
primarily to demote or dismiss unqualified officials.33 As we saw earlier, by the late Ming almost 
everyone received the rating of "satisfactory" at the third year review, making it an occasion for 
promotion (or parallel transfer), not demotion. By contrast, each triennial evaluation dismissed or
demoted anywhere from a few hundred officials (up to the mid-fifteenth century) to over four 
thousand officials (during the mid-sixteenth century).34 The evaluations apparently covered all 
territorial officials and not just the audience attendees, who acted as representatives of their 
respective offices and reported on the ability of their subordinates.35 Even though the process of 
evaluation was highly susceptible to corruption and disproportionately lenient to higher-ranked 
32. For a summary of relevant discussions, see Cha Hye-won, “Mindai ni okeru kōka seisaku,”  
especially 658 and 687 n. 3.
33. Cha Hye-won, “Mindai ni okeru kōka seisaku,” 667-68; Wang Xingya 王兴亚, “Mingdai guanli de 
kaohe zhidu” 明代官吏的考核制度, in Mingdai xingzheng guanli zhidu 明代行政管理制度 (Zhengzhou: 
Zhongzhou guji chubanshe, 1999), 171, 175.
34. Wada Masahiro, Min Shin kanryōsei no kenkyū, 571.
35. For example, a late-sixteenth century manual of the Ministry of Personnel specified that the Ministry 
should publicly post the evaluation results of all official, including both officials who attended the 
audience (laichao 來朝) and those who were still serving at their posts (zaoren 在任). See Libu 
zhizhang 吏部職掌 (SKCM edition), Kaogong qinglisi 考功清吏司, Yousi ke 有司科, "Chaojin tiaojian" 
朝覲條件, 55b-56a.
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officials, it remained the case that any official could potentially find his career abruptly derailed 
or terminated at a triennial evaluation.36
Finally and most importantly, the triennial audience followed a different type of cycle 
from the third year review. Whereas the third year review took place at different times for 
different officials, the triennial audience occurred simultaneously for all participating officials. 
Its cycle was officially set in 1396, when Emperor Hongwu announced that all future audiences 
would take place every three years starting in 1397, a cycle which was rigidly followed until the 
dynasty's end.37 This meant, essentially, that the Ming empire experienced a massive movement 
of officials every three years. According to Ming regulations, officials who participated in the 
triennial audience included, at the very least, one regular official, one staff-supervising official, 
and one clerk from each of the empire's counties, prefectures, Provincial Administration Offices, 
and Provincial Surveillance Offices. Each office, moreover, was required to send its head official
unless he had been on the post for less than three months, in which case a supporting official was
sent as substitute.38 In any audience year, therefore, the total number of audience attendees must 
have been close to 5,000, although the actual number could have been higher or lower depending
on how many officials were exempted from the trips and which other offices participated in the 
event.39 According to a late-sixteenth century manual of the Ministry of Personnel, all audience 
36. On the changing criteria for evaluation and the problem of fairness, see Wada Masahiro, Min Shin 
kanryōsei no kenkyū, 406-690; Wang Xingya, “Mingdai guanli de kaohe zhidu,” 190-95.
37. Early in his reign, Emperor did try to establish different audience cycles for different types of 
officials. In 1376, for example, he ordered all prefects to attend the audience every year and all county
magistrates and supporting officials to attend it every three years. See MSL-Taizu, Hongwu 9/12/10 
jiwei; Ming huidian (Wanli edition), "Chaojin kaocha" 朝覲考察, 13.1a.
38. Ming huidian (Wanli edition), "Chaojin kaocha," 13.1b-2a; Libu zhizhang (SKCM edition), Kaogong 
qinglisi 考功清吏司, Yousi ke 有司科, "Chaojin shiyi" 朝覲事宜, 34a-b. One exception was allowed 
under these regulations: for small counties that had only one head official and one staff-supervising 
official, the head official was exempted from attending the audience. 
39. As mentioned on p. 109, by the end of the dynasty the Ming empire had 13 provinces (i.e. 26 
provincial civil offices), 162 prefectures, 255 subprefectures, and 1,173 counties. Assuming that each 
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attendees were to arrive at the capital some time in mid-twelfth month, and submitted pre-
evaluation documents to the Ministry between 12/17 and 12/24.40 After all officials had attended 
the new year's audience on 1/1, the evaluation process took place from 1/2 to 1/9, during which 
time the Ministry conducted interviews with all audience attendees. The evaluation results were 
then announced in late first month, after which the attendees left the capital some time around 
2/5.41
The audience attendees thus spent roughly 1.5 months at the capital itself, but depending 
on where they traveled from, many spent much longer times on the road. A sample itinerary can 
be found in the writings of Yang Dezhou 楊德周, magistrate of Gutian County 古田縣 in Fujian, 
who participated in the triennial audience of 1634.42 According to his travel memoir, Yang left 
Gutian on 10/20 of 1633 and arrived in Beijing on or shortly after 12/14. After attending the new 
year's audience (1/1), the evaluation interview (1/3) and a post-evaluation audience (1/29), Yang 
left Beijing on 2/7 and returned to Gutian on 4/18 of 1634, having spent a little less than two 
months each way on the road and a total of six months away from his post.43 If an official from 
the moderately distant province of Fujian had taken so long, one can only imagine how much 
longer the process would have taken for officials from truly distant provinces of the southwest. 
As with the third year review, the Ming was not unique in requiring territorial officials to 
attend new year's audiences en masse. In the Han dynasty, for example, territorial governments 
sent yearly representatives to attend the new year's audience and to submit territorial financial 
office sent three audience attendees, the total number of attendees would have reached 4,848.
40. Libu zhizhang (SKCM edition), Kaogong qinglisi, Yousi ke, "Chaojin tiaojian," 53b.
41. Libu zhizhang (SKCM edition), Kaogong qinglisi, Yousi ke, "Chaojin tiaojian," 57b-58a.
42. Yang Dezhou 楊德周, Tongma bian 銅馬編. For an introduction to Yang's writing and on the general 
travel experience in triennial audiences, see Yu Jindong 余劲东 and Zhou Zhongliang 周中梁, 
“Mingdai chaojin kaocha chengxian.”
43. Yang Dezhou, Tongma bian, A.1a, A.11b-12a, B.1a-b, B.11a-b.
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records, a practice known as shangji 上計, or "submitting accounts." The Sui and Tang dynasties 
similarly required territorial representatives to attend the new year's audience every year and to 
participate in an empire-wide evaluation of officials, an event known as chaoji 朝集, or 
"gathering at court." But the Han audience attendees consisted of supporting officials of second-
level administrative units (equivalent to Ming prefectures), who were later replaced by persons 
of much lower status (equivalent to Ming staff-supervising officials and clerks). The Tang 
attendees, similarly, consisted of head officials and/or supporting officials of all second-level 
administrative units.44 By contrast, the Ming triennial audience occurred less frequently, but 
when it did, it required the participation of head officials from all three administrative levels, a 
scale that was truly unprecedented. Moreover, no other Chinese dynasty required its territorial 
officials to make regular capital trips both on individually-based cycles (the third year review) 
and on nationally-uniform cycles (the triennial audience). It was in this sense that the Ming 
commitment to immediacy surpassed its predecessors to a disproportionate degree.
Clearly, the triennial audience created great disruptions to territorial governance, much 
more so than the third year review because all head officials left their posts at the same time. Yet 
despite such inconveniences, the Ming state did not relax attendance requirements the same way 
it did for the third year review. Developments in the Ming stance on audience attendance can ben
divided roughly into three periods. In the first period, lasting up to the 1480s, superprovincial 
officials memorialized the court to request attendance exemptions on behalf of their subordinates
44. Lei Wen 雷聞, “Sui Tang chaoji zhidu yanjiu: jianlun qi yu liang Han shangjizhi zhi yitong” 隋唐朝集
制度研究—兼論其與兩漢上計制之異同, Tang yanjiu 7 (2001), 290-292 (Tang audience attendees), 303 
(Han audience attendees). For overviews on Han and Tang territorial government structures and 
official titles, I have consulted Meng Xiangcai 孟祥才, Zhongguo zhengzhi zhidu tongshi, vol. 3 Qin 
Han 中国政治制度通史 第三卷 秦汉, edited by Bai Gang 白钢 (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian 
chubanshe, 2010), 162-73; Yu Lunian 俞鹿年, Zhongguo zhengzhi zhidu tongshi, vol. 5 Sui Tang 
Wudai 中国政治制度通史 第五卷 隋唐五代, edited by Bai Gang 白钢 (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian 
chubanshe, 2010), 192-94.
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whenever there was a severe local disturbance such as war or famine. These requests were 
approved on a case-by-case basis, but for the most part the requested exemptions were granted. 
Some provinces received partial exemptions for specific prefectures and/or counties, while the 
remote southwestern provinces often received province-wide exemptions at the provincial, 
prefectural, and/or county levels (Table 3.3). 
The ease with which the court granted such exemptions, however, caused an apparent 
backlash in the late fifteenth century. The earliest recorded example occurred in 1480, when as 
many as nine provinces (including the metropolitan area of South Zhili) requested attendance 
exemptions for the audience of 1481, four of which involved province-wide exemptions of all 
counties and/or prefectures.45 Concerned about the scale of exemptions that the court had 
granted, a supervising secretary of personnel submitted a memorial in which he accused 
territorial governments of making frivolous exemption requests when there was no real 
emergency, a sentiment with which the emperor apparently agreed.46 A decade later in 1492, 
when the supreme commander of Guangdong and Guangxi requested province-wide exemptions 
for all prefectures and counties, the Ministry of Personnel argued that such large-scale 
exemptions set bad precedents that could be claimed by other provinces in future years. Even 
though province-wide exemptions had by then become customary for Guangdong and Guangxi, 
the Ministry decided to reduce the scale of exemptions to a few prefectures and counties most 
severely affected by the current hardship, in effect rejecting most of the supreme commander's 
original request.47 
45. See Table 3.3, #11 (1481). 
46. Ming shilu (Xianzong), Chenghua 16/12/14 jiwei.
47. Wang Shu 王恕, Wang Duanyi gong zouyi 王端毅公奏議, "Dingduo liang Guang chaojin guan 
zouzhuang" 定奪兩廣朝覲官奏狀, 14.12b-14b. On the exemptions received by the two provinces before
1492, see Table 3.3. Curiously, neither this reduced exemption of 1493 nor another 1490 exemption 
alluded to in the Ministry's memorial is recorded in the Ming Veritable Records, calling into question 
the compilers' claim that the audience exemption records are comprehensive for those years (see 
- 128 -
The fundamentalist backlash of the late fifteenth century probably gave rise to a more 
cautious approach to audience exemption that set the tone for the second period, lasting from 
about the 1490s to the 1610s. During this period, superprovincial officials continued to cite 
various local emergencies and hardships to request audience exemptions, but with the exception 
of the remote province of Guizhou, province-wide exemptions became much less common, as 
can be seen in Table 3.3. Instead, most exemptions were restricted to specific counties and 
prefectures. The vast majority of territorial governments, therefore, continued to send audience 
attendees as required by the dynastic regulations. We know, for example, that the audience of 
1529 was attended by as many as 4,076 officials and clerks, equivalent to 84% of the required 
number of attendees estimated above.48 In the audience of 1615, for which the records are 
unusually detailed, exemptions were granted to a total of 203 head officials, including 44 in 
North Zhili, 4 in South Zhili, 4 in Zhejiang, 15 in Jiangxi, 6 in Fujian, 7 in Huguang, 12 in 
Henan, 1 in Shaanxi, 4 in Shanxi, 104 in Shandong, and 2 in Yunnan.49 If we leave out the few 
frontier offices that received exemptions by default (the exact number of which cannot be 
known), the exemptions amounted to a mere 13% of all territorial head officials.
Eventually, empire-wide military disturbances compelled the Ming to drastically relax 
audience attendance requirements during the third period, extending from the 1620s to the 
dynasty's end. In 1621, anticipating the audience of 1622, a censor suggested granting 
exemptions to all "wise and able" officials located at places of strategic importance, for fear that 
their substitutes would cause harm to the locality while the head officials went away.50 Three 
explanatory notes to Table 3.3 on p. 213).
48. Ming shilu (Shizong), Jiajing 8/1/17 jiayin. For my estimate on the required number of audience 
attendees, see p. 125, n. 39.
49. Ming shilu (Shenzong), Wanli 43/11/10 renwu. There were 1,616 territorial offices in total by the end 
of the Ming. See p. 125, n. 39.
50. Xizong qinian duchayuan shilu 熹宗七年都察院實錄, 2.183 (Tianqi 1/6/7).
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years later in 1624, another censor suggested audience exemptions for all county magistrates 
who had no record of wrongdoing.51 The censor's original intention was to eliminate the audience
attendees' travel expenses (thereby lightening the burden of the local people who had to pay for 
them), but the Ministry of Revenue quickly seized on the opportunity and asked all taxes 
originally collected under the name of travel expenses to be turned over to the central court, in 
effect enacting a desperate pay-for-exemption measure that temporarily relieved the fiscal 
deadlock of the crumbling empire.52 For the rest of its remaining years the Ming continued to 
turn audience exemptions into sources of extra income, apparently collecting anywhere from 
nine thousand taels to as much as forty thousand taels in a single audience year.53
But despite the drastic relaxation of attendance requirements in the late Ming, for all we 
know the move was conceived as a temporary compromise, not a permanent change.54 While it is
possible that the approval process gradually turned into a mere formality, the fact remains that 
until at least the 1610s—the sources are too scarce for the period after it—all exemptions had to 
be requested and approved ahead of each audience year. Other than the few permanent 
exemptions granted to frontier counties of Guangxi (1444) and Yunnan (1469), the Ming state 
never granted permanent audience exemptions to officials of fixed categories.55
Why did the Ming commit so strongly to attendance requirements for the triennial 
audience, in contrast to its gradual relaxation of travel requirements for the third year review? 
Most likely, the ceremonial weight of the triennial audience made it much more resistant to 
51. Xizong qinian duchayuan shilu, Tianqi 4/3/19.
52. I have not found the original text of the Ministry of Revenue's 1624 memorial, but its content is 
summarized in a 1628 memorial by Bi Ziyan 畢自嚴, Duzhi zouyi 度支奏議, Tanggao 堂稿, "Liao xiang
bufu jiji wuqi shu" 遼餉不敷濟急無奇疏, 1.24b-25a.
53. Bi Ziyan, Duzhi zouyi, Tanggao, "Liao xiang bufu jiji wuqi shu," 1.25a, Xinxiang si 新餉司, "Fu huke 
tihe xinxiang rushu shu" 覆戶科題覈新餉入數疏, 6.11a.
54. Xizong qinian duchayuan shilu, Tianqi 4/3/19.
55. Ming huidian (Wanli edition), "Chaojin kaocha," 13.6a.
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compromise. From the perspective of the grand coordinator or regional inspector who had to 
memorialize the court, it was rhetorically easier to request an exemption for the third year review
than for the triennial audience: whereas the former merely compromised the thoroughness of 
review and the exempted official's opportunity to receive a promotion, the latter compromised 
the official's obligation to pay respects to the emperor, something that could not be taken lightly 
in Ming political discourse. 
In fact, those officials who criticized audience exemption emphasized precisely the 
audience's ceremonial value. During the fundamentalist backlash of the late fifteenth century, the
memorializer of 1480 condemned territorial governments for "deliberately bending original 
institutions [of our dynasty] and causing the great ceremony of the triennial audience to decay 
little by little" (故違舊制。使朝覲大典。漸至廢弛).56 The Ministry of Personnel's 1492 
memorial, likewise, explained why territorial governments should refrain from using local 
hardships as an excuse to request province-wide exemptions:
Under a virtuous reign and during a peaceful time, how could we abandon the rite 
of the triennial audience, thereby obstructing the exchange of sentiments between 
the above and the below? [If we were to do so,] there would be no way to tell if 
the officials are wise or not, no means to examine their achievements and errors. 
How could such a situation be acceptable?
有道之世。太平之時。豈可廢朝覲之禮。使上下之情不通。庶官賢否。無所旌
别。功過無所考覈。可乎。57
To this writer, the importance of triennial audiences derived certainly from its evaluative 
component, but just as important was its symbolic value. A properly-attended new year's 
audience symbolized a virtuous emperor and a peaceful reign, and large-scale absences injured 
an idealized image that the Ming court wanted to project. Even after military and fiscal realities 
56. Ming shilu (Xianzong), Chenghua 16/12/14 jiwei. The emperor agreed to the sentiments expressed in 
this memorial and prohibited territorial governments from making frivolous exemption requests in the
future.
57. Wang Shu, Wang Duanyi gong zouyi, "Dingduo liang Guang chaojin guan zouzhuang," 14.14a-b.
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compelled the late Ming state to grant large-scale exemptions, the fundamentalist discourse 
remained forceful. In 1639, in the midst of empire-wide military struggles against the Manchus 
in the northeast and rebel forces in the interior, a supervising secretary of war named Zou Shikai 
鄒士楷 remonstrated against what he saw as a shameful abandonment of ritual correctness in 
favor of temporary financial gains:
When [word of the exemptions] reaches the distant barbarians, they will start to 
think lightly of our Central Realm. When [records of the exemptions] are 
transmitted to posterity, saying that on such-and-such day Your Majesty ordered 
officials of the realm to deliver so-and-so much silver in exchange for audience 
attendance, will it not conceal the honorable fact of Your Majesty's concern for 




In Zou's mind, the value of the triennial audience lay in the reputation it established for the 
emperor and for the dynasty, which far outweighed any temporary advantage that could be 
acquired from compromising the solemnity of the imperial ceremony.
It may seem almost comical to us that one could prioritize ritual correctness above all 
else at a time when the dynasty was on the verge of military annihilation. But in the logic of 
officials like Zou Shikai, the triennial audience gave territorial officials the rare opportunity to 
admire the emperor's greatness in person, which in turn gave them the essential inspiration to 
perform well in their duties. As Zou put it, the audience was not meant to be "a mere admiration 
of the superficial beauty of the ceremony itself" (非直體貌之虛崇).59 We will return later to 
consider whether practices like the triennial audience may have actually contributed to the 
dynasty's stability. For the time being, it is useful to observe how Ming officials assumed almost 
58. Zou Shikai 鄒士楷, Liang yuan zoushu 兩垣奏疏, "Jinli guanxi shu" 覲禮關繫疏, 14b.
59. Zou Shikai, Liang yuan zoushu, "Jinli guanxi shu," 12a-b.
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by default that respect for the emperor could only be expressed through immediacy, a connection
which becomes especially clear in the case of congratulatory memorials.
Congratulatory Memorials
From our modern perspectives, the Ming practice of congratulatory memorials may seem 
almost an institutionalized form of empire-wide waste. Under Ming regulations, each prefectural 
and provincial office was to submit a memorial congratulating the emperor for each of the three 
major annual festivities: the new year's day (zhengdan 正旦), the winter solstice (dongzhi 冬至), 
and the imperial birthday (wanshou shengjie 萬壽聖節).60 Additionally, the empress dowager(s), 
the empress, and the crown prince each received separate memorials for the first two festivities 
and for his or her own birthday.61 The court must therefore have received large volumes of 
congratulatory memorials on each festive occasion. We know, for example, that on new year's 
day of 1593, the emperor received a total of 1,090 memorials (including those submitted by civil 
offices, military offices, and imperial clansmen), while the empress dowager and the empress 
each received the same number as well.62 
Perhaps the strangest feature, from our perspective, was the memorials' scripted nature. In
1396, upon finding the memorials he received to be too ornate and crafted, Emperor Hongwu 
ordered his top scholar-officials to draft a template for all future memorials. Thereafter, all 
routine congratulatory memorials contained essentially the same text, with only slight variations 
that reflected the occasion of the celebration and the bureaucratic position of the submitter.63 For 
60. Ming shilu (Taizu), Hongwu 14/7/2 yiyou. To be more precise, congratulatory memorials had to be 
submitted by each territorial office whose head officials held a rank of 5b or higher. Within the civil 
administrative hierarchy, this included all Provincial Administrative/Surveillance Offices, prefectures,
and subprefectures. To avoid unnecessary complications, I have excluded subprefectures in the 
current discussion.
61. Ming huidian (Wanli edition), Libu 禮部, "Biaojian shi" 表箋式, 75.1a-15b.
62. Ming shilu (Shenzong), Wanli 21/1/3 (wuwu).
63. For the memorial template used by civil officials, see Ming huidian (Wanli edition), Libu, "Biaojian 
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non-routine, one-time occasions such as the birth of a prince or the announcement of honorary 
titles of an empress dowager, the Ministry of Rites (or the Hanlin Academy) drafted the 
appropriate templates and distributed them to territorial offices in advance.64 Congratulatory 
memorials were not, therefore, meant to be communicative, if by communication we mean 
conveying information through words. Because all memorials contained the same text, they were
not an occasion for territorial officials to show off their literary talent or to flatter the emperor 
with gratifying praise. What mattered, on the other hand, was that each memorial be written on 
the right type of paper and in proper calligraphy, contain no copying mistake or stain, be 
delivered by the right person (more later), and arrive at the court on time and undamaged. Even 
though one may reasonably doubt if anyone actually read the memorials, we do know that there 
were designated capital officials who checked them for textual correctness, material condition, 
and promptness of delivery.65
Why did the Ming state devote so much time, labor, and resources to the production and 
delivery of highly formulaic documents that in all likeliness were not actually read? The key to 
answering this question lies in recognizing congratulatory memorials as examples of virtual 
immediacy. If the expression sounds like an oxymoron, it is because virtual immediacy was an 
shi," 75.8a-9b.
64. Ming shilu (Shizong), Jiajing 1/3/24 xinwei (titles for empress dowagers); Liangchao congxin lu 兩朝
從信錄, 28.1a (birth of prince); Feng Qi 馮琦, Zongbo ji 宗伯集, "Wei qinghe shu" 為慶賀疏, 55.1a-b 
(enthroning crown prince), 55.1b-2b (title for empress dowager).
65. For examples of submitters and deliverers faulted for such mistakes, see Ming shilu (Taizu), Hongwu 
17/11/16 jimao (late delivery); Ming shilu (Yingzong), Zhengtong 1/6/6 xinchou (late delivery), 6/1/3 
xinchou (water damage), 6/5/3 jisi (miswritten characters and late delivery); Ming shilu (Xianzong), 
Chenghua 10/11/28 jimao (late delivery); Ming shilu (Shenzong), Wanli 14/7/1 jiawu (not following 
the right template), 24/2/2 jihai (damage); 33/1/29 jiachen (late delivery), 46/11/28 guichou (late 
delivery); Sichuan difang sifa dang'an 四川地方司法檔案, 193 (stain); Gu Jiusi 顧九思, Yeyuan tigao 掖
垣題稿, [Chacan chiman qinghe guanyuan yi zheng liyi shi 查參遲慢慶賀官員以正禮儀事], A.15b-17b 
(late delivery).
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uneasy compromise between the Ming state's conflicting needs for propriety on the one hand and
administrative certainty on the other. As loyal servants of the emperor, it was most proper for all 
territorial officials to congratulate the emperor in person at all annual festivities. But to ensure 
the stability of territorial administration, it was realistically impossible for them to visit the 
capital personally on every celebratory occasion. The Ming state's solution came in two forms. 
The first was the triennial audience which, by requiring personal attendance for one of the three 
festivities every three years, achieved actual immediacy at a reduced scale. The second was 
congratulatory memorials which, by requiring memorial submission for all of the three festivities
every year, offered virtual immediacy at a full scale. Contemporary Ming officials did not 
describe what they were doing in such terms, but as an interpretive concept, virtual immediacy 
helps us make sense of a number of practices that otherwise seem very strange. The strangeness 
derived ultimately from congratulatory memorials' embodiment of two contradictory 
characteristics: on the one hand they offered what essentially was a virtual method to participate 
in festive celebrations at court; on the other hand, within this basic framework of virtual 
participation, they also incorporated elements of immediacy to the greatest possible extent.
These elements appeared most clearly in Ming regulations and debates on how the 
memorials were to be delivered. For even though memorial submitters could not visit the capital 
themselves, they could nevertheless convey their respect for the emperor more effectively, as was
generally assumed in Ming official discourse, by entrusting the memorials to qualified persons 
who acted as the conduits between the submitters and the recipient. For this reason, the deliverer 
of a congratulatory memorial could not be just anyone. Early-Ming regulations required each 
Provincial Administration Office and Provincial Surveillance Office to dispatch one official as 
memorial deliverer; all prefectures were to submit their memorials to the Provincial 
Administration Office, whose deliverer carried all prefectural memorials on their behalf.66 This 
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meant that each province only needed to dispatch two civil officials as memorial deliverers (not 
including another military official who delivered memorials of the Regional Military 
Commission and its subordinate battalions), but the selection of those two officials had to follow 
strict rules. Already in 1383, the Ministry of Rites reiterated that all congratulatory memorials 
had to be delivered by officials, not clerks.67 Some time during the Zhengtong reign (1436-49), 
the court further announced that all memorials for the imperial birthday had to be delivered by 
regular officials of the Provincial Administrative/Surveillance Offices, while memorials for the 
new year's day and the winter solstice could be delivered by provincial staff-supervising officials
or by prefectural supporting officials.68
Thereafter, memorial submission for imperial birthdays became a particular burden for 
provincial governments. As we saw in Figure 3.1, each provincial office had only one or two 
head officials (the provincial officials), probably fewer than ten supporting officials (the 
subprovincial officials), and some half dozen staff-supervising officials. Because head officials 
had to remain at their posts and staff-supervising officials could not be dispatched for imperial 
birthdays, the burden of delivery fell exclusively on the subprovincial officials, who were 
themselves the heads of one or more subprovincial circuits. When a subprovincial official left his
post, therefore, his circuit(s) had to be temporarily supervised by a nearby colleague, in effect 
increasing the latter's workload and lowering the overall quality of his work. In remote provinces
such as Yunnan, the task of memorial delivery could leave a circuit vacant for a full year, as we 
saw at the beginning of this chapter in the case of the vice commissioner who apparently never 
returned.
66. Ming shilu (Taizong), Hongwu 14/7/2 yiyou.
67. Ming shilu (Taizong), Hongwu 16/11/16 yimao.
68. Ming huidian (Wanli edition), "Jin biaojian yi" 進表箋儀, 75.4b. 
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Territorial governments did try to minimize the administrative disruption caused by 
memorial delivery, but not always with success. In 1581, for example, the regional inspector of 
Shaanxi asked for permission to have the Shaanxi Provincial Administrative and Surveillance 
Offices take turns delivering congratulatory memorials of both offices, citing as reason the 
latter's serious shortage of personnel.69 This meant that instead of having each of the two offices 
dispatch one subprovincial official every year (as the regulations required), each office would 
thereafter dispatch one official every other year, reducing its loss of officials by half. Yet the 
request met a firm denial from the Ministry of Rites, which argued that the personnel shortage 
should be resolved by having the remaining subprovincial officials each assume concurrent 
responsibility over multiple circuits. Even though the two offices were located in the same city 
and their memorials shared the same places of origin and destination, assigning two separate 
deliverers from each office gave the memorials a virtual sense of immediacy, a sense which the 
central court sought to maintain even at the expense of administrative needs of the territorial 
government.
Another way to reduce the disruption of memorial delivery was to dispatch a 
subprovincial official who was nearing the end of his three-year term. Because the official had to
visit the capital for his third year review anyway, dispatching such an official as memorial 
deliverer helped provincial governments keep their loss of officials to a minimum. Yet the Ming 
court tolerated this strategy only reluctantly. Even though a 1430 announcement had ruled it 
acceptable (it is unclear what case or debate initially prompted this ruling),70 the question 
resurfaced a century later in 1537, when an assistant minister of the Pasture Office in Shaanxi, 
having delivered the Office's a congratulatory memorial for the imperial birthday, stayed at the 
69. Zengxiu tiaoli beikao 增修條例備考, Libu 禮部, "Zhuoyi fan nie jijin guanyuan" 酌議藩臬齎進官員, 
2.16b-17a.
70. Ming huidian (Wanli edition), "Kaohe," 12.23b.
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capital for six extra months to complete his third year review before returning to his original 
post.71 The regional inspector of Shaanxi impeached him for the late return, arguing that even 
though the official had delayed his return due to an official task, the fact that he performed two 
tasks in one run showed a lack of respect (雖緣公務。得差二事而出。似非敬之禮). The Ministry
of Rites agreed that such acts compromised the integrity of the imperial servant (有傷臣體) and 
suggested that all future deliverers of congratulatory memorials should dedicate themselves to 
that task only. Even though the ruling was later reversed upon rediscovery of the 1430 
announcement (little is known about the circumstances that led to the reversal),72 the fact that the 
debate occurred at all shows the rhetorical vulnerability of officials who mixed up memorial 
delivery with the third year review. Because deliverers of congratulatory memorials served as the
material conduits through which the submitters' sincerity was conveyed, it followed that they had
to devote themselves fully to this critical task, or so the logic went in mainstream Ming political 
discourse. For those officials who took this discourse seriously (or wanted to use it to attack 
other officials), it was simply unacceptable for a memorial deliverer to complete additional tasks 
in the same run, even though doing so would have saved time and cost for the Ming state.
The Function of Immediacy
Why did the Ming value immediacy so much? As we saw in all three cases examined 
here, the court did occasionally relax its commitment to immediacy, but the ideal remained 
strong as a powerful rhetoric, if not always in actual administrative practice. The Ming 
preference for immediacy appears all the more strange when we consider the fact that no other 
71. Zhongguo Ming chao dang'an zonghui 中國明朝檔案總匯, Vol. 85, [Jiuhe kuangzhi deng guan 糾劾曠職
等官], 194-96. The Pasture Office was a special agency outside the regular territorial administrative 
hierarchy. Even though it was located outside the capital, it was under the control of the Ministry of 
War. See Charles O. Hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1985), 8234.
72. Ming huidian (Wanli edition), "Kaohe," 12.23b-24a.
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imperial Chinese dynasty went to such extremes. The subsequent Qing dynasty (1644-1911), in 
particular, inherited all three practices from the Ming but quickly moved on to either abolish or 
significantly modify them within the first century of its rule (Table 3.1). The first to go was the 
third year review, which was permanently abolished in 1665.73 Modifications to the triennial 
audience occurred in two steps. In 1652, the court exempted all county officials from audience 
attendance and ordered each prefecture to send a supporting official instead of the head official.74
In 1686, the Qing further exempted audience attendance for all prefectural officials and ordered 
each province to send a subprovincial official instead of the two head officials sent previously by
the Provincial Administration and Surveillance Offices.75 Evaluation of territorial officials—now 
based entirely on booklets submitted by superprovincial officials—continued to be carried out 
during each triennial audience, but the audience itself no longer saw direct participation of 
territorial officials in any significant sense. Whereas the Ming audiences were attended 
theoretically by all head officials at the provincial, prefectural, and county levels, after 1686 the 
Qing audiences were attended by a dozen or so subprovincial officials only. Reforms to 
congratulatory memorials involved many steps and were the slowest to come by, but the 
watershed occurred in 1692, when the court ordered all congratulatory memorials delivered 
through the postal system, permanently obviating the need to dispatch subprovincial officials as 
memorial deliverers.76 By 1753, memorial submission itself had been exempted for all but the 
superprovincial officials, turning it into more of a privilege for the highest-ranked officials rather
than a nation-wide obligation.77
73. Qing shilu (Shengzu), Kangxi 4/1/10 dingyou, 4/1/17 jiachen.
74. Qing shilu (Shizu), Shunzhi 9/4/18 jiwei.
75. Qing shilu (Shengzu), Kangxi 25/3/26 gengchen.
76. Qing shilu (Shengzu), Kangxi 31/10/25 gengzi. Rather than submitting the memorials individually, all
civil and offices were to first submit them to the office of the governor general (equivalent to the 
Ming supreme commander), which collectively forwarded them to the central court.
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From a modern perspective, it is tempting to see the changes from Ming to Qing as a 
process of rationalization. Among the Qing justifications for institutional change, many had been
proposed already during the Ming but were largely disregarded, such as the arguments that it was
redundant to perform both the third year review and the triennial audience/evaluation, that the 
departure of head officials compromised local stability, and that the movement of officials placed
heavy financial burdens on the state.78 Other justifications—such as Emperor Qianlong's (r. 
1736-95) remark that congratulatory memorials were never read by him anyway—broke sharply 
from the Ming official discourse that emphasized ritual formalities.79 We are tempted to 
conclude, therefore, that the Qing prioritized practical concerns such as cost and local stability, in
contrast to the Ming obsession with immediacy that was both unproductive and costly. Under 
such an interpretive scheme, the Ming commitment to immediacy can only be understood as a 
manifestation of what under the Qing came to be seen as the impracticality of Ming culture, 
embodied intellectually in the popularity of Wang Yangmingism and politically in the destructive
factionalism that plagued the late-Ming political scene.
Certainly, there is some truth in such an interpretation. For while some Ming officials 
petitioned for institutional reform using the same arguments that Qing reformers would 
eventually employ, the court often rejected their proposals based primarily on the fact that they 
deviated from the dynasty's original institutions.80 Once the basic regulations had been 
established under Emperor Hongwu, it seems that maintaining and protecting them became an 
end in itself, generating great institutional inertia that effectively silenced most suggestions for 
77. Qing huidian shili (Guangxu edition), "Jin biaojian shiyi," 318.745b.
78. Qing shilu (Shizu), Shunzhi 9/4/18 jiwei (local stability); Qing shilu (Shengzu), Kangxi 1/6/19 
gengshen (redundancy), 2/2/3 renyin (local stability, financial burden), 31/10/25 gengzi (financial 
burden).
79. Qing huidian shili (Guangxu edition), "Jin biaojian shiyi," 318.745b. 
80. Ming shilu (Shizong), Jiajing 6/11/9 guiwei; 12/6/22 guisi.
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change. In this sense, the Qing conquest freed the new dynasty from the inertia that had held 
back the Ming, allowing its rulers and officials to determine what best served their needs without
considering whether or not those needs aligned with an institutional legacy. That the Qing 
eventually chose to reject immediacy seems to confirm the far-sightedness of reform advocates 
of the Ming.
But the problem with this interpretation is that it assumes that the Qing system worked 
better than that of the Ming, an assumption which we have no means to verify. If the Qing 
rejection of immediacy appears more rational and practical to most modern eyes, it is because its 
style of governance conforms more readily with our notions of what rationality and practicality 
mean. Yet just as redundancy in the layered quotation style served important archival and 
communicative functions (Chapter 1), is it possible that immediacy, despite its seeming 
wastefulness, also fulfilled a concrete administrative need that happens to deviate from our 
familiar expectations? In what follows I suggest one such possibility: that the Ming commitment 
to immediacy served to offset forces of decentralization that accompanied unprecedented growth 
of the superprovincial administrative layer. The argument is consciously teleological, meaning 
that it explains the collective decisions made by Ming rulers and officials based on the functions 
that those decisions ultimately served, not necessarily based on what the decision-makers were 
originally thinking. Nevertheless, a teleological interpretation helps explain why the Ming 
managed to survive for so long despite having sacrificed so much for the sake of immediacy, and
how the Ming state's peculiar style of governance fit into the longer developmental trajectory of 
the late imperial state.
The Ming commitment to immediacy can be explained, at its most fundamental level, by 
a dilemma faced by all imperial Chinese states: on the one hand, the central court wanted its 
policies to be carried out effectively throughout the empire (=administrative effectiveness); on 
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the other hand, it also wanted to maintain tight control over the territorial bureaucracy 
(=administrative centralization). The two objectives were to some extent contradictory, for 
effective administration necessarily required some degree of decentralization, or delegating 
authority to territorial governments and ceding control over the direct management of things. The
contradiction became most apparent in the question of what constituted the optimal number of 
administrative layers for territorial governance. Until about the tenth century, the ideal aspired by
all dynasties was the two-layer model first institutionalized under the Qin dynasty (221-207 
BCE), which initially divided the empire into about 1,000 lowest-level administrative units 
known as counties (xian 縣) and 37 second-level administrative units known as commanderies 
(jun 郡).81 In theory, such a model allowed relatively centralized control because only one 
intermediary layer separated the court and the lowest administrative units. In practice, however, 
two factors encouraged the eventual appearance of a third administrative layer. First, some 
special tasks such as military mobilization required coordination across multiple second-level 
units, but the slowness of premodern communication made it ineffective to issue every crucial 
order directly from the court. Second, the initial Qin model required each commandery to 
supervise about 27 counties on average, which turned out to be practically unmanageable for the 
commandery. Throughout the rest of the imperial period, therefore, the number of second-level 
administrative units gradually proliferated even while the number of lowest-level units remained 
relatively constant (Figures 3.2 and 3.3).82 The increase of second-level units enabled each of 
them to closely supervise fewer numbers of lowest-level units, but it also meant that the central 
81. Zhou Zhenhe 周振鹤, Zhongguo difang xingzheng zhidu shi 中国地方行政制度史, (Shanghai: Shanghai 
renmin chubanshe, 2005), 59. To be more precise, there were 36 commanderies and one metropolitan 
area that surrounded the capital. In translating the names of administrative units, I have followed Feng
Li, Early China: A Social and Cultural History (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), 245.
82. Zhou Zhenhe, Zhongguo difang xingzheng zhidu shi, 206-10.
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court now had to directly supervise a greater number of second-level units, which in turn 
exceeded the court's administrative capacity. 
Figure 3.2: Numbers of Lowest- and Second-Level Administrative Units83































83. Source: Zhou Zhenhe, Zhongguo difang xingzheng zhidu shi, 207.
84. Source: Zhou Zhenhe, Zhongguo difang xingzheng zhidu shi, 207.
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The remedy to both problems was to create third-level administrative units that each 
supervised several second-level units, what came to be known as provinces (sheng) under the 
Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties.85 During the first half of the imperial period, however, the 
central state tended to regard the creation of third-level units as an undesirable compromise. 
Because each third-level unit was vast in size—provinces of the Ming and Qing were as large as 
European states—it could easily turn against the center whenever its head occupant succeeded in 
acquiring control over all of its financial and military resources. The friction between 
effectiveness on the one hand and centralization on the other acted as the driving force behind 
two uneasy cycles in the first half of the imperial period, in which third-level units were first 
established as surveillance districts without any administrative authority (2nd century BCE under
Western Han and 7th century under the Tang), after which they were gradually given 
administrative and military power to deal more quickly with local and frontier disturbances (1st 
century under Eastern Han and early 8th century under the Tang), which in turn allowed some 
third-level units to grow powerful enough to defy central orders (3rd century under late Eastern 
Han and late 8th century under the Tang), ultimately leading to the empire's fragmentation and 
reunification by a new dynasty that removed all third-level units in an effort to re-centralize 
territorial administration (6th century under the Sui and 10th century under Northern Song).
Yet after the 10th century, a new trend emerged. In sharp contrast to the instability of 
third-level units during the first half of the imperial period, the late imperial period saw their 
gradual stabilization and rise as the most powerful layer of territorial administration. The first to 
appear were circuits (lu 路) of the Song dynasty, which acted like the Ming provincial layer 
85. My account of the development of third-level units follows Zhou Zhenhe, Zhongguo difang 
xingzheng zhidu shi, 58-84; Shen Zhong 沈重, “Lüelun lidai zhengqu yanbian yu zhongyang jiquan” 
略论历代政区演变与中央集权, Zhongguoshi yanjiu (1991.2), 162-66. For dating developments under 
the Eastern Han, I have also consulted Rafe De Crespigny, A Biographical Dictionary of Later Han to
the Three Kingdoms (23-220 Ad) (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007), 1228.
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(sheng) in some respect but also like the Ming subprovincial layer (dao; confusingly also known 
as circuits in English) in other respects.86 As in the Ming provincial layer, the Song appointed to 
any given region multiple circuit intendants who held different types of responsibilities, the most
important of whom were the fiscal intendant, the judicial intendant, and the military intendant 
(equivalent respectively to the Ming Provincial Administration Office, Provincial Surveillance 
Office, and Regional Military Commission). But like the Ming subprovincial layer, spatial 
jurisdictions of circuit intendants did not always overlap exactly, so that one region might be 
defined as a single fiscal circuit but divided into two judicial circuits, for example.87 Following 
unprecedented complication of territorial government structure under the Yuan, the third-level 
offices that emerged under the Ming became more streamlined in two respects.88 First, each of 
the three provincial offices held jurisdictions over the same spatial area, making Ming provinces 
spatially more stable than Song circuits. Second, appearance of the superprovincial layer allowed
all three provincial offices to report to the grand coordinator rather than reporting directly to the 
court as Song circuit intendants did.89 Under the Qing, the superprovincial layer became further 
86. The scholarship on Song circuits is enormous. My account follows the classic study by Winston W. 
Lo, “Circuits and Circuit Intendants in the Territorial Administration of Sung China,” Monumenta 
Serica 31 (1974): 39-107. For a summary of Chinese and Japanese scholarship, see Kobayashi 
Takamichi, Sōdai Chūgoku no tōchi to bunsho, 371-94.
87. Lo, “Circuits and Circuit Intendants,” 59.
88. On the Yuan territorial government structure, see Chen Gaohua 陈高华 and Shi Weimin 史卫民 
Zhongguo zhengzhi zhidu tongshi, vol. 8 Yuandai 中国政治制度通史 第八卷 元代, edited by Bai Gang 白
钢 (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2010), 86-102; Zhou Zhenhe, Zhongguo difang 
xingzheng zhidu shi, 74-77.
89. On the development of the superprovincial layer, see p. 111, n. 6. In tracing the precursors to Qing 
provincial governors, Kent Guy notes that Ming grand coordinators and administrative 
commissioners both reported directly to the court, and that "there was no mechanism for [the grand 
coordinator and the administrative commissioner] to work together." However, this statement does 
not conform with the documentary evidence. Once grand coordinators had been incorporated into the 
territorial administrative routine, both administrative commissioners and surveillance commissioners 
reported to them, an example of which can be seen in Li Shangsi's memorial discussed in Chapter 1, 
pp. 19-25. The nature of relationship between the grand coordinator and the Regional Military 
Commission, on the other hand, needs to be confirmed through further research. See R. Kent Guy, 
Qing Governors and Their Provinces: The Evolution of Territorial Administration in China, 
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streamlined. The post of the regional inspector was abolished, making the provincial governor 
(xunfu; conventionally translated as grand coordinator in the Ming context) solely responsible for
all aspects of provincial administration.90 Additionally, whereas some Ming grand coordinators 
held jurisdictions over sub-provincial or inter-provincial regions, after the 1660s the Qing 
generally appointed one governor to each province, allowing a complete spatial alignment 
between the provincial and superprovincial layers.91 Thus from Song to Qing, third-level 
administrative units became spatially more stable, hierarchical relations among territorial offices 
became more clearly defined, and administrative power became increasingly concentrated into 
the hands of superprovincial officials.
In existing English-language scholarship, these developments are usually described as 
processes of rationalization. In his classic study on the development of Song circuits, Winston Lo
calls the Song circuit system "an integral part of an administrative system of unprecedented 
efficiency."92 In Kent Guy's recent book on Qing provincial governors, the first chapter of which 
traces the development of third-level units before the Qing, all pre-Qing third-level units are 
described as imperfect precursors to the province that eventually emerged under the Qing, which 
"converted [a] fairly unpromising institution into one of the pillars of the Chinese empire."93 
Certainly, if we consider the overall growth of population and post-Song expansions in territory, 
it may be true that late imperial China could not possibly have been ruled through a simple two-
layer territorial government. But even if the growth and consolidation of third-level 
administrative units was an inevitable necessity, we are still left with the question why, with so 
1644-1796 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010), 33.
90. Guy, Qing Governors and Their Provinces, 56.
91. Guy, Qing Governors and Their Provinces, 48-54.
92. Lo, “Circuits and Circuit Intendants,” 43.
93. Guy, Qing Governors and Their Provinces, 46.
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much power concentrated at this level, the late imperial states did not fragment into multiple 
regional power blocks the same way the Han and Tang empires eventually did.94 
It is this question of decentralization—or the lack thereof—that explains the function of 
immediacy in Ming territorial bureaucracy. If previously unstable third-level units grew so 
powerful during the late imperial period, we may postulate that their growth was realized at a 
price. During the Song, the price took the form of institutional redundancy. According to 
Winston Lo, even though each Song circuit intendant had an official area of responsibility (such 
as fiscal administration, the judiciary, or the military), the actual boundaries between those areas 
tended to be blurry, and "whenever an intendancy was assigned a specific job, other intendancies 
of the circuit were directed to check and report."95 Because all intendants were more or less equal
on the administrative hierarchy, and since there was no person to supervise all intendants 
working in a given region (the equivalent of Ming grand coordinators), many decisions had to be
made through consultation among multiple circuit intendants who held somewhat overlapping 
jurisdictions. Seen in this light, the Song circuit system sacrificed some degree of administrative 
effectiveness for the sake of administrative centralization. By deliberately fragmenting power at 
the circuit level, the Song system made it difficult for any one circuit intendant to accumulate 
94. The answer to this question is only alluded to by Lo and unaddressed by Guy. For example, a section 
of Lo's article describes the role of "inter-intendancy rivalry for central control" (64), but this 
important point (which informs my own argument below) is not incorporated into the core of his 
argument. On the question why Song circuits did not cause the empire's fragmentation, Lo simply 
notes that the Song maintained the stability of the circuit "by incorporating it formally into the 
governmental machinery instead of letting it develop haphazardly." Commenting on the Tang 
dynasty's failure, Guy notes that "the Tang central government was not misguided in the creation of 
regional authority, but... it was careless in the way it delegated power and weak in the 
institutionalization of regional power" (27). This statement implies that the Qing success derived from
its formal institutionalization of the province, but as with Lo's statement about Song circuits, it is not 
clear why formalizing the authority of third-level units would necessarily have erased their 
decentralizing tendencies, nor does Guy explain how the Qing delegation of regional power was more
careful than that of the Tang. See Lo, “Circuits and Circuit Intendants,” 42, 63-65; Guy, Qing 
Governors and Their Provinces, 27.
95. Lo, “Circuits and Circuit Intendants,” 64.
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enough influence to turn against the center. But the diffusion of authority also made it hard to 
respond to fast-paced developments such as war, which has often been cited as the reason for the 
Song's military weakness against its neighboring polities.96
The safety net that the Song had built into its circuit system soon disappeared under the 
Ming, when appearance of the superprovincial layer concentrated most provincial-level authority
in the grand coordinator (and to a lesser degree the regional inspector). Immediacy, then, was the
Ming state's price for maintaining a powerful superprovincial layer free from jurisdictional 
redundancy. By the dynasty's end, grand coordinators had acquired great authority over lower 
levels of the territorial bureaucracy, an important aspect of which was the ability to submit 
personnel evaluations and impeachments of all provincial and local officials.97 Since the grand 
coordinator's power was no longer checked by his peers as Song circuit intendants had been (the 
regional inspector acted as one form of check, but his rank was substantially lower), the court 
had to maintain strong ties with the lower territorial bureaucracy to prevent the grand coordinator
from monopolizing influence. By requiring territorial officials to undergo evaluations at the 
capital, the court maintained the appearance of centralized control over personnel management, 
even though appointment decisions relied increasingly on superprovincial officials' reports. By 
making personal trips to the capital, territorial officials gained a sense of connection with the 
center, even if the connection often took the form of bribing capital officials in the hopes of 
receiving favorable evaluations.98 Likewise, by committing the required level of energy, 
96. Zhou Zhenhe, Zhongguo difang xingzheng zhidu shi, 73; Shen Zhong, “Lüelun lidai zhengqu 
yanbian,” 164.
97. On superprovincial officials' growing influence over personnel evaluations, see Wada Masahiro, Min 
Shin kanryōsei no kenkyū, 428-59.
98. The bribery that accompanied third year reviews and triennial evaluations was an openly-
acknowledged problem. Part of the justification cited for the various pay-for-exemption measures was
that the officials would otherwise spend the equivalent amount on bribery. For examples, see Ming 
shilu (Xianzong), Chenghua 10/5/2 bingxu; Ming shilu (Muzong), Longqing 2/1/18 wuchen.
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resources, and personnel to each congratulatory memorial, provincial and local officials 
confirmed their continued commitment to the center even while superprovincial officials exerted 
increasing influence over their immediate careers. Immediacy, in this sense, was both a 
confirmation of the center's power and a means for maintaining it, a lie that stayed real as long as
everyone acted his part in believing it.
The Qing not only abandoned immediacy but further strengthened the power of 
provincial governors by abolishing the regional inspector's post. What, then, helped stabilize 
decentralizing forces of Qing provinces? One interpretation is that the Qing's price for 
strengthening the superprovincial layer was in fact decentralization. Tracing changes in routine 
administrative procedures from Ming to Qing, we can find that in a number of cases, the sites of 
decision-making moved from the court to the superprovincial level. Whereas the Ministry of 
Personnel appointed all local officials during the Ming (albeit based on superprovincial officials' 
reports and upon confirmation by the emperor), in the early eighteenth century the Qing 
partitioned the responsibility into three parts, with the most important posts selected directly by 
the emperor, the moderately important posts recommended by provincial governors, and the less 
important posts appointed by the Ministry of Personnel.99 During the Ming, local officials who 
fell sick had to remain at their posts until the court approved their retirement requests; in the 
Qing after 1736, they were allowed to leave as soon as the provincial governor's approval had 
been obtained.100 The authority to approve executions, formerly the sole prerogative of the 
emperor and his court, fell increasingly into the hands of provincial governors over the course of 
the Qing.101
99. Yamamoto Hajime 山本一, “Shindai tokubu ni yoru chihōkan jinji kitei no keisei to unyō” 清代、督撫
による地方官人事規定の形成と運用, T’ōyō gakuhō 93.3 (2013), especially p. 40 on how the 
responsibility of appointment was divided.
100. Wu Yue, “Shindai chihōkan no byōshi kyūyō,” 45-46. On Ming practices, see for example Li 
Shangsi's memorial discussed in Chapter 1, pp. 19-25.
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These observations do not, however, conform with the general scholarly understanding 
that the early Qing state underwent a significant centralization of its administrative structure.102 
An alternate interpretation, therefore, is that the Qing "center" expanded beyond the emperor and
his court to include the superprovincial layer. This interpretation conforms with what we know 
about palace memorials—often cited as an example of the Qing's centralizing reform—which 
allowed the emperor to maintain strong ties with his provincial governors (as well as other 
specially-selected officials) by creating a confidential passage of communication that bypassed 
the intervening regular bureaucracy.103 The Qing approach to territorial control was therefore 
quite the opposite of the Ming's. Whereas the Ming court sought to stabilize the territorial 
bureaucracy by maintaining a strong sense of cohesion with all territorial offices below the 
superprovincial level, the Qing court weakened its ties with the lower bureaucracy but greatly 
strengthened its connection with the superprovincial level instead. Such an approach was 
probably less costly than the Ming approach, for the court only needed to maintain a limited 
number of strong ties rather than requiring thousand of officials to make frequent rips to the 
center. But the approach was also risky, for the dynasty's stability now depended on the 
continued functioning of those strong ties. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the Qing 
ultimately ended in the hands of Yuan Shikai, a former superprovincial official. If the Qing mode
of governance seems efficient to us, efficiency nevertheless had a cost. 
101. Weiting Guo, “The Speed of Justice: Summary Execution and Legal Culture in Qing Dynasty 
China, 1644-1912” (PhD diss., University of British Columbia, 2016).
102. For an example of such a view, see William T. Rowe, China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 39-43.
103. Silas H. L. Wu, Communication and Imperial Control in China: Evolution of the Palace 
Memorial System, 1693-1735 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
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Conclusion
By contextualizing the Ming commitment to immediacy from a cross-dynastic 
perspective, we can discern consistencies, incremental changes, as well as qualitative shifts in the
long development of imperial China's territorial administration. Some fundamental problems 
remained unchanged throughout the period, such as the inherent tension between administrative 
effectiveness and administrative centralization. Within the framework of this basic dilemma, we 
also observe long-term developments in a particular direction, as was the case in the appearance 
and consolidation of the provincial administrative layer from Song to Qing. But beneath the 
surface of a seemingly unidirectional development, solutions to the same shared problem showed
qualitative changes from one dynasty to another. The Ming solution of immediacy appears both 
costly and incomprehensible when regarded all by itself, but placed in the context of other 
dynasties' solutions, we can start to understand it as a much-needed cost for the state's attempt to 
realize administrative effectiveness and centralization at the same time.
The Ming commitment to immediacy reflected its overall commitment to maintain steady
(albeit increasingly symbolic) ties with every level of the territorial government. In doing so, the 
Ming court maintained a sense of bureaucratic unity that partially offset an unprecedented 
growth in the power of superprovincial officials. But meanwhile, the court did not neglect to 
maintain control over the superprovincial officials either. One way in which the court asserted its
control was by transferring these officials from one post to another—or from a territorial post to 
a capital post and vice versa—according to the changing needs of the state. Yet given the 
vastness of the Ming empire and the slowness of communication and travel, such transfers 
generated a different set of problems and dilemmas, to which the next chapter will turn.
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Chapter 4: Official Transfers and the Paradox of Speed and Delay
Introduction
On 6/15 of 1587, the Ming court ordered an official named Wu Wenhua 吳文華, at the 
time serving as Supreme Commander of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces, to transfer to take 
up the post of Nanjing Minister of Works. Wu received the order on 7/16 (probably in the city of 
Guangzhou, Guangdong province), left his old post on 10/9, and reported to his new office on 
5/3 of the following year. From the day of Wu's appointment until his arrival, 312 days (about 
10.5 months) had elapsed.1
Governing an empire the size of Ming China meant dealing with constant time lags 
between the issuing of government orders and their taking effect at the local level. The journey 
of Wu Wenhua is an extreme case that illustrates how long these time lags could extend, but to 
varying degrees his experience was shared by many high officials of the Ming, whose long and 
complicated transfer processes form the subject of this chapter. In contrast to more extensively 
studied areas such as the procedures of official selection and evaluation, the process of official 
transfer belongs to a realm of seeming administrative triviality that has long escaped the attention
of historians. However, a case study of official transfers offers a convenient vantage point from 
which to evaluate the effects of time lags on the operating mechanisms of the Ming state.
This chapter analyzes the time spent on each step of the official transfer process and the 
cultural and institutional contexts that contributed to its frequent delay. In doing so, I examine 
some of the fundamental difficulties of governing an empire whose administrative center was 
separated from its provinces by many months of communicative time lag. As a centralized polity 
that stretched over a vast territory, the Ming state faced many challenges in keeping regional 
1. For details on Wu Wenhua's transfer, see Table 4.1, #55. 
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control. As we saw in Chapter 2, part of this challenge was to maintain a costly infrastructure for 
moving state documents and personnel over great distances. But another aspect of the problem 
derived from an inherent contradiction embodied by the very idea of administrative 
centralization, defined as a commitment to consolidate the sites of decision-making in one place 
(i.e. the Beijing court through most of the Ming dynasty), even though the matters decided 
concerned places far away from that location. As this chapter will show, the Ming court 
maintained control over the official transfer process through a set of bureaucratic procedures 
whose sites of final deliberation converged on the Beijing capital. However, since these 
procedures were achieved through long distance movement of documents and personnel, they 
also led to great losses of time that inadvertently undermined the original objective of 
administrative centralization itself. Through the case of official transfers, we can see the complex
ways in which the Ming state balanced its desire for centralization with the reality of delay that 
directly resulted from it. 
Reconstructing the Official Transfer Process
Reconstructing the official transfer process means, literally, chasing a moving target. 
Take the example of Wu Wenhua. The basic facts about his appointment can be found in the 
official annal Ming Veritable Records, appearing under the entry for 6/15 of 1587, when the 
appointment decision was made at court:
[The court] promoted Wu Wenhua, Vice-Minister of the Right of War, currently 
serving as Supreme Commander of Guangdong and Guangxi with a concurrent 
appointment as Grand Coordinator, to Minister of Works in Nanjing.
陞總督兩廣兼巡撫。兵部右侍郎吳文華。為南京工部尚書。2
From this crisp record, we learn Wu's original post, the date of his transfer order, and the new 
post to which he had been appointed. But his trail in the Veritable Records ends here, for once an 
order of appointment had left Beijing, the court had no means of receiving real-time updates on 
2. Ming shilu (Shenzong), 187.3504 (Wanli 15/6/15 guiyou).
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the actual movement of its officials. Consequently, decision-makers at court were left to 
speculate as to how much progress a transferring official had made at any given time, and if the 
Veritable Records ever made note of his progress, it was such speculations at court that found 
their ways into this centrally-compiled work.
To reconstruct the subsequent movement of the transferring officials, we must turn to a 
different set of sources which I call "arrival report memorials." These memorials, submitted after 
an official arrived at his new post, both ritually thanked the emperor for the new appointment and
reported one's arrival date to the central government. The originals of these memorials are no 
longer extant: either they were destroyed in the chaos of the Ming-Qing transition (along with 
most other archival documents), or they were never archived at court, having been destroyed as 
soon as routine checks of their contents had been completed. Fortunately, the texts of some 
memorials have survived through inclusion in the collected writings of their authors, and it is 
these reproduced texts which form the basis of my subsequent analysis.
A sample memorial from Wu Wenhua will convey a sense of what arrival report 
memorials look like. To preserve the original style of writing, I translate as literally as possible. 
Because of its many repetitive expressions and long official titles, the text may be somewhat 
confusing to a first-time reader; rather than following every detail, the reader is encouraged to 
observe the types of information that can be gleaned from the text (underlined in the following 
passage): 
A memorial to respectfully thank your majesty for heavenly favors. I had earlier 
held the post of Censor-in-Chief of the Right, with a concurrent post as Vice 
Minister of the Right of War, serving as Supreme Commander in charge of 
military affairs of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces, with concurrent duties in 
the management of grain supplies and salt regulations, and concurrently serving 
as Grand Coordinator of the Guangdong region. On the 16th day of the 7th month 
of Wanli 15 (1587), I received a document from the Ministry of Personnel, which 
said, "Our Ministry, together with other offices, has nominated [Wu Wenhua] and 
memorialized regarding this matter, whereupon we received the emperor's order, 
saying 'Promote Wu Wenhua to the Minister of Works in Nanjing.'" I respectfully 
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followed this [order], and on the 9th day of the 10th month in Cangwu County,3 I 
handed over administrative responsibilities to Vice Minister of the Right of War 
and concurrently Assistant Censor-in-Chief Wu [Shan],4 who had been newly 
appointed to serve as Supreme Commander in charge of military affairs in 
Guangdong and Guangxi. After the handover, I left for my new assignment. On 
the way, I became ill and submitted a memorial to seek approval for a leave. On 
the 2nd day of the 3rd month of Wanli 16 (1588), I received another document 
from the Ministry of Personnel, which said, "[Wu Wenhua's] memorial has 
received the emperor's response, which says, 'Wu Wenhua is instructed to follow 
this new order and serve at his appointed post. He is not allowed to take a leave. 
The Ministry of Personnel is to be aware of this.'" This document was delivered to
me, whereupon I proceeded with the journey regardless of my sickness. On the 
3rd day of the 5th month, I bowed deeply toward the palace to express my 








In the rest of the memorial (untranslated in the above excerpt), Wu goes on to expresses his 
gratitude for being selected despite his unworthiness, a conventional expression of humility that 
appears in nearly all arrival report memorials. While this second half of an arrival report 
memorial tends to be highly literary in style, the first half (the only part that will concern us here)
is always formulaic in style and precise in its presentation of dates, names, and places. Because 
of such characteristics, these memorials allow us to reconstruct the official transfer process with 
a great degree of chronological precision. Wu Wenhua's arrival report memorial, for example, 
contains several crucial pieces of information that cannot be found in the Ming Veritable 
Records: the date on which his appointment order was delivered to him (1587/7/16), the date on 
3. Cangwu County 蒼梧縣 was located in Wuzhou Prefecture 梧州府 of Guangxi Province.
4. For the appointment of Wu Shan 吳善 as Wu Wenhua's successor, see Ming shilu (Shenzong), 
187.3507 (Wanli 15/6/18 bingzi).
5. Wu Wenhua 吳文華, Jimei tang ji 濟美堂集, Liudu shugao 留都疏稿, "Nanjing gongbu daoren xie'en 
shu" 南京工部到任謝恩疏, 1a-2a.
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which he left his old post (1587/10/9), the fact that he fell sick on the road and requested a leave 
(rejection received 1588/3/2), and the date on which he arrived at the new post (1588/5/3). By 
collecting dates of this type and by supplementing them with information from the Ming 
Veritable Records, we can calculate and analyze the time spent on various components of the 
official transfer process.
The discussion that follows is based on data collected from 97 arrival report memorials 
(supplemented by relevant entries in the Ming Veritable Records) reflecting the experiences of 72
individual officials between 1458 and 1634. The memorials were located through a survey of 
more than 300 Ming collected writings, offering a fairly comprehensive coverage of the major 
collections of traditional Chinese books available today.6 Table 4.1 provides a summary of all 97 
cases, along with discussions on my criteria of case selection and conventions of data 
presentation. I use the table's reference numbers whenever referring to cases that appear in it, but 
occasionally my discussion will also touch on cases that have been excluded from the table for 
one reason or another; in such cases, the relevant citations will be provided in the footnotes 
directly. 
6. In traditional bibliographical classification, the collected writings surveyed in this study belong 
primarily to the Edicts and Memorials 詔令奏議 subsection under History 史部, although I have also 
examined some books classified under the Individual Collections 別集 subsection under Literature 集
部. Excluded from the survey are anthologies that contain writings by multiple authors. When 
conducting my survey, I created a bibliographic entry for each title that contained a significant 
number of official documents. A total of 304 such entries were created, although the actual number of 
books examined was far greater. The survey has covered major modern facsimile collections of 
traditional Chinese books, as well as the contents of a few Japanese and Taiwanese holding 
institutions. These include the Siku quanshu 四庫全書 (45 bibliographical entries created; same 
hereafter), Siku cunmu congshu 四庫存目叢書 (84), Xuxiu siku quanshu 續修四庫全書 (14), Siku jinhui 
congkan 四庫禁毀叢刊 (17), Siku jinhui congkan bubian 四庫禁毀叢刊補編 (9), Naikaku bunko 內閣文庫
(17), Tōyō bunkan kenkyūjo 東洋文化研究所 (19), University of Tokyo Central Library (9), Tōyō 
bunko 東洋文庫, including facsimiles from the National Central Library of Taiwan (39), and Fu Sinian
傅斯年 Library holdings in the Scripta Sinica Database, accessed June 2014 (16). Additionally, 35 
bibliographical entries were produced in a less systematic manner from several other collectanea and 
holding institutions.
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Because of source limitations, the officials included in this study were either capital 
officials or superprovincial officials after their transfers had been completed (see Table 4.1 
explanatory notes for details). Together, these two categories of officials made up roughly one-
tenth of all civil officials in the Ming.7 Unfortunately, the transfer experiences of the provincial 
and local officials (the remaining 90%) cannot be recovered.8 This study therefore concerns only 
a special subset of the Ming officialdom, but since these officials held the greatest power among 
all Ming officials, delays in their transfers had great ramifications that sometimes became the 
topics of debate at the court and beyond. Although the cases in this chapter do not represent the 
shared experience of all Ming officials, what they do illuminate is a set of expectations, shared 
among officials high and low, about the nature of bureaucratic movement.
Official Transfer Times: An Overview
Official transfers in the Ming required many months to complete. As we can see from 
Figure 4.1, Beijing officials who transferred into the provinces took anywhere from one month to
half a year before reaching their destinations. (Some transfers might have taken even longer, 
since my data do not include Beijing officials who traveled to remote destinations of the 
southwest.) For officials who transferred from one province to another, even longer times were 
required. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show the number of days that elapsed from appointment until 
7. We do not have precise statistics on the total number of officials of any given category, but some 
estimates can be made based on contemporary references. See Hucker, “Governmental Organization 
of the Ming Dynasty,” 12 n. 20; Huang, 1587, A Year of No Significance, 53, 240 n. 27. Because all 
superprovincial officials held the title of the censor, they were regarded as capital officials in Ming 
administrative nomenclature.
8. I have not seen a single arrival report memorial submitted by an official below the superprovincial 
level. For this reason, it is difficult to reconstruct the transfer process of provincial and local officials 
with the same degree of detail as the capital officials and superprovincial officials. Presumably, local 
officials reported their arrival dates to their direct superiors, hence obviating the need to submit 
arrival report memorials to the Beijing court. For regulations on the time limits for transfers of local 
officials, see Libu zhizhang 吏部職掌 (Siku cunmu edition), Wenxuan qinglisi 文選清吏司 2, Jijia ke 給
假科, "Guowei pingxian" 過違憑限, 14b-15a.
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arrival in select cases of inter-provincial transfer. These maps show that even transfers to 
adjacent provinces could take more than four months to complete, while in some extreme cases, 
transfers over longer distances required more than a year. The long transfer time of Wu Wenhua, 
while leaning toward the extreme side, was by no means an isolated case.
Figure 4.1: Days Taken for Transfers from Beijing9
9. Source: Table 4.1, #7, 40, 57, 60, 62, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 78, 81, 92, 93. The map shows all 
Beijing-provincial transfers (including transfers to destinations within North Zhili) for which the 
dates of appointment and arrival can be known. Provincial boundaries in Figures 4.1-4.3 are based on 
T. S. Baker, "1389 Ming Boundaries," vector layer on WorldMap.
- 158 -
Figure 4.2: Days Taken for Inter-Provincial Transfers from Jiangxi10
Figure 4.3: Days Taken for Inter-Provincial Transfers from Zhejiang and Fujian11
10. Source: Table 4.1, #18, 23, 27, 30, 31, 34, 50, 58, 61, 75. The map shows all inter-provincial transfers 
originating from Jiangxi for which the dates of appointment and arrival can be known.
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But bureaucratic movement in the Ming was not just slow; it also exhibited peculiar 
patterns that at first sight may seem perplexing to a modern observer. Especially noteworthy is a 
stark difference between the time of Beijing-provincial and inter-provincial transfers: while the 
former was roughly proportional to the distance of travel (Figure 4.1), the latter turns out to be 
much more unpredictable. As we can see from Figures 4.2 and 4.3, the time of inter-provincial 
transfers could vary greatly between transfers that covered very similar routes and distances. For 
example, included in Figure 4.2 are two separate instances of transfer from Nanchang (Jiangxi) 
to Yangzhou (South Zhili). Even though the two cases shared their places of origin and 
destination (and presumably the same routes of travel), the total time of transfer turns out to be 
76 days in one instance and 125 days in another. Figure 4.3 shows two transfers that each took 
110 days; even though one of these covered a much longer distance, the time of transfer turns out
to be identical.12 
Clearly, the time of transfer was not just a function of the distance that needed to be 
traveled. To understand what other factors determined the speed of official movement, we must 
look at the internal composition of the official transfer process. This process can be analyzed as 
three consecutive time segments: the time from when an appointment order was issued until it 
was received by the transferring official (period of information delivery); from the receipt of 
order until departure for the new post (period of waiting and preparation); and from departure 
until arrival at the destination (actual journey on the road). Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the amount 
of time spent on each of these segments in select cases of Beijing-provincial and inter-provincial 
transfers, respectively. We can see that the time spent on information delivery was negligible in 
11. Source: Table 4.1, #8, 17, 47, 73, 79, 90. The map shows all inter-provincial transfers originating 
from Zhejiang or Fujian for which the dates of appointment and arrival can be known.
12. See Table 4.1, #31 (Nanchang to Yangzhou, 76 days), #50 (Nanchang to Yangzhou, 125 days), #47 
(Huzhou to Nanchang, 110 days), and #73 (Ningbo to Xuanfu, 110 days).
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Beijing-provincial transfers (since appointment orders were issued from within Beijing), whereas
in inter-provincial transfers, information delivery took up much greater portions of the total time.
This extra time of information delivery explains why the time of inter-provincial transfers was so
unpredictable: whereas in Beijing-provincial transfers the total time of transfer was mostly a 
function of travel distance, in inter-provincial transfers it was influenced not only by the distance
of travel, but also by what might be called the communicative distance between an official's 
place of origin and the Beijing capital.



















Appointment to Order Receipt Order Receipt to Departure Departure to Arrival 
Figure 4.4: Breakdown of Beijing-Provincial Transfer Time13
13. This chart shows all transfers originating from Beijing for which we can determine the length of each 
component of the transfer process.
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Figure 4.5: Breakdown of Inter-Provincial Transfer Time14
In addition to the distances of communication and travel, a third factor contributed to the 
total time of official transfers. This was the length of a period of seeming inactivity, the time 
between receipt of appointment order and departure, that existed in almost every case of official 
transfer. The pervasive existence of this waiting period was another reason why the time of inter-
provincial transfer was unpredictable: while its length was relatively constant in Beijing-
provincial transfers (Figure 4.4), in inter-provincial transfers it showed great variation from one 
instance to another (Figure 4.5). These periods of waiting constitute the most perplexing feature 
of Ming official transfers, for their very existence goes against our intuitive expectations of how 
officials in a centralized bureaucracy should have behaved. After all, why did these officials fail 
to immediately start their journeys, despite having received imperial orders that explicitly 
instructed them to leave? Why is it that these waiting periods occasionally stretched into extreme
14. This chart shows all inter-provincial transfers for which we can determine the length of each 
component of the transfer process. Excluded from the chart are transfers whose places of origin or 
destination were located within North or South Zhili.
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lengths in inter-provincial transfers, but not for officials whose journeys started from Beijing? 
What, in fact, were these officials doing during the many months that they remained immobile?
The rest of this chapter will trace each stage of the official transfer process, identifying 
the various factors that collectively determined the total lengths of transfer time. The greatest 
focus will be on the periods of seeming inactivity between order receipt and departure which, 
upon closer examination, turn out to be crucial times of administrative activity, when various 
documents and personnel moved across the empire even while the transferring officials 
themselves remained still. As the upcoming examples will show, delays in the official transfer 
process arose from a mixed set of factors, many of which were caused by institutional 
requirements, some of which were the products of intentional decisions by the transferring 
officials, and yet others of which were born of unexpected circumstances outside anyone's 
control. 
From Appointment to Order Receipt
From the perspective of the Beijing court, the official transfer process started the moment
an appointment order was approved by the emperor; from the official's perspective, the process 
did not begin until this order had reached him. Officials who were located outside Beijing 
received their appointment orders through two possible means. First, decisions concerning high 
official appointments were announced publicly on the capital gazettes (dibao 邸報).15 Through a 
15. Much remains unknown about Ming dibao. For a comprehensive and mostly reliable overview, see 
Fang Hanqi 方汉奇 ed., Zhongguo xinwen shiye tongshi 中国新闻事业通史, 3 vols., vol. 1 (Beijing: 
Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1992), 119-86. For narrow but insightful investigations into a 
number of contentious points, see Su Tongbing 蘇同炳, Mingshi oubi 明史偶筆, (Taipei: Taiwan 
shangwu yinshuju, 1995), 57-126. For a recent comprehensive study on Qing dibao, see Emily C. 
Mokros, “Communication, Empire, and Authority in the Qing Gazette” (PhD diss., Johns Hopkins 
University, 2016). In addition to the regular capital gazettes that contained synopses of major 
communications that passed through the court (including communication about high official 
appointments), the Ming government may also have issued news sheets that specifically publicized 
recent appointment decisions, including those concerning the lowest-ranked officials. One set of news
sheets of this type survives in the National Library of China, although it is not clear whether it was 
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process of copying and recopying, these gazettes reached officials throughout the empire, 
including the appointee himself. Because the gazettes were disseminated in relay fashion, they 
tended to travel faster than other forms of official documents, and it was likely through these 
gazettes that most officials heard the news of their appointments for the first time. What counted 
as the formal appointment orders, however, were notifications of appointment issued by the 
Ministry of Personnel. In the sources, these notifications are referred to variously as 
"appointment certificates" (wenpin 文憑), "inter-departmental communication" (ziwen 咨文), or 
simply as "official documents" (gongwen 公文). They were delivered to the appointees by single 
messengers,16 and for this reason, these notifications probably reached the officials somewhat 
issued directly by the court or compiled by private (or quasi-official) hands. See Wanli ba nian si yue 
jixuan bao 萬曆八年四月急選報, printed, 3 leaves, held in National Library of China; also introduced in
Pan Xinghui 潘星辉, Mingdai wenguan quanxuan zhidu yanjiu 明代文官铨选制度研究, (Beijing: 
Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2005), 278-83.
16. In most cases, the arrival report memorials only reported that a notification of appointment had been 
received on a certain day, without specifying how exactly the document had been delivered. Even 
though we cannot exclude the possibility that some of these notifications were delivered through the 
postal system, I have not seen any reference to this method of delivery among the arrival report 
memorials that I have examined. In contrast, there are five confirmed instances in which these 
memorials state explicitly that the notifications had been carried by specific messengers:
• Luo Qinshun (#5), 1527: "On the 19th day of the 3rd month of Jiajing 6, [I received] an official 
document, which was carried by an administrative official who had been dispatched by the 
Ministry of Personnel." 嘉靖六年三月十九日。吏部差辦事官齎到公文一通. (Note: Luo was likely 
located at his home in Taihe County 泰和縣 of Ji'an Prefecture 吉安府, Jiangxi.)
• Wang Shouren (#8), 1527: "On the 6th day of the 6th month this year, an official who had been 
dispatched by the Ministry of War arrived at my home, carrying an official document." 今年六月
初六日。兵部差官齎文前到臣家. (Note: Wang's home was likely located in Shaoxing Prefecture 紹
興府, Zhejiang.)
• Li Sui (no ref. number), 1550: "On the 5th day of the 11th month, I received an inter-
departmental communication from the Ministry of Personnel, forwarded by the Ministry of War 
and carried by Company Chief Wang Xun, who had originally been dispatched by me to deliver 
a memorial." 十一月初五日。據臣原差齎奏百戶王勲。齎到兵部十月十七日轉發吏部咨. (Note: At the 
time of order receipt, Li was likely located along the northern border of South Zhili, awaiting 
further instructions regarding his transfer appointment. ) See Li Sui 李遂, Li Xiangmin gong 
zouyi 李襄敏公奏議, "Jizhou duxiang qingchi shu" 薊州督餉請敕疏, 3.17a-18b.
• Tan Lun (#36), 1565: "On the 23rd day of the 11th month of Jiajing 44, while at my home, I 
received an inter-departmental communication from the Ministry of Personnel, brought by the 
messenger-official Long Tong." 嘉靖四十四年十一月二十三日。臣在原籍。據承差龍詷齎到吏部咨. 
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later than the capital gazettes.17 Nevertheless, since the appointees could not move forward with 
their transfers until the formal notifications had been received,18 for most practical purposes the 
speed of information delivery depended on how quickly the messengers who carried the 
appointment notifications managed to travel. 
How long, then, were these periods of information delivery? Figure 4.6 shows the 
number of days that elapsed from appointment decisions were made until they were received in 
the various provinces. Two points must be noted regarding the nature of the data. First, although 
most officials cited the formal appointment notifications as their sources of information, in a 
small number of cases, they cited the capital gazettes or did not specify how the news had 
reached them. Therefore, part of the variation in communication time may have arisen from 
differences between these two media, rather than from variations in the travel speed itself. 
Second, distances to Beijing could vary greatly depending on where one was located within a 
(Note: Tan's home was likely located in Yihuang County 宜黃縣 of Fuzhou Prefecture 撫州府, 
Jiangxi.)
• Tan Lun (#36), 1565?: "When I reached Liping Station, I received an inter-departmental 
communication from the Ministry of Personnel, carried by an official dispatched by the Ministry 
of War." 至李坪驛。及准兵部差官齎到吏部咨. (Note: Liping Station was located in Hugngang 
County 黃岡縣 of Huangzhou Prefecture 黃州府, Huguang.)
It is noteworthy that all five cases date from the Jiajing reign, and moreover, they all involve officials 
who, at the time of order receipt, were either on leave from official duties or had left their formal 
locations of appointment. For this reason, I cannot conclude for certain that notifications of 
appointment were always delivered by single messengers, even though I see this as a very likely 
possibility.
17. For example, in 1585 Gu Yangqian (#51), located in Jizhou 薊州 in the vicinity of Beijing, received 
news about his appointment through the capital gazette on 6/23, followed by an official notification of
appointment on 6/25. In 1628 Liu Zongzhou (#91), located in Zhejiang, received news about his 
appointment first through the gazette and later through a formal notification. Still, there is no solid 
proof that the officials always received the gazettes before the formal notifications, because most 
officials cited only one of these two media, not both, as the source of their information.
18. For example, Lu Xiangsheng (no ref. number), located in Huguang around 1635, wrote in a memorial
that although he had read in the gazettes repeated imperial instructions concerning his new 
appointment, he did not dare submit further memorials of declination because he had not received a 
formal communication from the Ministry of Personnel. See Lu Xiangsheng 盧象昇, Ming da sima Lu 
gong zouyi 明大司馬盧公奏議, "Xie'en daoren shu" 謝恩到任疏, 4.1a-2b.
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province, so the categorization of data points by province (as I do here), while conceptually and 
stylistically convenient, lacks geographic and statistical precision.19 Despite these cautions, 
Figure 4.6 shows that the time of order delivery was roughly proportional to distance. But within 
this roughly regular pattern, the time of delivery could still vary considerably even when the 
orders were being delivered to the same province. To take an example from the province of 
Guangdong, the fastest order of appointment reached its recipient within a matter of 30 days 






























































Location of Receipt 
◇=median; vertical lines indicate max and min values 
Figure 4.6: Number of Days from Appointment to Order Receipt (Source: Table 4.2)
It is tempting to find the reasons for these variations in differences in the media of 
information delivery (capital gazettes vs. formal appointment notifications), or from the fact that 
19. There are also other considerations such as whether the official was in office or on leave at the time of
order receipt. Presumably, it would have taken shorter periods of time for appointment orders to reach
officials of the former category, many of whom were located in provincial or prefectural seats, in 
contrast to the latter officials who likely resided in their homes located away from major 
administrative centers. 
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some appointment orders were being delivered to different locations in the same province. 
Although there is a degree of truth to both explanations, there were also substantial variations in 
speed that were independent of either factor. This is confirmed by Figure 4.7, which shows the 
number of days between appointment and order receipt in all known instances of order delivery 
to the secondary capital of Nanjing. Even though these orders were being delivered to the same 
city, on what must have been the most-traveled route between Beijing and Nanjing, we 
nevertheless observe great fluctuations in the time of delivery. To be sure, some of the outlier 
data points happen to come from cases for which the sources of information were either the 
capital gazettes or unspecified. However, even among the cases in which appointment orders 
were undoubtedly delivered through formal notifications, time of delivery still fluctuated greatly,

































Jiajing, Longqing (1522-72) Wanli (1573-1620) Tianqi, Chongzhen 
(1621-44) 
●＝received through capital gazette or source unspecified   ○＝received through notification of appointment 
Figure 4.7: Time of Order Delivery from Beijing to Nanjing20
20. Source: Table 4.1, #4, 13, 14, 15, 16, 33, 37, 56, 63, 64, 76, 86, 94.
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All of this suggests that the Ming state operated in a world of communicative uncertainty.
While the central government could count on most of its outgoing documents to reach their 
recipients eventually, it could not always control the speed with which they moved. In some 
instances, the communicative time lags stretched to significant lengths. If we were to follow the 
maximum values shown in Figure 4.6, the Ming court always faced the possibility, however 
small, that its orders would take more than two months to reach South Zhili, three months to 
reach Fujian and Sichuan, and as many as four months to reach Guangdong. Together, these 
uncertainties all factored into the general unpredictability of transfer times that we have already 
observed.
From Order Receipt to Departure
We might expect that once an appointment order had reached an official, he would 
quickly pack up his belongings and depart immediately for his new assignment. Yet in practice, 
as we saw in Figures 4.4 and 4.5, many officials remained at their original locations for a long 
time. We can get a different look at this strange phenomenon from Figure 4.8, which shows the 
number of days that went into this period of waiting in all thirty-five known cases where its 
length can be determined. The chart shows that while the majority of officials left for their new 
assignments within a month of order receipt, a few officials took two to three months or even 
longer before leaving for their new assignments. Curiously, the Beijing officials invariably left 
their old posts between 10 to 49 days after receiving the transfer order, whereas the departure 
time of officials outside Beijing was more spread out. 
The existence of a clear pattern, while perplexing, suggests that these occasional long 
periods of waiting arose from reasons that were not coincidental but rather necessary and 
legitimate. As we will see, many officials remained at or near their original locations not because
they were lazy or unwilling to follow imperial orders, or at least not entirely so. In most cases, 
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their delayed departures arose from one of the following three reasons: (1) waiting for imperial 
rescripts to be issued, (2) submitting memorials of declination, and (3) waiting for the arrival of 
the succeeding official. Reason 1 accounts for the delays of most Beijing officials, while Reasons
2 and 3 contributed to those of outside officials. Looking closely into the rationale behind each of
these practices, we can see how the Ming state's desire for centralized administration came into 




















Number of Days 
Originally located in Beijing Originally located outside Beijing 
Figure 4.8: Time from Order Receipt to Departure (Source: Table 4.3)
Imperial Rescripts
For officials in Beijing, the primary reason for delays in departure came from the extra 
time required to pick up the imperial rescript (chi 敕). A formal document written in the voice of 
the emperor, the imperial rescript was issued to officials who had been appointed to positions of 
special importance, including the superprovincial officials who make up many of the cases in this
study.21 The rescript served as a material proof of the delegation of imperial authority to its 
21. On the types of officials who were given imperial rescripts, see Ming huidian (Wanli edition), "Hanlin
yuan" 翰林院, 221.2939.
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recipient, but its functions were more than just symbolic. Contained in these documents were 
very specific descriptions of the recipients' authority and responsibility, including lists of 
administrative regions that came under their jurisdictions, the specific tasks they were expected 
to perform, and the types of officials who came under their command.22 Not only did the rescripts
need to be quickly replaced when lost or destroyed, they also had to be re-issued whenever 
changes were made to the recipients' responsibility or jurisdiction.23
The issuing of imperial rescripts was an elaborate process that required the cooperation of
a number of government agencies, the process of which could take many days to complete. The 
rescripts were drafted by the Secretariat Drafters 中書舍人, who belonged formally to an 
auxiliary office under the Grand Secretariat, but probably worked under the supervision of the 
Hanlin Academy. If there were uncertainties about technicalities of the appointment, further 
inquiries were made to the relevant offices, usually the Ministry of War. The completed rescripts 
were then forwarded to the Seal Office 尚寶司 to be impressed with the imperial seal.24 The 
rescripts of outside officials were delivered by messengers dispatched from the court, who met 
the transferring officials either before their departure or after their arrival. Occasionally, these 
messengers even intercepted the officials while they were on the road to the new post.25 Officials 
22. For a rescript that specifies the regions under the recipient's jurisdiction, see the text quoted in Wang 
Shouren 王守仁 (#4), Wang Yangming quanji 王陽明全集, "Xie'en shu" 謝恩疏, 9.298-99. For a rescript 
that lists the tasks to be performed, see Zhonguo Ming chao dang'an zonghui 中國明朝檔案總匯, Vol. 1,
145-48 (Document #45). For a rescript that specifies the types of officials who came under the 
recipient's command, see Qin Jin 秦金, An Chu lu 安楚錄, [untitled rescript], 1.1a-b.
23. On the replacement of a lost rescript, see Zhu Xieyuan 朱燮元, Du shu shucao 督蜀疏草, "Zunyi dao 
chi bei fen qing ji shu" 遵義道敕被焚請給疏, 5.30a-b. On the re-issuing of rescripts, see Guo Zizhang 
郭子章, Pin yi sheng Qian cao 蠙衣生黔草 "Qing zengyi chishu shu" 請增易敕書疏, 7.34b-36a.
24. On institutional regulations, see also Ming huidian (Wanli edition), 212.2835 (Zhongshu sheren), 
221.2939-40 (Hanlin yuan), 222.2947 (Shangbao si). For examples of inter-agency inquiries made in 
the process of drafting imperial rescripts, see Zhonguo Ming chao dang'an zonghui, Vol. 84, "Chigao 
dibo" 敕稿底簿, 121-126; Bi Ziyan 畢自嚴 (#78), Fu Jin shucao 撫津疏草, "Ling chi wuqi ling yin 
cichao shu" 領敕無期領印辭朝疏 1.24a-25b. 
25. For references to the delivery of rescripts by single messengers, see the arrival report memorials of 
Qin Yao (#58, received before departure), Wu Wenhua (#46, received after arrival), and Li Zhong 
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who were located in Beijing, on the other hand, needed to pick up their rescripts before leaving 
the capital, which meant that any delay in the issuing of rescripts necessarily delayed their 
departure date.26 Among the cases examined in this study, the time from appointment to rescript 
receipt ranged from 13 to 49 days for officials located in Beijing.27
This wait for rescript pickup, although relatively brief compared to other forms of delay 
(more below), exemplifies the necessary cost of time that came with the Ming state's efforts of 
administrative centralization. The imperial rescripts served as the ultimate bases of authority for 
their recipients, acting as proof that the officials had received direct imperial commands to carry 
out specific tasks at the local level. This is why some superprovincial officials who received new 
assignments considered themselves not fully qualified to start their positions until the rescripts 
had been delivered, claiming that they had no means to carry out their duties without the 
rescripts in hand.28 Officials who transferred out of Beijing did not face this problem, because 
they picked up the rescripts before departure, but this meant they needed to wait—sometimes for 
a month or longer—until the rescripts were ready for pickup. The practical importance of the 
imperial rescript came from a shared understanding among Ming officials that its recipient's 
ultimate source of authority was imperially bestowed. But in making the rescript's presence a 
(#18, received mid-journey). It is not clear how the court made sure that these messengers met the 
transferring officials at the right locations—the only plausible explanation is that the notifications of 
appointment contained instructions as to where the rescript would be delivered to, and whether or not 
the official needed to wait for the arrival of the rescript before departing toward his new post.
26. The only exception is the case of Bi Ziyan (#78), who was appointed to a newly-created post, the 
rescript of which required a long process of inter-agency fact-checking before it could be issued. Bi 
asked for and was granted permission to leave before receiving his rescript.
27. The account is based on 10 Beijing-provincial transfers for which the number of days from 
appointment to rescript receipt can be determined. The distribution of these numbers is as follows: 13 
(#40), 15 (#81), 22 (#62), 26 (#67), 30 (#72), 31 (#60), 34 (#57), 37 (#84), 49 (#52).
28. Li Sui 李遂, Li Xiangmin gong zouyi 李襄敏公奏議, "Jizhou duxiang qingchi shu" 薊州督餉請敕疏, 
3.18a; Xiong Tingbi 熊廷弼, Jing Liao shudu 經遼疏牘, "Xuanwei qin chishu guanfang shu" 宣慰請敕書
關防書, 1.2a.
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requirement for carrying out the appointee's everyday duties, and by issuing this document 
through an elaborate and lengthy process, the Ming state also ensured that its specially-
dispatched officials took longer to arrive at their posts, thereby depriving itself of the ability to 
place its officials quickly at the desired locations.
Declination Memorials
If Beijing officials waited roughly a month before departure, the waiting period of outside
officials could stretch much longer. One factor that contributed to the wait was the practice of 
submitting memorials of declination, in which newly-appointed officials pleaded for the 
withdrawal of their appointment orders. As we can see from the cases summarized in Table 4.4, 
these memorials were submitted most frequently (but not exclusively) by officials who had been 
on temporary leaves or promoted from lower-ranked positions, and they usually cited sickness, 
old age, or insufficient qualifications as reasons for declining. While some officials probably 
declined due to genuine sickness (one official died while waiting for the imperial response),29 for 
many, the act of declining a post was a gesture of humility, a recognition shared and 
acknowledged by contemporary officials themselves. I will return to this question of sincerity in 
a moment, but for now, what is significant is that whatever the officials' true intentions may have
been, these requests were almost always rejected by the central court.30 This meant that for an 
official located away from Beijing, what the submission of a declination memorial most 
29. See Table 4.4, #6 Fang Liangyong.
30. Among the 15 known cases of declination summarized in Table 4.4, only one case led to the approval 
of the official's plea (#5 Luo Qinshun), and another (#4 Wang Shouren) mentioned a different official 
whose request was approved with a stern reprimand. Because my cases have been reconstructed from 
arrival report memorials (submitted after an official had arrived at his new post), it is possible that 
those cases that led to the approval of the requests tend not to appear in my data. Nevertheless, in both
of the successful cases cited above, the approvals were only granted after the officials submitted their 
second declination memorials, after the first memorials had been rejected. This means that those 
officials who submitted only one memorial most likely did so out of formality, as they could 
reasonably expect their initial requests to be rejected.
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concretely achieved was to delay his departure for a certain time, for once a memorial had been 
submitted, its author needed to wait for it to reach Beijing, receive an imperial response (most 
likely a rejection), and get delivered back to him, a process that could take months to complete.
The extra time of memorial submission significantly prolonged the overall time of 
transfer, as we can see from the case of Pan Jixun 潘季馴 (#47), who was appointed to be Grand 
Coordinator of Jiangxi in 1576. At the time of the appointment, Pan was on temporary leave at 
home, probably in Huzhou Prefecture, Zhejiang. The order of his appointment was issued in 
Beijing on 3/8, news of which reached Pan through the capital gazette on 3/22. Upon receiving 
the news, Pan wrote a declination memorial and sent a household servant to deliver it to Beijing, 
where it was rejected by the emperor on 4/29. Another month elapsed before the imperial 
response reached Pan, presumably carried by the same servant who had delivered his original 
memorial. Soon after he had received the imperial response (5/26), Pan started his journey, 
arriving at his new post on 6/29. In all, out of the 110 days that elapsed from the issuing of the 
appointment order until Pan's arrival at the new post, a full 63 days, or 57% of the entire time, 
had been spent on an unsuccessful attempt to decline the post.31 
In addition to prolonging the overall transfer process, the acts of declining also created 
time losses that occasionally threatened local stability.32 One such case involved a change in the 
Grand Coordinator of Nan-Gan, a post that had jurisdiction over an inter-provincial region along 
the borders of Jiangxi, Huguang, Fujian, and Guangdong. What started this complicated series of
events was an initial court decision (1516/1/18) to transfer the original Grand Coordinator of 
31. Pan Jixun 潘季馴 (#47), Pan sikong zoushu 潘司空奏疏, "Wenbao qiyong cishu" 聞報起用辭疏, 4.1a-3b,
"Baodai xie'en shu" 報代謝恩疏, 4.3b-4b; Ming shilu (Shenzong), Wanli 4/3/8.
32. The account that follows is based on the following sources: Ming shilu (Wuzong), Zhengde 11/1/18 
(gengzi), 11/1/29 (bingwu), Zhengde 11/8/19 (wuchen); Wang Qiong 王瓊, Jinxi benbing fuzou 晉溪本
兵敷奏, "Wei jibao zeiqing shi" 為急報賊情事, 10.1a-3b (submitted 1516/7/5); Wang Shouren 王守仁, 
Wang Yangming quanji 王陽明全集, "Xie'en shu" 謝恩疏, 9.298-99 (submitted 1517/1/26).
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Nan-Gan to a similar position elsewhere. To fill the resulting vacancy, the court appointed a 
Nanjing official named Wen Sen 文森 (1/29), who, to the dismay of the court, submitted a 
memorial declining the post. Under usual circumstances, the court would have rejected Wen's 
request and followed up with an additional order, after which Wen might have proceeded to his 
new post without much problem. But it happened that just around the time when Wen's memorial
was being delivered to Beijing, over the second and third months, a local uprising ensued within 
the Nan-Gan Grand Coordinator's jurisdiction. Several thousands of bandits looted residences 
throughout southeastern Fujian, fleeing across the border into the neighboring Guangdong 
province. When this news reached Beijing (in late sixth or early seventh month), Wen Sen was 
partially blamed for the intensification of the trouble: with the previous Nan-Gan Grand 
Coordinator gone, the only person who had the authority to coordinate inter-provincial military 
action was Wen Sen, the incoming Grand Coordinator, who had dared to linger on for months on 
the pretext of being sick. The court was initially ready to give Wen another chance and ordered 
him to head toward his post immediately (7/7), but soon it decided that Wen was lingering on for 
too long and things could wait no longer. On 8/19, the court appointed Wang Shouren 王守仁 
(#4; better known by his alternate name Yangming 陽明), also serving in Nanjing at the time, to 
take the place of Wen as the new Grand Coordinator of Nan-Gan. When Wang received this 
order on 9/14, he too submitted a memorial declining the post, the formal rejection of which was 
not returned to him until 12/2. In the end, Wang arrived at his new post on 1/16 of the following 
year, finally taking up a position that had remained vacant for nearly a full year.
This example suggests that declining high-level assignments was a widespread and 
expected action within Ming political culture, even though it occasionally led to delays with 
serious repercussions. Whenever a high-level appointment was made, contemporary officials 
knew that there was a good chance the appointee would initially decline the position. For 
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example, a mere six days after the court appointed Wang Shouren to the Grand Coordinator of 
Nan-Gan, the Minister of War expressed his concern that Wang too might decline the post, a 
concern which, as we just saw, turned out to be correct.33 Similar concerns were raised when the 
court was making final deliberations on two candidates who had been nominated to the position 
of the Grand Coordinator of Liaodong in early 1610. Even before a formal appointment was 
made, Xiong Tingbi 熊廷弼, the Regional Inspector of Liaodong, expressed his concern that 
whoever was appointed might decide to submit a declination memorial, thereby delaying his 
eventual arrival:
Even if [the new grand coordinator] were to hurry quickly to Liaodong upon 
receiving the order, it would not be until the fifth month that he would arrive. If 
moreover he cites his long retirement as an excuse and follows old models to 
decline the post, waits to receive a warm decree of rejection, and only then finally 
starts a slow journey to show his reluctance in accepting the post, then over the 
fifth and sixth months, the pressing conditions along the Liaodong frontier will 
certainty get wasted in the process of appointing and declining, leaving our 




It is clear that Xiong was fully aware of the great loss of time that declination memorials caused. 
He also pointed out what must have been a widely-practiced act of performed humility, in which 
the appointee intentionally slowed his arrival as proof of his reluctance to accept the position. To 
Xiong Tingbi, an official who submitted a memorial of decline likely did so with the full 
intentions of accepting the post after an initial rejection, engaging in a performance of humility 
only for the sake of his own reputation.
33. Wang Qiong 王瓊, Jinxi benbing fuzou 晉溪本兵敷奏, "Wei difang youshi jique xunfu guanyuan shi" 為
地方有事急缺廵撫官員事 (submitted Zhengde 11/08/25), 10.18b-19b.
34. Xiong Tingbi 熊廷弼, An Liao shugao 按遼疏稿, "Cui xunfu shangren shu" 催巡撫上任疏 (imperial 
response Wanli 38/03b/16), 96b. On the context of this appointment, see also Ming shilu (Shenzong), 
Wanli 38/3b/4 (yiyou), 3b/11 (bingchen).
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In the eyes of critics, such insincere attempts at declining were so widespread that they 
came to be referred to as "formulaic declinations" (taoci 套辭). In the excerpt that we saw above,
Xiong Tingbi also used a variant of this expression, noting that the newly-appointed official may 
"[follow] old models to decline the post" (循套具辭). Faced with the possibility that a declination
might be considered by others as a mere political show, officials who did submit such memorials 
tried to phrase them in the sincerest possible terms. One official, when declining the post of 
Minister of Personnel in 1640, went so far as to state explicitly that he "did not dare to engage in 
a formulaic declination" (非敢套辭).35 When compiling a posthumous collected writings of Yang 
Sichang 楊嗣昌, who declined the post of Minister of War in 1636, Yang's son wrote that 
"throughout the memorial, every single character shows [my father's] genuine sincerity, with no 
single word of a formulaic declination" (通篇字字血誠。無一套辭之語).36 Clearly, a declination 
memorial, when not accompanied by sincerity (or when its author could not convince others of 
his sincerity), could become a target of criticism.
Given contemporary awareness of the serious time loss and possible insincerity that 
surrounded memorials of declination, one might expect that the Ming state would have banned 
them altogether. Yet while officials and emperors occasionally expressed their disdain for 
declination memorials that they considered to be performative shows, and although the court 
occasionally issued regulations limiting the privilege of declining to officials of certain ranks,37 
the court never placed a total ban on the act of declining official appointments. Officials 
35. Li Rixuan 李日宣, Quancao zoulüe 銓曹奏畧, Tangti 堂題, "Chongming jingwen" 寵命驚聞, (submitted 
Chongzhen 13/09/21), 1a-3b.
36. Yang Sichang 楊嗣昌, Yang Wenruo xiansheng ji 楊文弱先生集, "Jing wen zhaoming feichang lixue 
kongci shu" 驚聞召命非常瀝血控辭疏, 9.4b.
37. For example, in 1593 the court regulated that among the capital officials who were being promoted, 
only those of the second rank or higher were allowed to submit memorials of declination. See Zengxiu
tiaoli beikao 增修條例備考, Libu 吏部, "Jing sheng er pin guan fang xu juci" 京陞二品官方許具辭, 
2.56a-b.
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continued to submit declination memorials throughout the dynasty, and those who did not do so 
risked hurting their own reputations. In fact, by the late Ming, the custom of declining 
appointments was so widespread that officials who decided not to decline their posts felt obliged 
to justify their decisions. When appointed supreme commander in 1550, the official Zhang Yue 
張岳 explained that even though he was "required by custom to submit a memorial of 
declination" (例該具奏辭免), he decided not to submit one because the area under his new 
jurisdiction needed urgent supervision.38 When Liu Yikun 劉一焜 (#75) received a grand 
coordinator appointment upon the conclusion of his mourning leave in 1614, he claimed that 
even though he had wanted to submit a memorial declining the post, he decided against it 
because he was unable to find a precedent from similar cases of the past (典制例無控辭).39 
From this tug of war between submitters of declination memorials and their critics, we 
can infer that those who served in Ming government shared the basic value that true humility was
a virtue that should be praised. Because everyone agreed that a genuine act of declining was 
something to be admired (after all, the emperor himself was expected to decline the throne twice 
before his accession),40 the government could never completely prohibit the submission of 
declination memorials, or to go so far as to punish all officials who submitted them. Yet because 
the practice of declining had become too prevalent, there also emerged a widespread recognition 
that any attempt to decline a post was likely an expression of hidden vanity, a desire to appear 
humble even though one was not really planning to give up the post. At the same time, officials 
38. Zhang Yue 張岳, Xiaoshan leigao 小山類稿, "Zhi Huguang xie'en shu" 至湖廣謝恩疏, 4.1a-3a.
39. Liu Yikun 劉一焜 (#75), Fu Zhe shucao 撫浙疏草, [Daoren xie'en shi 到任謝恩事], 1.1a-4a.
40. For example, see Ming shilu (Shizong), Zhengde 16/4/21 (renyin) for an account of how officials 
presented three separate petitions before the would-be Jiajing emperor finally agreed to ascend the 
throne. Usually, these petitions were carried out over the course of several days. The Jiajing emperor's
case was special because all three petitions were presented within a single day to speed up his 
accession, as 36 days had already passed since the death of the Zhengde emperor by the time Jiajing 
arrived in Beijing from his princedom in Huguang.
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who accepted their posts without first declining them might appear too eager to get promoted, a 
risk many officials were not willing to take. In this way, even though Ming officials realized that 
declining official appointments might draw criticism upon themselves, they had no choice but to 
actively participate in this culture of political performance, fueled by a contradiction inherent in 
the value of humility that they all shared.
This contradiction, between need to appear humble on the one hand and suspicion of 
appearances of humility on the other, remained somewhat concealed as long as the memorials 
were submitted from within the capital, where the actors could try to make their performances 
appear as though they were real. But when the same culture of political performance came to be 
adopted by officials nation-wide, the contradiction became much more apparent. With a long 
time needed for the delivery and processing of each declination memorial, the cost of the 
performances became too high, making contemporaries all the more concerned about whether a 
particular attempt in declining was authentic. In this sense, the case of declination memorials is 
another example of the cost of administrative centralization, albeit at a more symbolic level. 
Essentially, the acts of declining official appointments constituted a culture that functioned best 
at the imperial center. When this culture came to be incorporated by officials throughout the 
empire, the intricate equilibrium that once existed between the expectations for and criticisms 
against declination memorials started to crumble. The continued functioning of this culture was 
now achieved at the expense of great communicative time lags which, because of the negative 
repercussions that these delays potentially created, made the earlier equilibrium ever more 
difficult to achieve.
Waiting for Replacement
A final factor that delayed the departure of transferring officials was a regulation known 
as houdai 候代 (literally: waiting for replacement). This regulation can be understood as a 
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component of the procedure of jiaodai 交代 (literally: to hand over and replace), which referred 
to the process of administrative handover between an outgoing official and his incoming 
successor. Although it was possible to complete this handover through the exchange of 
documents alone (without the two officials meeting in person), the regulation of houdai further 
required the outgoing official to wait for the arrival of the incoming official before departing 
toward his next destination. These important practices of administrative handover were not a 
Ming invention, and much remains unknown about their complex evolution.41 For our current 
analysis, it suffices to note that while most Ming officials probably needed to go through a 
documentary handover of some form (jiaodai), not all were required to wait for the arrival of 
their successors before transferring to new posts (houdai). But starting in the sixteenth century, 
the Ming court started to require houdai for certain officials of high responsibility, and among 
them, a particularly important group was the superprovincial officials.
It was this process of houdai that had the greatest potential of prolonging official transfer 
times to extreme lengths. Table 4.5 summarizes the jiaodai process for all fifteen known cases in 
which the outgoing official was a superprovincial official. Among the six cases where 
calculations are possible, the average time between appointment and the completion of jiaodai 
was 143 days. In other words, nearly five months were required on average before these officials 
could start their transfer journeys. Several factors contributed to this long wait. Sometimes, the 
court took a long time to appoint the successor, thereby delaying his departure and eventual 
arrival.42 At other times, the appointed successor was located too far away and required many 
41. On administrative handover in other historical periods, see Jia Zhigang 贾志刚, “Tangdai difang 
zhangli de jiaojie tidai” 唐代地方长吏的交接替代, Zhengzhou daxue xuebao: zhexue shehui kexue ban 3
(2007): 92-97; Katagiri Takashi 片桐尚, “Gendai chihōkan no kōtai seido” 元代地方官の交代制度, 
Taishō daigaku daigakuin kenkyū ronshū 32 (2008): 61-71; Doi Tomonori 土居智典, “Shindai zaisei 
kansatsu seido no kenkyū: kōtai seido o chūshin to shite” 清代政監査制度の研究—交代制度を中心とし
て, Shigaku kenkyū 247 (2005): 1-19.
42. See Table 4.5, Column "Days A~B" for a list of the time between appointments of the outgoing and 
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months to travel to the new post. Finally, the successor's departure could also be delayed for any 
number of reasons that have been discussed above, especially when the incoming official was 
himself a superprovincial official who needed to wait for his own replacement.
To understand the compounding effect of delays caused by houdai, we can turn to an 
extreme case that involved three interconnected transfers, each leading to delays of increasing 
magnitude.43 This long chain of transfers started on 9/24 of 1566, when the court ordered an 
official named Wu Guifang 吳桂芳, at the time serving as Supreme Commander of Guangdong 
and Guangxi, to move to be Vice Minister of War in Nanjing. To fill the resulting vacancy, the 
court then appointed Tan Lun 譚綸 (#38), at the time serving as Grand Coordinator of Sichuan, 
as new Supreme Commander of Guangdong and Guangxi (10/19). In turn, to fill the vacancy that
would result from Tan Lun's departure, the court appointed a Nanjing official named Chen Kai 陳
炌 to replace Tan as Grand Coordinator of Sichuan (10b/4). By the time of Chen's appointment, 
40 days had already passed since Wu Guifang's original appointment, but neither Wu Guifang 
nor Tan Lun was allowed to leave his post because of the houdai requirement: for Wu Guifang to
be allowed to start his journey, he needed to first be replaced by Tan Lun, who in turn needed to 
be replaced by Chen Kai (who, as a capital official, was not bound by the houdai requirement). 
Eventually, 146 more days passed before Chen Kai arrived in Sichuan to complete the handover 
procedures with Tan Lun (1567/3/2), and 84 additional days elapsed before Tan Lun arrived in 
Guangdong to take over administrative responsibilities as the new Supreme Commander of 
Guangdong and Guangxi (5/27). In the end, from the day Wu Guifang's original order of 
incoming officials. The interval between the first and second appointments were usually not too long 
(14.4 days on average), but in the longest instance, this interval stretched into 50 days.
43. The account is based on the following sources: Tan Lun 譚綸 (#38), Tan Xiangmin zouyi 譚襄敏奏議, 
"Gong xie tian'en shu" 恭謝天恩疏, 3.1a-2a; Ming shilu (Shizong), Jiajing 45/09/24 (xinhai), 45/10/19 
(bingzi), 45/10b/04 (xinmao).
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appointment was issued, a total of 270 days (9 months) had passed before Wu was finally 
allowed to leave his old post.44 
As Wu Guifang's example shows, a delay in one place led to further delay at another, 
resulting in a chain of delays that spread across the empire. To some extent, we can understand 
why the Ming state needed the houdai requirement for its grand coordinators and supreme 
commanders: by temporarily retaining an outgoing official until his successor arrived, the 
regulation prevented regional power vacuums, thereby reducing potential factors for local 
instability at moments of official transfer. On the other hand, by instituting a mandatory waiting 
period, the requirement of houdai not only slowed down official movement, but also added a 
further layer of uncertainty to the central court's ability to predict how quickly its appointment 
orders could take effect. What we observe, then, is an inevitable tension between the Ming state's
needs for administrative certainty on the one hand and speed of movement on the other.
In fact, when the houdai regulations were first introduced for superprovincial officials, 
the court itself showed a degree of inconsistency in handling situations when the needs of speed 
and bureaucratic certainty came in conflict.45 The year 1523 saw the first recorded instance when 
the court made houdai a requirement for all grand coordinators.46 The timing of this imperial 
44. In reality, Wu Guifang was further promoted to the Vice Minister of War on 10b/14 of 1566 (10 days 
after Chen Kai's appointment), and for reasons that are unknown, he seems to have left his supreme 
commander post before Tan Lun's arrival. However, Wu was later impeached (and lightly punished) 
for this action. This suggests that officials of the time took the houdai regulations seriously, and 
considered it inappropriate to leave one's post before the successor's arrival. See Zengxiu tiaoli 
beikao, Libu, "Fuchen bixu jiaodai fang xu liren" 撫臣必須交代方許離任, 3.1a-b.
45. The following account on the evolution of houdai regulation is based on the following sources: Libu 
zhizhang 吏部職掌 (National Library of China edition), Wenxuan qinglisi 文選清吏司, Kaishe ke 開設
科, "Xunfu houdai" 巡撫候代, 10b-12a (Jiajing 2, 12, 29); Tiaoli beikao 條例備考, Libu 吏部, "Yi dufu 
jiaodai" 議督撫交代, 1.60a-61a (Jiajing 2, 12, 29), "Dufu shengqian dingyou houdai" 督撫陞遷丁憂候代,
1.61a-b (Jiajing 33); Zengxiu tiaoli beikao 增修條例備考, Libu 吏部, "Fuchen bixu jiaodai fang xu 
liren" 撫臣必須交代方許離任, 3.1a-b (Longqing 1); Ming huidian (Wanli edition), Ducha yuan 都察院, 
"Dufu jianzhi" 督撫建置, 209.17b-18a (Jiajing 3, Longqing 2); Ming huidian (Wanli edition), Bingbu 
兵部, "Ge zhen tongli" 各鎮通例, 132.7a (Jiajing 14); Ming shilu (Shizong) Jiajing 7/03/04 (yihai), 
Jiajing 33/03/21 (xinyou).
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order coincided with the rise in importance of the grand coordinator's post—by the Zhengde 
reign (1506-21), the word xunfu (used as a verb: to tour and pacify) no longer carried its early 
Ming meaning of special tasks that were assigned to censorial officials on an ad-hoc basis; 
rather, xunfu (used as a noun: grand coordinator) now referred to a quasi-formal post that became
the new highest authority in a province or a trans-provincial region.47 As grand coordinators 
gradually acquired new responsibilities of crucial importance, their temporary absence during the
transfer process became a potential cause of regional instability. As we recall, the 1516 military 
crisis along the Fujian-Guangdong border occurred exactly at a time when the previous grand 
coordinator had left for a new appointment, while his newly-appointed successor was still busy 
declining the the position (p. 173-174). The houdai regulation, introduced seven years after this 
incident, was probably an effort to prevent similar situations from occurring again.
But in solving the problem of administrative handover, the Ming state created the new 
problem of a nationwide slowdown of movement. Through much of the Jiajing reign (1522-66), 
the court was never consistent in upholding a policy that inevitably caused substantial delay in 
the official transfer process. In 1550, an official was punished for his late arrival at the new post, 
even though the delay was caused by a correct following of the houdai regulation.48 In the same 
46. The 1523 (Jiajing 2) regulation, quoted in a number of sources (see note 45 above), gives one the 
impression that this was the first time when houdai was made a requirement for grand coordinators. 
However, there is evidence indicating that already in 1522 (Jiajing 1), a grand coordinator of Yunnan 
had waited for the arrival of his successor before leaving the post, suggesting that the regulation 
already existed by then. It is likely, however, that this early requirement applied only to grand 
coordinators who were located in strategic frontier locations such as Yunnan. See He Mengchun 何孟
春, He Wenjian zouyi 何文簡疏議, "Cimian gairen shu" 辭免改任疏, 9.1a-2b (submitted 1522/6/3).
47. On the origin and development of the grand coordinator's post, see Chapter 3, p. 111, n. 6.
48. In 1550, the official Li Sui 李遂, originally Superintendent of Defense of the Yangzi River 提督操江, 
was appointed the Superintendent of Supplies in Jizhou 薊州督餉 in North Zhili. Even though he had 
correctly followed the regulations and left his post only after the arrival of his successor, the Jiajing 
emperor was angered by Li's late arrival, and stripped him of his official status. See Li Sui 李遂, Li 
Xiangmin gong zouyi 李襄敏公奏議, "Jizhou duxiang qingchi shu" 薊州督餉請敕疏, 3.17a-18b; Ming 
shilu (Shizong), Jiajing 29/11/22 (xinhai).
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year, the court made a partial modification to the 1523 regulation, limiting the houdai 
requirement to grand coordinators who served in frontier areas of strategic importance, while 
allowing those in interior provinces to leave their posts without waiting for replacement. But four
years later, in 1554, yet another official was punished, this time for leaving his post without 
waiting for his successor, even though he had correctly followed the new 1550 regulation that 
exempted him from houdai.49 Eventually, the incident induced a final modification of regulations
in 1554. To ensure that no strategic position would be left vacant, the houdai requirement was 
again extended to all grand coordinators, along with supreme commanders and a few other 
territorial censorial posts. In making this policy reversion, the court chose administrative safety 
over speed, and the choice held for the rest of the dynasty.
The only and last attempt to fundamentally modify the houdai requirement was a 
proposal made by Grand Secretary Gao Gong 高拱 in 1570.50 The most perceptive among all 
officials who discussed the problem of houdai, Gao pointed out that the greatest problem in 
official transfers lay in the fact that whenever a vacancy arose at one place, a different official 
needed to be moved to fill the vacancy, resulting in situations where "a vacancy is filled in the 
east, yet a new vacancy arises in the west" (補於東又缺於西). Moreover, since the newly-
appointed officials needed to wait for their own replacements, and because the officials were 
often located far away from each other, the whole process frequently took a very long time to 
49. In 1553, the official Peng An 彭黯, originally Grand Coordinator of Yingtian (South Zhili area), was 
promoted to the Nanjing Minister of Work. He left his post immediately, citing the 1550 regulation 
that exempted grand coordinators of interior provinces from the houdai requirement. However, the 
area was in the midst of a popular uprising at this time, and Peng was impeached by the regional 
inspector of South Zhili, who claimed that Pang was reluctant to lead military actions agains the 
uprising even before he was promoted, and that he was too eager to dodge his responsibilities upon 
hearing about his promotion. Peng was brought to Beijing for questioning, and was eventually 
stripped of his official status. See Ming shilu (Shizong), Jiajing 32/11/14 (bingchen), 33/2/26 
(dingyou), 3/21 (xinyou).
50. Gao Gong 高拱, Gao Wenxiang gong ji 高文襄公集, "Yichu benbing ji bianfang dufu bingbei zhi chen 
yi bi anrang daji shu" 議處本兵及邊方督撫兵備之臣以裨安攘大計疏, 8.8a-11b.
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complete (彼此候代。道途遙遠。動經歲時). As a remedy to this dilemma, Gao proposed that the
Ministry of War newly establish two additional vice minister positions. Unlike the regular vice 
ministers who always resided in Beijing, these additional vice ministers would occasionally be 
dispatched on short missions of frontier army inspection. When a vacancy arose among the 
supreme commander positions in the frontier, the Ministry would send one of them directly to fill
the spot, eliminating the delays that would have resulted from houdai if the court were to appoint
a grand coordinator or supreme commander who was already located in a different province. In 
this way, the court would be able to obviate the need to fill the secondary and tertiary vacancies 
that would have resulted from a single initial transfer.
Had Gao Gong's proposal been implemented, the delays that resulted from houdai might 
have been alleviated to some degree. But Gao's suggested reform fell apart when he fell out of 
power two years later, and there is no clear evidence that his proposed reforms were ever carried 
out.51 The houdai regulations remained in place through the rest of the dynasty, albeit with 
occasional flexibility in its actual implementation. In some special situations when speedy 
movement was especially important, such as when a grand coordinator of an interior province 
had been ordered to take over responsibilities in a frontier war zone, the court granted ad-hoc 
exemptions to the houdai requirement through special imperial orders. But otherwise, the 
requirement of houdai became so entrenched by the Wanli reign (1573-1620) that even officials 
whose parents had died (which imposed a near-compulsory mourning leave of 27 month on all 
officials) needed to remain at their posts until their replacements had arrived, and those who left 
51. Ming shi 明史 (72.1754) records that the positions of additional vice ministers were abolished soon 
after their addition in 1570 (Longqing 4). Even though these positions were plater reinstated across 
the Six Ministries in late Wanli or early Tianqi reign, they seem to have functioned more like 
additional positions that took charge of affairs within each ministry. For the first appearance of the 
additional vice minister position after its reinstatement, see Ming shilu (Xizong), Taichang 1/9/19 
(guisi).
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without waiting for their successors were punished.52 Throughout the last century of the dynasty, 
grand coordinators and supreme commanders became trapped in a general rigidity of movement, 
in exchange for which regional security was maintained.
From Departure to Arrival
With his imperial rescript received, declination memorial rejected, or administrative 
handover completed, the transferring official was finally ready to begin his journey. Most of the 
officials examined in this study held positions high enough to use the state-run relay system, 
allowing faster and more comfortable travel experiences than those of lower-ranked officials 
who had to rely on private means.53 Despite the relative convenience, journeys could take a long 
time to complete, and distance was not the only factor that determined time of travel. Sometimes 
officials fell sick on the road, forcing them to take long stops mid-journey or travel very slowly. 
This was the case of Wu Wenhua (#55), whose long transfer process we saw at the beginning of 
this chapter, and who took half a year to travel from Guangdong to Nanjing when he fell sick en 
route. Others ran into local military disturbances that cut off major roads, requiring large detours.
For example, when Fujian Administrative Commissioner Min Hongxue 閔洪學 (#79) was 
appointed Grand Coordinator of Yunnan in 1621, he had originally planned to reach his new post
through the province of Guizhou. But upon finding out that relay routes in Guizhou were 
completely blocked by an aboriginal uprising, he turned southward and traveled through the 
province of Guangxi, eventually entering Yunnan through a dangerous non-relay route. In the 
end, Min spent a total of 253 days (8.5 months) on the road.
52. These include the cases of Mao Gang 毛綱, Grand Coordinator of Liaodong in 1571 (Longqing 5), 
and Xu Honggang 許弘綱, Grand Coordinator of Jiangxi in 1607 (Wanli 35). See Libu zhizhang (Siku 
cunmu edition), Wenxuan qinglisi 4, Kaishe ke, "Xunfu houdai," 9b-10a; Ming shilu (Shenzong), 
Wanli 35/1/7 (xinwei), 3/15 (wuyin). 
53. For regulations on the eligibility for use of the relay system, see Ming huidian (Wanli edition), 
Bingbu 兵部, Chejia qinglisi 車駕清吏司, "Yingfu shili" 應付事例, 148.9b-31a.
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If some travel delays arose from unexpected health or road conditions, others resulted 
from deliberate decisions. One institutional cause of delay was the occasional court decision to 
issue consecutive transfer orders to the same official, making him change directions while still on
the road. Table 4.6 shows fourteen known cases in which the transferring officials received new 
transfer orders before arriving at their initial appointment. In most cases, the new orders merely 
required officials to travel in the same general direction, resulting in little time loss.54 But in a 
few instances, officials were required to change direction entirely, or even turn back.55 One 
example is the case of Xu Shi 徐栻 (#42), who was serving as Administrative Commissioner of 
Shandong in early 1571.56 On 2/14, the court appointed Xu as Administrative Commissioner of 
Jiangxi, followed by two additional appointments as Prefectural Governor of Shuntian (Beijing) 
on 3/29 and as Grand Coordinator of Jiangxi on 5/6. It is not clear how far Xu had traveled when
each of these orders had reached him,57 but assuming that he had been complying with each order
soon after its receipt, he would have traveled from north to south, then south to north, and finally
from north to south again, presumably all on the same road that connected Jiangxi and Beijing.
54. Table 4.6, #5, 6, 12, 32, 34, 35, 53, 61, 83.
55. Table 4.6, #22, 36, 42, 46, 50.
56. Xu Shi 徐栻, Dufu Jiangxi zouyi 督撫江西奏議, "Jieguan xunfu xie'en shu" 接管巡撫謝恩疏, 1.1a-2b; 
Ming shilu (Muzong), Longqing 5/2/14 (bingwu), 3/29 (gengyin), 5/6 (dingmao). 
57. An intriguing question about these successive appointments is how the court managed to convey the 
updated orders to the appointees while they were on the road. In some cases, the officials learned the 
new orders from reading the capital gazettes (#35, 1565). In other cases, officials received the new 
orders through messengers dispatched by the court, and amazingly, these messengers were somehow 
able to intercept the officials in transit. For example, in late 1565, Tan Lun 譚綸 (#36) was originally 
traveling from Jiangxi to Shaanxi, passing by Liping Relay Station 李坪驛 in Huguang. There, he met 
a messenger dispatched by the Ministry of War, who carried a new order appointing him to the Grand 
Coordinator of Sichuan. Presumably, there was only one major road that connected Jiangxi and 
Shaanxi, and the messenger had been waiting for Tan at the midpoint, knowing for certain that Tan 
would pass through the station eventually. A similar case is that of Mao Bowen 毛伯溫 (#12, 1532), 
who met a messenger in Jiujiang Prefecture (north Jiangxi) while traveling from Ji'an Prefecture 
(eastern Jiangxi) toward Beijing.
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Finally, officials themselves sometimes contributed actively to the delay. We have already
seen the practice of intentional travel slowdown, whereby an official deliberately delayed his 
arrival in order to convey reluctance to accept a post. Another common cause of delay was the 
practice of stopping by one's home on the way to the new post. Such detours were common 
enough to receive frequent mention in court discussions, but since they were officially 
prohibited, officials rarely admitted to them in their arrival report memorials.58 Although we do 
not know whether many officials indeed took these secret detours, there is one known instance of
an official who took advantage of the communication time lag to take a home-visiting detour 
without having to hide the fact from the central court. This was the case of Li Rixuan 李日宣 
(#84), originally an Investigating Censor in Beijing. On 12/16 of 1622, Li was given the task of 
inspecting a salt-producing district located in Shanxi province. He picked up the imperial rescript
on 1/23 of the following year, and left the capital the next day. Originally, Li's appointment order 
required him to arrive at his destination by 3/22. However, just before leaving the capital, Li 
submitted a memorial asking for permission to delay his arrival by three months, on the grounds 
that he had not had a chance to visit his deceased father's gravesite when his father was granted a
new posthumous title a year ago. After submitting this memorial, Li hurriedly left the capital 
without waiting to receive an imperial response, traveling all the way to Jiangxi province and 
arriving at his home (probably in Ji'an Prefecture) on 3/21, exactly one day before he was 
supposed to show up at his new assignment in Shanxi. As Li explained, it was only after arriving 
home that he had the chance to read the capital gazette, where he learned that his request for a 
three-month leave had been rejected. Thereupon Li rushed toward his new assignment, arriving 
58. For a 1579 regulation prohibiting transfer detours by capital officials and superprovincial officials, 
see Zengxiu tiaoli beikao, Libu 吏部, "Zhuoyi jingguan bing dufu daoren qixian" 酌議京官并督撫到任期
限, 3.17b-18a. For court discussions on the practice of detours among government officials in general,
see Ming shilu (Yingzong), Zhengtong 13/11/12 (jiawu); Gao Gong 高拱, Gao Wenxiang gong ji 高文
襄公集, "Fu zongdu Wang Zhigao tiaochen shu" 覆總督王之誥條陳疏, 13.5b. 
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at his new office two months later, on 5/21. Since we know that many other officials were able to
read the capital gazettes while on the move,59 Li's excuse that he did not see the gazette until 
arriving home is highly doubtful. Most likely, Li had carefully planned his home visit, submitting
his memorial at just the right time to take advantage of the communicative uncertainties of the 
Ming government.
Conclusion
The transfer of high officials in the Ming was fraught with uncertainties. From the central
court's perspective, the time required for any particular transfer could only be predicted and 
controlled to a certain degree. Too many factors contributed to delays in the transfer process, not 
all of which were within the court's control: bad weather and road conditions, local uprisings, 
delay in issuing imperial rescripts, appointees who decided to decline their posts, complications 
in the administrative handover process—all these had the potential of prolonging official 
transfers to extreme lengths. 
A necessary condition that set the stage for such delays was the long communicative time
lag that separated the imperial capital from its regional government offices. But while slow 
communication was a characteristic shared by all pre-industrial societies, its effects on the 
operations of the Ming state were compounded by two additional features specific to 
governments of imperial China. As we saw in Chapter 1, one such feature was the heavy reliance
on administrative writing, a commitment to carrying out every administrative task through the 
exchange of official documents. Another was the ideal of bureaucratic centralization, in which 
administrative communications passed through many layers of government offices, while the 
ultimate power of decision-making resided within the central court. As we saw from breaking 
down the time of official transfers, only a fraction of the total time was spent on the delivery of 
59. See page 186, note 57.
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appointment orders or on the transfer journey itself. When serious delays occurred, they often 
arose from long periods of waiting in which documents were being exchanged over long 
distances. Through these bureaucratic procedures, the court tried to maintain its control over 
regional levels of the government. Yet ironically, such centralizing efforts were partially 
undermined by the resultant loss of time that they themselves helped create.
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Conclusion
By now we have seen many dilemmas of governance faced by the Ming and the difficult 
choices it made. Rulers and officials sometimes recognized their decisions as choices between 
imperfect compromises, as when a superprovincial official cited the urgency of local 
developments to justify not submitting a declination memorial (Chapter 4). More often the 
choices were unconscious, as when officials continued to write documents in layered quotations 
despite their length and repetitiveness (Chapter 1); or when the court tried, on some occasions, to
discourage alternate delivery methods even after serious deterioration of the postal system 
(Chapter 2). Although the Ming occasionally vacillated between two contrasting choices—as 
seen in early regulations and rulings on houdai that contradicted one another (Chapter 4)—for 
the most part it maintained the same basic preference within the context of a particular problem.
A question unaddressed so far, however, is whether the Ming also followed a consistent 
logic in the choices it made in all different contexts—was there, for example, a particular 
objective (or set of objectives) that it consistently prioritized over the others? Our case studies 
are limited, but a pattern does seem to emerge. Borrowing mathematical notation, we may 
tentatively arrange Ming priorities as follows, in order of decreasing importance:
propriety > administrative certainty > cost-saving > speed
In Chapter 1, we saw that the Ming relied on the principle of replication to authenticate and 
synchronize state documents, even though the necessary procedures slowed down administrative 
work (certainty > speed) and required great input of material and personnel resources 
(certainty > cost). Chapter 2 revealed that persistent cost-cutting measures eventually slowed 
down the Ming postal system (cost > speed), but faced with the possibility of interception or 
loss, officials often chose to send documents using the more costly method of single-messenger 
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delivery (certainty > cost). In Chapter 3, both the third year review and the triennial evaluation 
originally assumed that accurate evaluations were possible only when territorial officials traveled
personally to the court (certainty > cost). Triennial audiences and congratulatory memorials, 
moreover, confirmed territorial officials' respect for the emperor even while they generated great 
costs and caused local administrative disruptions (propriety > cost; propriety > certainty).1 In 
Chapter 4, we saw that many officials felt obliged to submit declination memorials and 
consequently delayed their transfers (propriety > speed), while the eventual stabilization of 
houdai regulations allowed secure handover of responsibilities at the expense of long waiting 
periods (certainty > speed). 
Because our cases are limited in number, it is hard to say whether the ordering presented 
here reflects a real gradation of Ming priorities or if it represents mere coincidence. Additional 
case studies may show, for example, that the Ming prioritized opposite ends of the same dilemma
under different circumstances. But whether or not the above ordering turns out to be correct, we 
are still left with the question why the objectives in our current list appear in this particular order.
In other words, was there a unifying logic that explains why the Ming prioritized propriety over 
administrative certainty or cost-saving over speed, but not the other way around?
Here the evidence is even more tentative, but a possible answer emerges when we try to 
explain not the order itself but the reasoning behind each of the Ming's choices, which may be 
summarized as follows: whenever confronted with a dilemma, the Ming tended to prioritize the 
objective that could be more readily observed or concretely measured from the central state's 
perspective. In administrative paperwork, for example, the court required local governments to 
1. Cases in Chapter 3 are somewhat complicated by the fact that they also reveal competing elements 
within the general objective of administrative certainty. Specifically, both the third year review and 
the triennial audience embodied the conflict between administrative centralization (the desire to 
evaluate territorial personnel directly at the capital) and administrative effectiveness and safety (the 
desire to avoid administrative disruption at the local level).
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submit many record books because it could see them as material objects and could check their 
content for consistency and accuracy of calculations. The extent to which production of record 
books slowed down local administrative work or used up local resources, on the other hand, was 
not directly observable or quantifiable from the court's perspective. Similarly, the Ming cared 
greatly about limiting postal expenses because the postal system was run directly by the state 
(and therefore its expenses appeared clearly on official account books), whereas the impact of 
cost-reduction on delivery speed was harder to predict. When delays did appear, most observers 
blamed the problem on insufficient human effort instead of insufficient funding. In the case of 
third year reviews and triennial audiences, territorial officials apparently spent great sums on 
travel expenses and gifts (or bribes), but most of that cost was collected informally from the local
population and therefore not exactly quantifiable. The departure of head officials may have 
caused administrative disruptions, but the court did not see the damage until it caused a problem 
serious enough to be reported. When a territorial official presented himself at court, on the other 
hand, his presence and by extension his sincerity were clearly visible to the emperor and his 
court. 
Put another way, the Ming seems to have cared more about whichever objective 
presented itself as a choice between all or nothing: account books either contained mistakes or 
they did not; territorial officials either traveled to the capital or they did not; and an appointee 
either submitted a declination memorial or he did not. How many work hours went into the 
production of an account book, how much administrative disruption an official's departure 
caused, or for how long an appointee waited for the rejection of his declination, on the other 
hand, was a matter of degree. Here again, my conclusion may be constrained by small sample 
size, but among the cases that we have seen, there does seem to emerge a consistent preference 
for results that are concrete and visible over those that are abstract and need to be inferred.
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Finally, it is worth pointing out the contrast between modern priorities and those of the 
Ming (or what we can tentatively conclude of it). Whereas speed and cost-saving occupy the 
latter half of the Ming list of priorities, they tend to appear at the top of ours—when we say that 
an institution is efficient, for example, we usually mean that it gets things done quickly or at a 
low cost. Propriety, appearing at the top of the Ming list, has dropped so low on ours that it has 
become hardly discernible. It is such a reversal of priorities that generates a conceptual filter 
between us and the Ming, making the latter appear particularly strange and hard to understand. 
What this study has done is to identify the filter and to reveal its effects on our vision, for beyond




GC=grand coordinator; SC=supreme commander; RI=regional inspector; VM=vice minister;
Admin=administrative; Commr=Commissioner; N=north; S=South.
Table 1.1: Record Books Compiled by Guards in Guangdong
Source: Guangdong tongzhi chugao 廣東通志初稿 (1535), "Junxu fu" 軍需附, 32.7a-24b.









Military Affairs 軍務册 0.27 annual 3
Commanders' Duel Examinations 旗役併鎗冊 0.62 annual 3
Military Equipment 軍器冊 0.19 once every 3 yrs 12
Annual Spending 歳支冊 0.5 annual 3
Spring Cultivation 春耕冊 0.45 annual ?
Actual Taxpaying Households 實徴冊 0.18 annual 2
Annual Report 歲報冊 0.23 annual 3
Military Lists and Record Books 軍單 軍冊 1.00 annual ?
Horses and Mules of the Government Army 官軍馬騾冊 0.26 once every 5 yrs 2
Picturebook on the Careful Selection of Militias 慎選擢以重民兵圖冊 0.10 once every 3 yrs 2
Minor Census of Households and Population 小造户口冊 0.20 once every 5 yrs 2
Performance of Military Officials 軍職官員賢否須知冊 1.00 ? ?
Major Census of Military Households and Population 大造官軍户口冊 0.40 once every 10 yrs ?
Government Army Stipends in Grain and Paper Money
官軍俸糧俸鈔冊
1.20 ? ?
Evaluation of Military Policy Officials 填註冊 0.07 once every 5 yrs 7
Affairs of the People and Services of Clerks 民情吏役冊 0.18 ? 4
Recommendations on Grain Supply 陳言食糧冊 0.23 once every 3 yrs 3
Age and Appearance of Government Army Soldiers in Service
上班征進官軍年貌冊
0.31 annual 3
Service Records of Civil Personnel 文職貼黄冊 0.01 once every 3 yrs 3
Discussion of Affairs 議事冊 0.21 once every 3 yrs 3
Total 7.61 n/a n/a
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Table 1.2: Record Books Compiled by Guards in Liaodong
Source: Li Chengxun 李承勛, Shaobao Li Kanghui gong zoucao 少保李康惠公奏草, "Liaodong 
fuchu canpo biancheng shu lüe" 遼東撫處殘破邊城疏略, 1.5b-7a.
Record Book Title # of Items
Required by Ministry of Personnel:
• Official Vacancies 缺官事
• Affairs of the People 民情事
• Investigating Service Records of Civil Personnel 清理文職貼黃事 3
Required by Ministry of Revenue:
• Clarifying Original Regulations and on the Inconveniences of Separating Divisions 
and Guards 申明舊制及分豁營衛不便事件事
• Advance Preparation of Grain Storage 預備倉糧事
• Grass for Horses 馬草事
• Annual Report on Money and Grain 歲報錢糧事
• Fields for Supplemental Soldiers 餘丁田畒事
• Imperially-Sanctioned Affairs 欽奉事
• Investigating Grain from Military Colonies 清理屯糧事
• Form-Fields of Military Colonies 樣田事
• Fabrics for Winter Clothes 冬衣布花事
• Cultivation of Military Colonies 屯種事
• Offering Words on Policy Direction to Curtail Disasters 陳言興革利弊以弭災異事
• Offering Words on Local Affairs 陳言地方事
• Strictly Enforcing Deadlines to Compile Tax Registers 嚴限大造賦役黄冊事
• Self-Reflections 脩省等事
• Prohibiting Frauds in the Handling of Grain Storage 禁革收支倉糧作弊事 15
Required by Ministry of Rites:
• Offering Words on the Rectification of Customs to Benefit Governance
陳言振肅風紀裨益治道事
• Following Conventions to Receive Donations and Register Monks to Overcome the 
Famine 援例納糧度僧以救荒歉事 2
Required by Ministry of War:
• Annual Report on Service Records of Military Personnel 歲報軍職官員貼黄事
• Organizing Service Records of Military Personnel 清理軍職貼黄事
• Annual Report on Horses, Mules, and Population Census of the Government Army
歲報官軍馬騾戶口文冊事
• Investigating Registered Soldiers 清理軍伍事
• Public Affairs 公務事
• Commanders' Duel Examinations 旗役已併鎗文冊事
• Carrying Out Policies on Horses 舉行馬政事
• Requesting to Retain Horse-Purchasing Silver to Meet Urgent Needs 
乞恩存留馬價銀兩以便急用事
• Examining Barbarians' Tribute Horses 稽考夷人進貢馬匹事 9
Required by Ministry of Works:
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• Military Affairs 軍務事
• Annual Report on Cattle 歲報牛隻事
• Clarifying Original Regulations to Correct Official Responsibilities
申明舊制以復職掌事
• Kanhe Communications 行移勘合事 4
Total: 33
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Table 2.1: Number of Post Stations, Postmen, and Wage by County
This table covers the eight provinces of North Zhili, Shandong, Henan, South Zhili, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Guangdong, and Sichuan. The data was collected through uncontrolled keyword searches
of Series One and Two of the Airusheng China Gazetteers Database 愛如生中國方志庫. (The 
only exception is Entry #1, which comes from a non-gazetteer source.) The table is not meant to 
be a comprehensive representation of all available sources. Rather, it is a rough approximation of
the high, low, and typical figures within a given prefecture and province. Rather than providing a
basis for statistical analyses, the figures are meant to show the range of possibilities available at 
different times and regions. 
Bolded county names indicate prefectural seats. Station masters are included in the count of 
postmen.
















1 1592 N. Zhili Shuntian - Wanping 12 48 4.0 7.2
2 1593 N. Zhili Shuntian - Liangxiang 5 32 6.4 6.0
3 1625 N. Zhili Shuntian - Dong'an 4 16 4.0 2.7
4 1593 N. Zhili Shuntian Changping (Changping) 8 34 4.3 6.0
5 1593 N. Zhili Shuntian Changping Miyun 10 18 1.8 3.6
6 1593 N. Zhili Shuntian Changping Shunyi 8 24 3.0 -
7 1593 N. Zhili Shuntian Tonzhou (Tongzhou) 5 23 4.6 6.0
8 1593 N. Zhili Shuntian Bazhou (Bzahou) 5 12 2.4 7.2
9 1570 N. Zhili Shuntian Jizhou Fengrun 10 45 4.5 2.0
10 1538 N. Zhili Baoding - Qingwan 13 72 5.5 3.0-4.0
11 1534 N. Zhili Zhending - Gaocheng 4 16 4.0 6.8
12 1556 N. Zhili Zhending - Huolu 7 40 5.7 3.6
1. Shen Bang 沈榜, Wanshu zaji 宛署雜記, 5.33-34.
2. Shuntian fuzhi 順天府志 (1593), 2.49a-55a, 3.29a.
3. Dong'an xianzhi 東安縣志 (1625), 2.6a, 3.2b-3a.
4. Shuntian fuzhi 順天府志 (1593), 2.49a-55a, 3.43a.
5. Shuntian fuzhi 順天府志 (1593), 2.49a-55a, 3.45a.
6. Shuntian fuzhi 順天府志 (1593), 2.49a-55a, 3.47b.
7. Shuntian fuzhi 順天府志 (1593), 2.49a-55a, 3.35a.
8. Shuntian fuzhi 順天府志 (1593), 2.49a-55a, 3.51a.
9. Fengrun xianzhi 豐潤縣志 (1570), 4.6b-7a, 6.8a.
10. Qingwan xianzhi 清苑縣志 (1538), 3.42a.
11. Gaocheng xianzhi 藁城縣志 (1534), 3.10a.
12. Huolu xianzhi 獲鹿縣志 (1556), 3.8b, 5.6a.
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13 1550 N. Zhili Guangping - Wei 3 18 6.0 3.0
14 1640 Shandong Jinan - Licheng 16 82 5.1 6.0-9.0
15 1546 Shandong Jinan - Zichuan 11 23 2.1 -
16 1573 Shandong Yanzhou - Ziyang 11 40 3.6 3.0-4.0
17 1573 Shandong Yanzhou - Yutai 4 9 2.3 3.0-4.0
18 1573 Shandong Yanzhou Dongping (Dongping) 12 49 4.1 3.0-4.0
19 1573 Shandong Yanzhou Yizhou Fei 22 54 2.5 3.0-4.0
20 1515 Shandong Dongchang - Xin 3 27 9.0 -
21 1549 Shandong Dongchang Gaotang Wucheng 2 6 3.0 3.7
22 1540 Shandong Dongchang Gaotang Xiajin 6 28 4.7 1.5
23 1547 Shandong Dengzhou Ninghai (Ninghai) 15 51 3.4 4.0
24 1552 Shandong Qingzhou - Linqu 12 32 2.7 3.6
25 1548 Henan Kaifeng - Weishi 14 40 2.9 3.0
26 1554 Henan Kaifeng - Yifeng 4 20 5.0 3.0
27 1564 Henan Nanyang Dengzhou (Dengzhou) 14 59 4.2 3.0
28 1564 Henan Nanyang Dengzhou Xinye 12 69 5.8 2.9
29 1551 Henan Guide - Xiayi 13 72 5.5 3.0
30 1554 Henan Runing - Zhenyang 7 37 5.3 3.0
31 1556 Henan Runing Guangzhou Guangshan 12 84 7.0 -
32 1552 Henan - Ruzhou Lushan 7 42 6.0 2.0
13. Weixian zhi 威縣志 (1550), 4.13b, 8.5a.
14. Licheng xianzhi 歷城縣志 (1640), 3.27a-b, 5.21b-22a.
15. Zichuan xianzhi 淄川縣志 (1546), 4.53a-b, 4.58a.
16. Yanzhou fuzhi 兗州府志 (1573), 26.11a.
17. Yanzhou fuzhi 兗州府志 (1573), 26.27a.
18. Yanzhou fuzhi 兗州府志 (1573), 26.48b.
19. Yanzhou fuzhi 兗州府志 (1573), 26.64b.
20. Xinxian zhi 莘縣志 (1515), 2.6b.
21. Wucheng xianzhi 武城縣志 (1549), 2.16b, 3.34a.
22. Xiazjin xianzhi 夏津縣志 (1540), 2.14b, 3.48b-49b.
23. Ninghai zhouzhi 寧海州志 (1547), A.22a, A.32a.
24. Linqu xianzhi 臨朐縣志 (1552), 2.40a, 2.44b.
25. Weishi xianzhi 尉氏縣志 (1548), 2.26b-28b, 2.56b.
26. Yifeng xianzhi 儀封縣志 (1554), database location 31/477, 93/477, 119/477. 
27. Dengzhou zhi 鄧州志 (1564), 9.16b, 10.22b, 10.25a.
28. Dengzhou zhi 鄧州志 (1564), 9.22a, 10.27a, 10.28b
29. Xiayi xianzhi 夏邑縣志 (1551), 2.4b-5a, 3.6a.
30. Zhenyang xianzhi 真陽縣志 (1554), 6.4b-5a.
31. Guangshan xianzhi 光山縣志 (1556), 3.6a-b.
32. Lushan xianzhi 魯山縣志 (1552), 2.6b, 4.22b-23a.
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33 1598 S. Zhili Yingtian - Jiangning 14 59 4.2 4.0
34 1526 S. Zhili Yingtian - Gaochun 10 60 6.0 -
35 1583 S. Zhili Huai'an - Yancheng 10 11 1.1 4.0-5.0
36 1577 S. Zhili Huai'an Pizhou Suqian 6 24 4.0 -
37 1599 S. Zhili Yangzhou - Jiangdu 25 135 5.4 -
38 1536 S. Zhili Yangzhou Tongzhou Haimen 4 13 3.3 -
39 1591 S. Zhili Yangzhou Gaoyou Xinghua 7 12 1.7 7.2
40 1642 S. Zhili Suzhou - Wu 4 32 8.0 6.0
41 1488 S. Zhili Suzhou - Wujiang 12 108 9.0 -
42 1547 S. Zhili Changzhou - Jiangyin 7 37 5.3 6.0
43 1640 S. Zhili Changzhou - Jiangyin 7 37 5.3 7.2
44 1475 Zhejiang Hangzhou - Renhe 13 99 7.6 -
45 1579 Zhejiang Hangzhou - Renhe 13 50 3.8 7.2-12
46 1550 Zhejiang Huzhou - Wukang 4 18 4.5 3.0-4.0
47 1557 Zhejiang Huzhou Anji (Anji) 7 23 3.3 -
48 1575 Zhejiang Shaoxing - Kuaiji 13 65 5.0 8.3
49 1560 Zhejiang Ningbo - Yin 22 136 6.3 3.0-4.0
50 1560 Zhejiang Ningbo - Xiangshan 18 74 4.1 2.3
51 1540 Zhejiang Taizhou - Taiping 22 77 3.5 3.0-4.5
52 1503 Zhejiang Wenzhou - Yueqing 27 160 5.9 -
33. Jiangning xianzhi 江寧縣志 (1598), 3.28a.
34. Gaochuan xianzhi 高淳縣志 (1526), 1.19b.
35. Yancheng xianzhi 鹽城縣志 (1583), database location 2.69/463, 3.119/463.
36. Suqian xianzhi 宿遷縣志 (1577), 4.5b.
37. Jiangdu xianzhi 江都縣志 (1599), 7.9a-10a.
38. Haimen xianzhi 海門縣志 (1536), 3.8a.
39. Xinghua xianzhi 興化縣志 (1591), database location 3.335/983.
40. Wuxian zhi 吳縣志 (1642), 7.28a-b.
41. Wujiang zhi 吳江志 (1488), database location 3.149/963, 4.171-2/963.
42. Jiangyin xianzhi 江陰縣志 (1547), 1.12a, 5.31a.
43. Jiangyin xianzhi 江陰縣志 (1640), 1.3a-b, 2.50b, 2.53b.
44. Hangzhou fuzhi 杭州府志 (1475), 14.5b-6a.
45. Hangzhou fuzhi 杭州府志 (1579), 31.10b-11b, 39.21b.
46. Wukang xianzhi 武康縣志 (1550), 4.8b.
47. Anji zhouzhi 安吉州志 (1557), 5.15b-16a.
48. Kuaiji xianzhi 會稽縣志 (1575), 7.2a.
49. Ningbo fuzhi 寧波府志 (1560), 10.4a-b.
50. Ningbo fuzhi 寧波府志 (1560), 10.13b.
51. Taiping xianzhi 太平縣志 (1540), 3.19b.
52. Wenzhou fuzhi 溫州府志 (1503), 7-yi-2b.
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53 1503 Zhejiang Wenzhou - Taishun 11 33 3.0 -
54 1547 Fujian Fuzhou - Fuqing 20 85 2.4 -
55 1503 Fujian Xinghua - Putian 16 74 4.6 -
56 1525 Fujian Yanping - Nanping 26 146 5.6 -
57 1521 Fujian Yanping - Shunchang 18 76 4.2 -
58 1545 Fujian Tingzhou - Qingliu 10 51 5.1 -
59 1546 Fujian Shaowu - Jianning 7 32 4.6 -
60 1612 Fujian Quanzhou - Jinjiang 20 63 3.2 4.6-7.2
61 1531 Fujian Quanzhou - Dehua 2 6 3.0 3.0
62 1612 Fujian Quanzhou - Dehua 2 4 2.0 5.0
63 1535 Fujian Zhangzhou - Longxi 21 91 4.3 3.0
64 1616 Fujian - Funing (Funing) 24 51 2.1 3.0-6.5
65 1538 Fujian - Funing Ningde 9 38 4.2 3.0
66 1537 Guangdong Zhaoqing Deqing (Deqing) 24 33 1.4 3.6
67 1537 Guangdong Zhaoqing Deqing Kaijian 6 7 1.2 3.6
68 1556 Guangdong Huizhou - Guishan 17 59 3.5 3.6
69 1556 Guangdong Huizhou - Haifeng 41 124 3.0 3.6
70 1556 Guangdong Huizhou - Longchuan 7 24 3.4 3.6
71 1547 Guangdong Chaozhou - Haiyang 25 81 3.2 3.6
72 1614 Guangdong Gaozhou - Haikang 13 40 3.1 -
53. Wenzhou fuzhi 溫州府志 (1503), 7-yi-3a.
54. Fuqing xianzhi xulüe 福清縣志續略 (1547), 4.16b.
55. Xinghua fuzhi 興化府志 (1503), 48.18b-19b.
56. Yanping fuzhi 延平府志 (1525), Shihuo 食貨 1.19a, Gongshu 公署 1.8b-9a.
57. Shunchang yizhi 順昌邑志 (1521), 2.10a-11a, 3.17b.
58. Qingliu xianzhi 清流縣志 (1545), 2.38a-b.
59. Jianning xianzhi 建寧縣志 (1546), 2.8a-b.
60. Quanzhou fuzhi 泉州府志 (1612) 6.23a-b.
61. Dehua xianzhi 德化縣志 (1531), 4.22b-23a, 5.6b.
62. Quanzhou fuzhi 泉州府志 (1612), 6.75a.
63. Longxi xianzhi 龍溪縣志 (1535), 4.19b.
64. Funing zhouzhi 福寧州志 (1616), 7.6b.
65. Ningde xianzhi 寧德縣志 (1538), 1.20a-b, 2.5a-b.
66. Deqing zhouzhi 德慶州志 (1537), 10.16a.
67. Deqing zhouzhi 德慶州志 (1537), 10.20b.
68. Huizhou fuzhi 惠州府志 (1556), 7B.9b.
69. Huizhou fuzhi 惠州府志 (1556), 7B.12a.
70. Huizhou fuzhi 惠州府志 (1556), 7B.14a.
71. Chaozhou fuzhi 潮州府志 (1547), 2.16b, 3.3a.
72. Leizhou fuzhi 雷州府志 (1614), 8.32a-33a.
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73 1614 Guangdong Gaozhou - Suixi 21 61 2.9 -
74 1579 Sichuan Chongqing Hezhou (Hezhou) 15 49 3.3 -
75 1579 Sichuan Chongqing Hezhou Tongliang 14 40 2.9 3.0
76 1555 Sichuan Mahu - Pingshan 5 14 2.8 2.0-4.0
77 1562 Sichuan - Meizhou Hongya 4 12 3.0 -
78 1611 Sichuan - Jiading (Jiading) 15 43 2.9 7.2
73. Leizhou fuzhi 雷州府志 (1614), 8.33a-34a
74. Hezhou zhi 合州志 (1579), 6.16b-17a.
75. Hezhou zhi 合州志 (1579), 6.17b.
76. Mahu fuzhi 馬湖府志 (1555), 4-chuangshe-7b, 4-shihuo-4b.
77. Hongya xianzhi 洪雅縣志 (1562), 5.6a.
78. Jiading zhouzhi 嘉定州志 (1611), 4.48b-49a.
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Table 2.2: Allocation of Postmen in Renhe County, Hangzhou
Sources: Hangzhou fuzhi 杭州府志 (1475), 14.5b-6a; Hangzhou fuzhi (1579), 31.10b-11b, 39.21b.
# of Postmen in 1475 # of Postmen in 1579
Beiguo Main Station 11 5
Taiping Main Station 11 3
Dongxin Station 7 4
Gaoting Station 7 4
Baijiawan Station 7 4
Chi'an Station 7 4
Tongkou Station 7 6
Shimu Station 7 4
Lianhua Station 7 4
Xiaxin Station 7 3
Taijun Station 7 3
Tangzhen Station 7 3
Fangjia Station 7 3
Post Stations Total: 99 50
Main Station in Front of Provincial 
Administration Office *
- 12
Main Station in Front of Provincial 
Surveillance Office *
- 11
Regional Inspector's Office - 0.5
Salt Tax Censor's Office - 0.5
Ministry of Works Branch Office - 1
Nanjing Ministry of Revenue Branch Office - 1
Textiles Office - 1
5 functional circuit offices:
Education, Troops, Relay, Waterworks, and 
Maritime Affairs
- 5
5 sub-provincial circuit offices - 5
Hangzhou Prefecture - 2
Renhe County - 1
Government Offices Total: - 40
* The nature of these two stations is unclear. Although it is possible that they acted like real post 
stations, I find it more reasonable to regard them as irregular "post stations" where the primary 
responsibility of their "postmen" was to deliver documents to nearby administrative seats, not to 
the nearest post stations (Beiguo Main Station and Taiping Main Station) located just outside the 
city wall. If the latter had been the case, the number of postmen assigned to these two stations is 
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disproportional compared to the number assigned to the other post stations. It is hard to imagine 
how the other stations, staffed with much fewer postmen, could have handled the same volume 
of documents that these two stations collectively handled and eventually passed on to them.
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Table 2.3: Memorials of Min Hongxue, 1622-27
Source: Min Hongxue 閔洪學, Fu Dian zoucao 撫滇奏草.









1 1.17a-20a Arrival report 1622/12/23 1623/6/8 Rao Guangyu 163
2 1.21a-23b Military operations; civil and 
military personnel impeachment
1623/2/20 1623/6/8 Rao Guangyu 107
3 1.24a-27b Military supplies 1623/2/20 1623/6/8 Rao Guangyu 107
4 1.28a-33b Military operations 1623/2/20 1623/6/8 Rao Guangyu 107
5 1.34a-39a Civil personnel appointment 1623/2/20 1623/6/8 Rao Guangyu 107
6 1.40a-44b Local governance and military 
supplies
1623/2/24 1623/6/8 Rao Guangyu 103
7 1.45a-50a Civil personnel impeachment 1623/5/20 1623/10b/29 Yang Dexi 186
8 1.51a-62b Military operations and supplies 1623/5/20 1623/10b/29 Yang Dexi 186
9 1.63a-64b Reporting earthquake 1623/5/20 1623/10b/29 Yang Dexi 186
10 1.65a-71a Civil personnel evaluation 1623/5/20 1623/10b/29 Yang Dexi 186
11 2.1a-5b Civil administration and finance 1623/5/20 1623/10b/29 Yang Dexi 186
12 2.6a-9a Civil personnel appointment 1623/5/20 1623/10b/29 Yang Dexi 186
13 2.10a-15b Military operations 1623/6/6 1623/11/7 Yang Dexi 178
14 2.16a-22a Civil administration and finance 1623/6/6 1623/11/7 Yang Dexi 178
15 2.23a-26b Military administration and 
finance
1623/6/6 1623/11/7 Yang Dexi 178
16 2.27a-29a Civil personnel evaluation 1623/6/6 1623/11/7 Yang Dexi 178
17 2.30a-33b Congratulating emperor's birthday 1623/8/24 ? Wang Wannian ?
18 2.34a-40b Military operations and supplies 1623/8/27 1623/11/20 Lang Cunjian 111
19 2.41a-47a Military personnel impeachment 1623/8/27 1623/11/20 Lang Cunjian 111
20 2.48a-52a Civil personnel evaluation 1623/8/27 1623/11/20 Lang Cunjian 111
21 2.53a-59a Military personnel impeachment 
and appointment
1623/10/9 1624/1/22 Li Chunhua 131
22 2.60a-64a Civil personnel impeachment 1623/10/9 1624/1/22 Li Chunhua 131
23 2.65a-71a Civil personnel appointment 1623/10/9 1624/1/22 Li Chunhua 131
24 2.72a-79a Finances and military supplies 1623/10/9 1624/1/9 Li Chunhua 118
25 3.1a-11b Military operations 1623/10/9 1624/1/9 Li Chunhua 118
26 3.12a-17b Civil and military personnel 
rewards
1623/10/22 1624/1/24 Li Chunhua 120
27 3.18a-21a Military personnel impeachment 1623/10/22 ? Li Chunhua ?
28 3.22a-27a Military personnel impeachment 1623/11/12 1624/2/19 Duan Jinxiu 95
29 3.28a-31a Civil personnel impeachment 1623/11/12 1624/2/19 Duan Jinxiu 95
30 3.32a-41a Local finances and military 
supplies
1623/11/12 1624/2/19 Duan Jinxiu 95
31 3.42a-52b Military operations 1623/11/12 1624/2/19 Duan Jinxiu 95
32 3.53a-61b Military operations 1623/11/19 1624/2/19 Duan Jinxiu 95
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33 3.62a-64b Civil personnel appointment 1623/11/23 ? Yang Tailai ?
34 3.65a-80b Rebels trial report 1624/2/16 1624/6/22 Zhuang Qili 124
35 3.81a-86b Civil personnel impeachment 1624/2/16 1624/6/26? Zhuang Qili 128
36 4.1a-5a Civil personnel evaluation 1624/2/16 1624/6/22 Zhuang Qili 124
37 4.6a-11b Military supplies 1624/2/16 1624/6/22 Zhuang Qili 124
38 4.12a-16b Military administration 1624/2/16 1624/6/22 Zhuang Qili 124
39 4.17a-19a Civil personnel evaluation 1624/2/16 1624/6/22 Zhuang Qili 124
40 4.20a-26b Civil personnel impeachment 1624/2/28 1624/6/22 Zhuang Qili 112
41 4.27a-30a Roads in Sichuan blocked by 
rebels
1624/2/28 1624/6/22 Zhuang Qili 112
42 4.31a-41a Military operations 1624/5/16 1625/1/9 Rao Guangyu 229
43 4.42a-47b Military operations 1624/5/16 1625/1/9 Rao Guangyu 229
44 4.48a-49a Civil personnel appointment 1624/5/16 1625/1/22 Rao Guangyu 242
45 4.50a-52b Congratulating emperor's birthday 1624/8/1 ? Wang Wannian ?
46 4.53a-63a Military operations 1624/8/1 1625/1/9 Rao Guangyu 156
47 4.64a-70b Military supplies 1624/8/1 1625/1/9 Rao Guangyu 156
48 4.71a-76a Civil personnel evaluation 1624/8/1 1625/1/9 Rao Guangyu 156
49 4.77a-78b Civil personnel appointment 1624/8/1 1625/1/23 Rao Guangyu 170
50 5.1a-2b Congratulating birth of a prince 1624/8/5 1625/1/5 Wan Bangning 147
51 5.3a-7b Reporting death of retired official 1624/9/19 1625/1/22 Xiong Yingzhao 121
52 5.8a-9a Civil personnel appointment 1624/9/19 1625/1/23 Xiong Yingzhao 122
53 5.10a-12b Civil personnel impeachment 1624/9/19 1625/1/9 Xiong Yingzhao 108
54 5.13a-30b Civil personnel impeachment 1624/9/19 1625/1/9 Xiong Yingzhao 108
55 5.31a-40a Local governance 1624/9/25 1625/1/9 Li Zhongmei 102
56 5.41a-43b Military personnel appointment 1624/9/25 1625/1/9 Li Zhongmei 102
57 5.44a-63b Military operations 1624/10/10 1625/1/8 Ma Jigao 86
58 5.64a-66b Personnel evaluation reports lost 
to robbers while in transit
1624/11/12 1625/1/9 Wu Zhaojing 56
59 5.67a-75a Civil administration and finance 1624/12/13 1625/3/16 Duan Jinxiu 91
60 5.76a-81a Military personnel appointment 1624/12/13 1625/3/16 Duan Jinxiu 91
61 5.82a-85a Military personnel appointment 1624/12/13 1625/3/16 Duan Jinxiu 91
62 5.86a-88a Civil personnel evaluation 1624/12/13 1625/3/16 Duan Jinxiu 91
63 6.1a-4b Civil personnel impeachment 1625/1/13 1625/4/3 Zhai Linghan 78
64 6.5a-10b Military supplies 1625/2/5 1625/4/21 Yang Xun 74
65 6.11a-13b Civil personnel appointment 1625/2/5 1625/4/21 Yang Xun 74
66 6.14-a17a Civil personnel appointment 1625/2/5 1625/4/21 Yang Xun 74
67 6.18a-24a Military operations 1625/3/4 1625/6/15 Li Chunhua 99
68 6.25a-43b Military operations 1625/4/8 1625/6/15 Li Chunhua 66
69 6.44a-48b Military supplies 1625/4/8 1625/6/15 Li Chunhua 66
70 6.49a-53b Military operations 1625/4/12 1625/7/4 Duan Jie 81
71 6.54a-57b Civil personnel appointment 1625/4/12 1625/7/4 Duan Jie 81
72 6.58a-74a Military operations 1625/6/9 1625/9/12 Zhuang Qili 92
73 6.75a-76a Civil personnel appointment 1625/6/9 1625/9/12 Zhuang Qili 92
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74 6.77a-81a Military personnel appointment 1625/6/9 1625/9/12 Zhuang Qili 92
75 6.82a-87b Local governance 1625/6/9 1625/9/12 Zhuang Qili 92
76 7.1a-5a Civil personnel impeachment 1625/6/9 1625/9/12 Zhuang Qili 92
77 7.6a-11a Civil personnel appointment 1625/6/9 1625/9/12 Zhuang Qili 92
78 7.12a-15a Congratulating emperor's birthday 1625/8/7 1625/10/3 Wang Wannian 55
79 7.16a-18a Declining promotion 1625/8/10 1625/10/3 Yang Dexi 52
80 7.19a-21b Civil personnel appointment 1625/8/17 1625/10/3 Yang Dexi 45
81 7.22a-23a Donating salary for palace 
construction
1625/8/17 1625/10/5 Yang Dexi 47
82 7.24a-25b Donating salary for palace 
construction
1625/8/17 1625/10/5 Yang Dexi 47
83 7.26a-29b Military personnel impeachment 
and appointment
1625/8/17 1625/10/3 Yang Dexi 45
84 7.30a-33a Civil personnel evaluation 1625/11/6 1626/2/11 Wang Shibi 93
85 7.34a-36a Military personnel appointment 1625/11/28 1626/2/11 Li Biao 71
86 7.37a-38b Civil personnel impeachment 1625/11/28 1626/2/11 Li Biao 71
87 7.39a-41a Military personnel appointment 1625/11/28 1626/2/11 Li Biao 71
88 7.42a-46a Reporting death of civil official 1625/11/28 1626/2/11 Li Biao 71
89 7.47a-52b Military personnel impeachment 
and appointment
1625/11/28 1626/2/11 Li Biao 71
90 7.53a-56a Civil personnel impeachment 1625/11/28 1626/2/11 Li Biao 71
91 7.57a-66a Reporting flood 1625/11/28 1626/2/11 Li Biao 71
92 7.67a-88b Civil personnel impeachment 1626/1/20 1626/5/23 Su Dong 120
93 8.1a-2b Thanking emperor for promotion 1626/2/20 1626/7/23 Lang Cunjian 180
94 8.3a-4b Congratulating birth of a prince 1626/2/26 1626/7/23 Zhang Guowei 174
95 8.5a-6a Donating salary for frontier 
military expenses
1626/4/25 1626/7/23 Lang Cunjian 105
96 8.7a-13a Donating salary for palace 
construction
1626/4/25 1626/7/23 Lang Cunjian 105
97 8.14a-18b Local governance 1626/4/25 1626/7/23 Lang Cunjian 105
98 8.19a-28b Local governance 1626/4/25 1626/7/25 Lang Cunjian 105
99 8.29a-30b Civil personnel appointment 1626/4/25 1626/7/23 Lang Cunjian 105
100 8.31a-32b Civil personnel appointment 1626/4/25 1626/7/23 Lang Cunjian 105
101 8.33a-35a Civil personnel evaluation 1626/4/25 1626/7/23 Lang Cunjian 105
102 8.36a-39b Civil personnel appointment 1626/6b/15 1626/9/11 Yang Xuan 85
103 8.40a-41b Military personnel appointment 1626/6b/16 1626/9/11 Yang Xuan 84
104 8.42a-44a Civil personnel evaluation 1626/7/20 1626/9/13 Yang Xuan 52
105 8.45a-50a Civil personnel evaluation 1626/7/20 1626/9/13 Yang Xuan 52
106 8.51a-64a Local education 1626/7/25 1626/12/28 Su Xiwen 151
107 8.65a-71a Reporting death of retired official 1626/7/25 1626/12/28 Su Xiwen 151
108 8.72a-77b Reporting death of military 
general
1626/7/25 1626/12/28 Su Xiwen 151
109 8.78a-80a Civil personnel appointment 1626/7/25 1626/12/28 Su Xiwen 151
110 9.1a-6b Financial administration 1626/7/25 1626/12/28 Su Xiwen 151
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111 9.7a-8a Donating local administrative 
income for palace construction
1626/7/25 1626/12/28 Su Xiwen 151
112 9.9a-12b Donating local administrative 
income for palace construction
1626/7/25 1626/12/28 Su Xiwen 151
113 9.13a-15a Civil personnel evaluation 1626/7/25 1626/12/28 Su Xiwen 151
114 9.16a-22b Report on military spending 1626/7/25 1626/12/28 Su Xiwen 151
115 9.23a-27b Local governance 1626/9/13 1626/12/30 Su Xiwen 106
116 9.28a-33a Local education 1626/9/13 1626/12/20 Wu Zhaojing 96
117 9.34a-36a Civil personnel appointment 1626/9/13 1626/12/30 Wu Zhaojing 106
118 9.37a-40a Report on the execution of rebels 1626/9/13 1626/12/30 Wu Zhaojing 106
119 9.41a-43b Civil personnel appointment 1626/9/13 1626/12/30 Wu Zhaojing 106
120 9.44a-58b Reporting flood 1626/9/13 1626/12/30 Wu Zhaojing 106
121 9.59a-63a Reporting flood and earthquake 1626/9/13 1626/12/30 Wu Zhaojing 106
122 9.64a-68b Local governance 1626/9/13 1626/12/30 Wu Zhaojing 106
123 9.69a-70a Donating salary for palace 
construction
1626/9/13 1626/12/30 Wu Zhaojing 106
124 9.71a-73b Civil personnel evaluation 1626/10/10 1627/3/2 Wu Zhaojing 140
125 9.74a-76a Civil personnel appointment 1626/11/10 1627/4/13 Yang Dexi 150
126 9.77a-87b Donating salary for palace 
construction
1626/11/25 1627/4/13 Yang Dexi 135
127 10.1a-6a Reporting death of local official 1626/11/25 1627/4/13 Yang Dexi 135
128 10.7a-12b Local education 1626/11/25 1627/4/13 Yang Dexi 135
129 10.13a-16a Civil personnel appointment 1626/11/25 1627/4/13 Yang Dexi 135
130 10.17a-18b Congratulating completion of 
palace building
1627/1/3 1627/3/22 Li Hong 78
131 10.19a-26b Local governance 1627/1/3 1627/4/13 Duan Jinxiu 98
132 10.27a-31a Local governance 1627/1/3 1627/4/13 Duan Jinxiu 98
133 10.32a-38a Delivering minted coins 1627/1/3 1627/4/13 Duan Jinxiu 98
134 10.39a-47b Local governance 1627/1/3 1627/4/13 Duan Jinxiu 98
135 10.48a-49b Civil personnel appointment 1627/2/10 1627/4/14 Duan Jinxiu 63
136 10.50a-56a Civil personnel impeachment 1627/2/10 1627/4/14 Duan Jinxiu 63
137 10.57a-58a Education personnel appointment 1627/2/10 1627/4/14 Duan Jinxiu 63
138 10.59a-60a Civil personnel appointment 1627/2/10 1627/4/14 Duan Jinxiu 63
139 10.61a-66a Military personnel appointment 
and impeachment
1627/2/10 1627/4/14 Duan Jinxiu 63
140 10.67a-68b Military personnel appointment 1627/2/10 1627/4/14 Duan Jinxiu 63
141 10.69a-71b Local governance 1627/2/10 1627/4/14 Duan Jinxiu 63
142 10.72a-73b Recommending talented officials 1627/2/10 1627/4/14 Duan Jinxiu 63
143 10.74a-76b Military supplies 1627/2/10 1627/4/14 Duan Jinxiu 63
144 10.77a-78b Declining promotion 1627/2/10 1627/4/14 Duan Jinxiu 63
145 10.79a-81a Returning imperial rescripts 1627/2/10 ? ?
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Table 3.1: Regulations and Debates on the Third Year Review, Triennial Audience, and 
Congratulatory Memorials
Abbreviations: TR=third year review; TA=triennial audience; CM=congratulatory memorials.
# Year Category Event
1 1399-
1402
TR All civil officials are permanently exempted from capital trips.
2 1402 TR The above regulation revoked.
3 1430 TR, TA, 
CM
If an audience attendee or congratulatory memorial deliverer is nearing his 
review, he is allowed to complete both tasks in one trip.
4 1436-49 CM Memorials for the imperial birthday must be carried by a provincial regular 
official. Memorials for other celebrations can be carried by provincial staff-
supervising officials or supporting officials of prefectures or guards. 
5 1444 TA Permanent audience exemption for Guangxi counties located near the frontier.
6 1456 TR First recorded instance of pay-for exemption.
7 1469 TA Permanent audience exemption for Yunnan counties that have reduced quota of 
officials.
8 1493 TR Last recorded instance of pay-for exemption.
9 1490's TR Permanent trip exemption for all Guizhou and Yunnan local officials except for 
prefects.
10 1527 TR Minister of Personnel suggests trip exemption for everyone undergoing fist and 
second reviews → not approved.
11 1530 TR, TA Supervising Secretary of War suggests abolishing either the third year review or 
the triennial evaluation → outcome not recorded (i.e. not approved).
1. Ming shilu (Taizong), Hongwu 35/7/13 jiawu.
2. Ming shilu (Taizong), Hongwu 35/7/13 jiawu.
3. Ming huidian (Wanli edition), "Kaohe" 考覈, 12.23b.
4. Ming huidian (Wanli edition), "Jin biaojian yi" 進表箋儀, 75.4b. The regulation first appears under an 
entry dated to the Zhengde reign (1436-49), and is repeated under another entry dated 1504. 
5. Ming huidian (Wanli edition), "Chaojin kaocha" 朝覲考察, 13.6a.
6. Ming shilu (Yingzong) Jingtai 7/1/24 jiawu.
7. Ming huidian (Wanli edition), "Chaojin kaocha," 13.6a.
8. Ming shilu (Xiaozong), Hongzhi 6/12/11 xinwei.
9. The Ming huidian gives the date for both provinces as 1490, whereas the Ming shilu only records the 
exemption for Guizhou in the year 1497. Additionally, the Zhengde edition of Ming huidian records 
further exemptions given to officials serving in South Zhili and provinces such as Zhejiang, but this 
clause does not appear in the Wanli edition. Possibly, the latter exemptions were later revoked. See 
Ming shilu (Xiaozong), Hongzhi 10/3/3 yisi; Ming huidian (Zhengde edition), "Kaohe" 考覈, 
14.11b-12a; Ming huidian (Wanli edition), "Kaohe," 12.18b.
10. Ming shilu (Shizong) Jiajing 6/11/9 guiwei.
11. Ming shilu (Shizong) Jiajing 9/11/3 jichou.
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12 1533 TR Nanjing Minister of Personnel suggests trip exemption for all Nanjing officials 
below the fifth rank → not approved and reprimanded.
13 1537 TR, TA, 
CM
If an audience attendee or congratulatory memorial deliverer is nearing his 
review, he is allowed to combine the two trips into one. (Confirming the 
regulation of 1430.)
14 1563 TR Permanent trip exemption for all local officials except for prefectural supporting 
officials.
15 1568 TA Announcement of an official scale of travel subsidies for audience attendees.
16 1581 CM Regional Inspector of Shaanxi requests permission to have provincial 
administrative/surveillance offices take turns delivering both offices' 
congratulatory memorials → request denied.
17 1593 TR Chief Supervising Secretary of Personnel suggests permanent trip exemption for 
prefectural supporting officials → outcome not recorded (i.e. not approved).
18 1624 TA When an official is exempted from the audience, his portion of the travel subsidy 
should be turned over to the central court.
Qing-Dynasty Developments:
19 1652 TA Each of the two provincial offices should send one [head] official. Each 
prefecture should send one supporting official. Counties no longer need to send 
any official.
20 1663 CM Officials no longer required to submit congratulatory memorials for the winter 
solstice.
21 1665 TR Third year review abolished.
22 1669 CM Congratulatory memorials of all civil offices should be submitted collectively by 
the Provincial Administration Office.
23 1686 TA Prefectural officials permanently exempted from audience attendance. Each 
province should send one subprovincial official.
12. Ming shilu (Shizong) Jiajing 12/6/22 guisi.
13. Ming huidian (Wanli edition), "Kaohe," 12.23b-24a.
14. Ming shilu (Shizong) Jiajing 42/12/6 gengxu.
15. Ming shilu (Muzong), Longqing 2/9/11 dingsi.
16. Zengxiu tiaoli beikao 增修條例備考, Libu 禮部, "Zhuoyi fan nie jijin guanyuan" 酌議藩臬齎進官員, 
2.16b-17a.
17. Ming shilu (Shenzong), Wanli 21/8/13 jiawu.
18. Bi Ziyan 畢自嚴, Duzhi zouyi 度支奏議, Tanggao 堂稿, "Liao xiang bufu jiji wuqi shu" 遼餉不敷濟急無
奇疏, 1.24b-25a.
19. Qing shilu (Shizu), Shunzhi 9/4/18 jiwei.
20. Qing shilu (Shengzu), Kangxi 2/2/3 renyin.
21. Qing shilu (Shengzu), Kangxi 4/1/10 dingyou, 4/1/17 jiachen.
22. Qing huidian shili (Guangxu edition), "Jin biaojian shiyi" 進表箋事宜, 318.741b.
23. Qing shilu (Shengzu), Kangxi 25/3/26 gengchen.
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24 1692 CM Congratulatory memorials of all civil and military offices should be submitted 
collectively through the governor general's office through the relay system. 
Termination of delivery by officials. 
25 1753 CM Officials at the provincial level and below no longer required to submit 
congratulatory memorials. 
24. Qing shilu (Shengzu), Kangxi 31/10/25 gengzi.
25. Qing huidian shili (Guangxu edition), "Jin biaojian shiyi," 318.745b.
- 210 -





Payment Requirement / Announcement Details
Units—grain: piculs; fodder: bundles; silver: taels.
1 1456 Huguang (a) GC of Huguang Grain 40 for all officials except staff-supervising and 
miscellaneous officials
20 for staff-supervising officials and miscellaneous 
officials
2 1459 Huguang (a) Huguang 
provincial offices
Grain 40 for local head and supporting officials
20 for local staff-supervising officials





4 1466 Huguang (p) Ministry of 
Revenue
Grain n/a
5 1466 Shaanxi (a) Ministry of 
Revenue
Fodder 500 for all officials
6 1466 Henan (a) RI of Henan Grain n/a
7 1470 Shaanxi (a) GC of Shaanxi Fodder 500 for all officials






9 1475 Huguang (a) n/a Grain 50 for [officials ranked 4a-7a] 
40 for [officials ranked 7b-8a]
30 for [officials ranked 9a] and staff-supervising 
officials
10 1477 Henan (p) GC of Henan Grain n/a
11 1478 Shaanxi (a) GC of Ningxia Silver 30 for local officials ranked 4b and above
25 for local officials ranked 6a-5b
20 for local officials ranked 7a-8b
15 for local officials ranked 9a and below
1. Ming shilu (Yingzong), Jingtai 7/1/24 jiawu.
2. Ming shilu (Yingzong), Tianshun 3/11/15 guisi.
3. Ming shilu (Xianzong), Chenghua 1/1/25 guiyou.
4. Ming shilu (Xianzong), Chenghua 2/1/26 jisi.
5. Ming shilu (Xianzong), Chenghua 2/2/21 guisi.
6. Ming shilu (Xianzong), Chenghua 2/4/4 jiachen.
7. Ming shilu (Xianzong), Chenghua 6/1/7 bingxu.
8. Ming shilu (Xianzong), Chenghua 8/2/9 bingzi.
9. Ming shilu (Xianzong), Chenghua 11/7/1 wushen.
10. Ming shilu (Xianzong), Chenghua 13/4/28 yichou.
11. Ming shilu (Xianzong), Chenghua 14/2/21 jiayin.
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12 1482 Shaanxi (a) GC of Shaanxi Grain 70 for officials ranked 2a-3b
60 for officials ranked 4a-b
50 for officials ranked 5a-b
40 for officials ranked 5a-7b
30 for officials ranked 8a-9b
25 for miscellaneous officials
13 1484 N. Zhili (p) GC of Baoding Grain n/a
14 1485 Shaanxi, 
Shanxi (a)
GC of Xuanfu Grain, 
fodder
Applicable to all local officials (amount 
unspecified)
15 1493 N. Zhili? GC of Baoding Silver/
grain?
Applicable to all local officials (details of 
implementation unrecorded).
12. Ming shilu (Xianzong), Chenghua 18/3/7 yihai.
13. Ming shilu (Xianzong), Chenghua 20/7/7 xinmao.
14. Ming shilu (Xianzong), Chenghua 21/3/14 yiwei.
15. Ming shilu (Xiaozong), Hongzhi 6/12/11 xinwei.
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• Table 3.3: Triennial Audience Exemptions by Year
This table indexes entries in the Ming Veritable Records that record exemptions to the triennial 
audience granted to each province.
Abbreviations:
V: Head officials at both of the civil provincial offices were exempted.
v: Head official at one of the two civil provincial offices was exempted.
P: Head officials at all prefectures exempted.
p: Head official(s) at one or some prefectures exempted.
C: Head officials at all counties exempted.
c: Head official(s) at one or some counties exempted.
→: When an arrow is shown, the left side of the arrow indicates the exemption request originally
made by the provincial authorities (usually a superprovincial official); the right side indicates the
exemption actually granted by the central court. 
Notes about the Data:
• The Veritable Records do not always indicate whether an exemption applied to both the head
official and the staff-supervising official, to the head official only (i.e. the staff-supervising 
official still had to attend the audience), or to the head official on the condition that a 
supporting official was sent as a substitute. The table, therefore, only shows whether or not 
head officials at a particular administrative level and province had been exempted; it does 
not document exemptions for staff-supervising and clerks, some of which are also recorded 
in the Veritable Records.
• The completeness of records is uneven. In the explanatory notes to Veritable Records of the 
Chenghua (1465-87), Hongzhi (1488-1505), Zhengde (1506-21), and Longqing (1567-72) 
reigns, the compilers state that they have recorded all exemptions to the triennial audience.1 
We can therefore assume that the Records from these reigns provide comprehensive records 
of all audience exemptions that were known to the compilers at the times of compilation. 
This means that the data is much more complete for the late fifteenth and early sixteenth 
centuries, and less so for the rest of the dynasty. In fact, no case of audience exemption is 
recorded at all during 1541-54, 1578-1603, and after 1629.
• Despite the lack of comprehensiveness for some years, it is still possible to observe changes 
over time. For example, the Ming court frequently granted province-wide exemptions (V, P, 
and C) until about 1481, after which it tended to only grant exemptions to specific regions 
within a province (p and c).
1. Ming shilu (Xianzong), Xiuzuan fanli 修纂凡例, 2; Ming shilu (Xiaozong), Xiuzuan fanli, 6; Ming 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.1: Summary of Official Transfer Dates
On the Scope of Data
The table below shows a summary of all 97 cases of official transfer that form the basis 
of other tables and figures presented in Chapter 4. Each entry has been reconstructed using a 
combination of the Ming Veritable Records (for information on the date of appointment) and the 
corresponding arrival report memorial (for information on all other dates and special 
circumstances). To save space, I have omitted all citations to the former source, which can be 
located by referring to the entry that falls under the date of appointment.2
To ensure data consistency, I have followed three principles in determining which cases 
to include in this table. First, the arrival report memorial must contain sufficient information on 
dates and locations to allow at least a partial reconstruction of the transfer process. Following 
this principle, I include cases for which some of the dates are missing, but exclude cases in 
which I cannot reasonably infer the official's location at the time of appointment. This is because 
one can reconstruct part of the official transfer process even when some of the dates are missing, 
but the lack of information about locations inevitably renders all other pieces of information 
unusable for proper analysis.
Second, the post of an official after the transfer is always that of a capital official or a 
superprovincial official (supreme commander, grand coordinator, or regional inspector). This 
restriction is more the result of source limitation than a conscious analytical decision—since 
provincial and local officials apparently did not submit arrival report memorials (most likely, 
they submitted reports to their direct superiors instead), we have no sources with which to 
reconstruct the transfer processes of these officials, who admittedly constituted the great majority
of the Ming civil officialdom. Even within the relatively small group of capital officials and 
superprovincial officials, those who appear in this table tend to be the highest-ranked officials, 
such as ministers or vice ministers of the Six Ministries, supreme commanders, and grand 
coordinators. What is reflected in these data, therefore, are the experiences of a small group of 
high officials who nevertheless had the greatest influence within the Ming bureaucracy.
Finally, this table includes only cases for which the transferring official's place of 
departure or arrival (or both) was located outside Beijing. This means that the table does not 
include transfers within the Beijing capital, since these transfers did not involve any long-
distance movement of documents or people. On the other hand, the table does include transfers 
that occurred within the secondary capital of Nanjing or within a single provincial city (for 
example, when the Administrative Commissioner of Jiangxi was promoted to the Grand 
Coordinator of Jiangxi). Although transfers of this type did not require the officials themselves to
travel to new locations, they can nevertheless provide useful data on the communication time 
between the Beijing and the various cities.
2. In the rare instances when the appointment date falls under a period when a new emperor had 
ascended the throne but the era name had not changed (i.e. within the same year as the previous 
emperor's death), entries concerning official appointments are found under the Veritable Records of 
the new emperor rather than the old one.
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Notes on Table Fields
#: Reference number appearing in Chapter 4 and Tables 4.2-4.6.
Original Post / New Post: The posts held by an official before and after the transfer. If an 
official was on temporary leave when he received the order of appointment, I indicate the reason 
of the leave whenever it is known. For official titles that include the designations of left or right 
(indicating slight differences in rank and responsibilities between two positions of otherwise 
identical name), I have left out the designations.
Location (Original Post / New Post): The place where an official was located at the time of 
receiving the appointment order. If this information is not stated in the arrival report memorial, I 
use square brackets [] to show the official's likely location, which were inferred based on the 
following principles:
• For grand coordinators and supreme commanders, I use the likely location of their residence 
as provided in Jin Rucheng's study.3 Sometimes, the reported arrival locations refer to 
locations of jiaodai, which were usually carried out along provincial borders rather than at 
the usual locations where these officials held office. In such cases, I mark the location names
with the asterisk sign *.
• For regional inspectors, I presume their locations to have been the same as the provincial 
seat, even though a significant portion of their terms involved leaving the provincial seat and
and touring various regions of the province to perform administrative evaluations.
• For provincial officials, I use the location of the provincial seat, as provided in the Mingshi 
明史.
• For subprovincial officials who took charge of circuits with geographical jurisdictions, I use 
the seat of the circuit as provided in Tan Qixiang's Historical Atlas of China.4 If this 
information cannot be known, I presume their locations to have been the same as the 
provincial seat.
• For officials who were on temporary leaves at home, I use the locations of their native 
places of record, as provided in Mingren zhuanji ziliao suoyin 明人傳記資料索引.5
3. Jin Runcheng, Mingchao zongdu xunfu xiaqu. Jin Rucheng reconstructs changes in residence 
locations through scattered references in Ming historical records, but some of these posts went 
through frequent changes in their residence locations, not all of which have found their ways into the 
official historical records. It is possible that Jin has missed some of these location changes, either 
because he did not come across the relevant references, or because they simply do not appear in the 
sources. Also, these supplemented locations can only be taken as rough estimates, because grand 
coordinators and supreme commanders sometimes moved around within their regions of jurisdiction 
(especially at times of war).
4. Tan Qixiang 谭其骧 ed., Zhongguo lishi ditu ji: Yuan Ming shiqi 中國歷史地圖集: 元・明時期, 8 vols., 
vol. 7 (Shanghai: Ditu chubanshe, 1982).
5. Guoli zhongyang tushuguan 國立中央圖書館 ed., Mingren zhuanji ziliao suoyin 明人傳記資料索引 
(Taibei: Guoli zhongyang tushuguan, 1978).
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Appointment Date [A]: The date of appointment as appears in the Ming Veritable Records.
Order Receipt Date [B]: The date when an official received news of his appointment, as 
indicated in his arrival report memorial. 
Departure Date [C]: The date when an official started his journey toward the new post, as 
indicated in his arrival report memorial. Some capital officials' arrival report memorials only 
indicate the dates on which they picked up the imperial rescript, without stating on what date 
they left the capital. In such cases, I consider the date of rescript pickup as the date of departure.
Arrival Date [D]: Date when the official arrived at his new post, as indicated in his arrival report
memorial. If this date refers to the date of jiaodai, I mark it with an asterisk sign *.
General Comment on Dates: In some instances, we can only find out an approximate date 
range for the occurrence of a particular event. For example, we may not know an official's exact 
date of order receipt if it is not stated in his arrival report memorial, but if we can find a dated 
memorial of declination by the same official, we can be certain that he had received the news of 
appointment by this date. To accommodate this kind of ambiguity, I use the expression "~date" to
indicate that an event had happened before and including a certain date, and the expression 
"date~" to indicate that the event had happened after and including that date. 
No. of Days A-B: Number of days between appointment and order receipt, or the time of 
communication.
No. of Days B-C: Number of days between order receipt and departure, or the time of waiting 
and preparation.
No. of Days C-D: Number of days between departure and arrival, or the time of travel.
No. of Days A-D: Number of days from appointment to arrival, equivalent to the time spent on 
the entire transfer process.
Special Circumstances: The following notations are used to indicate known special 
circumstance that delayed the transfer process:
• DM (Declination Memorial): Official submitted one or more memorials declining the 
appointment. Number inside brackets indicates the number of times the memorials had been 
submitted.
• WR (Waiting for Replacement): Official's departure was delayed due to the requirements of 
houdai.
• TD (Travel Delay): The travel was delayed due to unexpected occurrences on the road. The 
text inside a bracket indicates the reason for delay.
• CO (Change of Order): The court issued additional orders of appointment before the official 
could reach his initial post of appointment. For officials who received such successive 
appointments, I create one single entry representing the entire transfer process, where the 
"New Post" field refers to the final post to which the official had been appointed, not the 
initial one.
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On Data Consistency and Reliability
As one may infer from these notes, the data presented in this table are fraught with 
ambiguities. For example, a regional inspector might have been touring the province at the time 
of receiving his appointment order, but if his exact location is not stated in the arrival report 
memorial, the "Location" field would show that he was located in the provincial seat. Likewise, a
capital official may report that he had picked up the imperial rescript on a certain date, without 
noting when exactly he had left for his new post. In such cases, the date of rescript pickup would 
appear under the "Departure Date" field, even though the official might have waited a few more 
days before actually starting his journey.
These ambiguities suggest that the data presented in this table, as well as any quantitative 
interpretation that derives from them, are meant to be rough estimates whose function is not to 
provide exact numbers, but to offer a rough approximation of what contemporaries might have 
expected about the speed of communication and movement. Although these estimates necessarily
contain some degrees of error, given the nature of the available sources, the best that can be done
is to acknowledge the existence of these ambiguities and to clearly indicate it when a piece of 
information has been obtained from contextual conjectures. This I have done as much as 
possible, using asterisk signs to mark confirmed locations and dates on the one hand, and using 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.2: Time from Appointment to Order Receipt
The table is based on 70 cases of transfer for which we can determine the number of days that 
elapsed from appointment to order receipt.6
Location of Recipient 
(# of Cases)
Median Mean Max Min
Beijing (12) 0.5 1.2 5 0
Liaodong (1) 5 5 5 5
North Zhili (5) 8 9.6 20 5
Shanxi (2) 13.5 13.5 14 13
Shandong (2) 19.5 19.5 24 15
Shaanxi (2) 26 26 28 24
South Zhili (16) 28.5 33 76 8
Henan (1) 41 41 41 41
Fujian (4) 38.5 51 95 32
Jiangxi (10) 47 48.1 73 29
Zhejiang (6) 28.5 39.8 81 14
Guangdong (6) 60.5 66.5 121 30
Huguang (2) 62 62 96 28
Sichuan (1) 97 97 97 97
6. The reference numbers of all 70 cases are as follows: Beijing (1), (40), 57, 60, 62, (67), 69, 70, 71, 
72, 78, 81; Liaodong (89); North Zhili 41, 53, 65, (68), 82; Shanxi 32, 54; Shandong 22, 43; Shaanxi 
2, (44); South Zhili  4, 8, (13), 14, (15), (16), (20), 24, 33, 37, 56, 59, 63, 64, 76, (86); Henan 25; 
Fujian 17, 35, 66, 79; Jiangxi 5, 18, 23, 27, 29, 30, 31, 36, (58), 75; Zhejiang 8, 14, 20, (73), 85, 90, 
Guangdong 10, 11, 19, 26, 49, 55; Huguang (21), (48); Sichuan 80. 
Numbers in bold indicate cases in which the capital gazettes were cited as the sources of information,
while numbers in brackets () indicate cases for which the means of information delivery are unknown.
All other numbers refer to cases in which the cited sources of information were the formal 
notifications of appointment. In three instances where the dates of order receipt cannot be determined 
with precision, I have used the maximum or minimum possible values in my calculations. (#1 and 
#86 allowed for calculation of maximum values, and #21 allowed for calculation of the minimum 
value.)
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Table 4.3: Time from Order Receipt to Departure
This table shows summaries of 34 known cases for which we can find out the time from order 
receipt to departure.1




Original Status Rescript Receipt
(Number of Days from Order 
Receipt to Rescript Receipt )
Special 
Circumstance
19 Zhang Yue 1542 0 Local On Road (11)
41 He Dongxu 1570 0 Local ?
17 Dai Shizong 1539 1 Home Before Departure (0)
20 Zhou Yong 1543 1 Home ?
31 Li Sui 1557 1 Home After Arrival
48 Xu Xuemo 1576 2 Local After Arrival
18 Li Zhong 1539 4 Home On Road (8)
95 Lu Xiangsheng 1634 8 Local ?
81 Zhang Fengxiang 1622 10 Beijing Before Departure (10)
93 Lü Weiqi 1630 12? Beijing ?
24 Yu Zhan 1545 13 Home After Arrival (29)
40 Tan Lun 1568 13 Beijing Before Departure (13)
71 Tu Xongjun 1606 15 Beijing ?
52 Xu Yuantai 1585 21 Beijing Before Departure (18)
62 Liu Yuanlin 1594 22 Beijing Before Departure (22)
23 Zhang Yue 1544 22~ GC of Jiangxi Before Departure? (22)
3 Huang Zan 1515 24 Nanjing Before Departure (0)
78 Bi Ziyan 1621 24 Beijing After Arrival (142+) Declination
97 Zhang Guowei 1634 25 Beijing ?
67 Li Sancai 1599 28 Beijing Before Departure (26)
60 Ai Mu 1591 30 Beijing Before Departure (30)
72 Zhang Wenda 1607 30 Beijing Before Departure (30)
69 Zhou Kongjiao 1604 32 Beijing Before Departure (32)
57 Li Shangsi 1589 34 Beijing Before Departure (34)
70 Qiao Bixing 1605 48 Beijing Before Departure (48)
75 Liu Yikun 1614 49 Home ?
27 Zhu Wan 1547 50~ GC of Nan-Gan 
(S. Jiangxi)
After Arrival (124) Replacement
47 Pan Jixun 1576 63~ Home After Arrival (151) Declination
1. Of the 34 cases, we are able to calculate the exact number of days for 28 cases, have rough estimates 
for 5 cases (Table 4.1: #21, 23, 27, 47, 58), and can deduce the number for 1 case (Table 4.1: #93 Lü 
Weiqi: we do not know on what day Lü received the appointment order, but since he was located in 
Beijing, I have assumed that he had received the order on the same day when the appointment 
decision was made).
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21 Zhang Yue 1543 72~ GC of Yunyang 
(N. Huguang)
Before Departure Replacement




4 Wang Shouren 1516 90 Nanjing Before Departure (53) Declination
8 Wang Shouren 1527 91 Home ? Declination
79 Min Hongxue 1621 114 Local Before Departure (102)
58 Qin Yao 1589 138~ GC of Nan-Gan 
(S. Jiangxi)
Before Departure (49) Replacement
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Table 4.4: Officials Who Submitted Declination Memorials
This table shows all 15 known cases in which the appointed official submitted one or more 
declination memorials.
Person, Year: Wang Shouren 王守仁 (#4), 1516
Type of Transfer: Chief of the Court of State Ceremonial (Nanjing) → GC of Nan-Gan (S. 
Jiangxi)
Reasons for Declining: Sick, unqualified, responsibility too heavy
Result: Wang was appointed on 8/19 and received the news on 9/14. About a month 
after submitting a declination memorial (10th month), Wang received news 
(11/14) that an earlier official who declined this post had been reprimanded. 
Wang slowly traveled toward his new post thereafter. While on the road (12/2 in
Hangzhou Prefecture, Zhejiang), he received notification that his plea had been 
rejected. He arrived at his post on 1/16 of the following year.1
Person, Year: Luo Qinshun 羅欽順 (#5), 1527
Type of Transfer: Mourning at Home (Jiangxi) → Minister of Personnel (Beijing)
Reasons for Declining: Unqualified, old age
Result: Luo was first appointed to the Minister of Rites (2/14). He submitted a 
memorial declining the post (3/19~), which was rejected (4/28). The court then 
appointed Luo to the even higher post of Minister of Personnel (5/8), to which 
Luo submitted another memorial declining it (6/23). This was approved and 
Luo was allowed to retire.2
Person, Year: Fang Liangyong 方良永 (#6), 1527
Type of Transfer: Mourning at Home (Fujian) → Minister of Punishment (Nanjing)
Reasons for Declining: Fell sick on the road
Result: Fang was first appointed (4/5) to the Grand Coordinator of Yingtian (S. Zhili). 
He left home on 8/4, but fell sick on the road (8/24 in Quzhou Prefecture, 
Zhejiang) and submitted two memorials asking for permission to retire. These 
were rejected (10/10), and the court further changed his appointment to the 
Nanjing Minister of Personnel (11/13). Fang died soon after submitting his 
declination memorials, without seeing the imperial response or the new order of 
appointment.3
1. Wang Shouren 王守仁, Wang Yangming quanji 王陽明全集, "Ci xinren qi yi jiuzhi zhishi shu" 辭新任乞
以舊職致仕疏, 9.297; "Xie'en shu" 謝恩疏, 9.298-99; Ming shilu (Wuzong), Zhengde 11/8/19; Wang 
Qiong 王瓊, Jinxi benbing fuzou 晉溪本兵敷奏, "Wei jinji zeiqing shi" 為急報賊情事, 10.1a-3b, "Wei 
difang youshi jique xunfu guanyuan shi" 為地方有事急缺廵撫官員事, 10.18b-19b.
2. Luo Qinshun 羅欽順, Zheng'an cungao 整菴存稿, "Cimian libu shangshu shu" 辭免禮部尚書疏, 
10.13a-14a; "Cimian libu shangshu shu" 辭免吏部尚書疏, 10.14a-15b; "Zhishi xie'en shu" 致仕謝恩疏, 
10.15b-16b; Ming shilu (Shizong), Jiajing 6/2/14 (xniyou), 6/4/28 (jiaxu), 6/5/8 (jiashen).
3. Fang Liangyong 方良永, Fang Jiansu wenji 方簡肅文集, "Zai qi xunfu qixiu shu" 再起巡撫乞休疏, 
1.14b-15b; "Zai qixiu shu" 再乞休疏, 1.15b-16b; Jiao Hong 焦竑 comp., Guochao xianzheng lu 國朝獻
徵錄, "Nanjing xingbu shangshu yi Jiansu Fang gong Liangyong muzhiming" 南京刑部尚書諡簡肅方公
良永墓誌銘 (biography by Peng Ze 彭澤), 48.67a-74a; Ming shilu (Shizong), Jiajing 6/4/5 (xinhai), 
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Person, Year: Wang Shouren 王守仁 (#8), 1527
Type of Transfer: Sick Leave at Home (Zhejiang) → GC of Guangdong and Guangxi
Reasons for Declining: Sick, others are more qualified
Result: Wang was appointed to the post on 5/11, and the order reached him on 6/6, after 
which he submitted a memorial declining the post. This was rejected (7/18), 
and Wang left home on 9/8, arriving at his new post on 11/20.4
Person, Year: Lin Fu 林富 (#9), 1529
Type of Transfer: GC of Yunyang (N. Huguang) → GC of Guangdong and Guangxi
Reasons for Declining: Sick
Result: Lin was appointed on 1/8 to replace Wang Shouren, who had left the post 
without obtaining imperial approval (and later died on the road to home). Lin 
submitted a memorial declining the post, which was rejected on 4/26. It is not 
clear when Lin had left toward his new post, but he is reported to have arrived 
on 5/20.5
Person, Year: Pan Jixun 潘季馴 (#47), 1576
Type of Transfer: Home (Zhejiang) → GC of Jiangxi
Reasons for Declining: Sick, brother imprisoned unjustly
Result: Pan was appointed on 3/8, and received the news on 3/22. He submitted a 
memorial declining the post, which was rejected on 4/29. After receiving this 
imperial response (5/26), Pan left home and arrived at his post on 6/29.6
Person, Year: Gu Yangqian 顧養謙 (#51), 1585
Type of Transfer: Vice Surveillance Commr of Shanxi (located in N. Zhili) → GC of Liaodong
Reasons for Declining: Unqualified
Result: Gu heard about his appointment on 6/23, and submitted a memorial declining 
the post. This was rejected, and he arrived at his post on 8/12.7
Person, Year: Wu Wenhua 吳文華 (#55), 1587
Type of Transfer: SC of Guangdong and Guangxi → Nanjing Minister of Works
Reasons for Declining: Sick
6/10/10 (jiayin), 6/11/13 (dinghai).
4. Wang Shouren, Wang Yangming quanji, "Cimian zhongren qi'en yangbing shu" 辭免重任乞恩養病疏, 
14.460-61, "Furen xie'en sui chen fujian shu" 赴任謝恩遂陳膚見疏, 14.462-66; Ming shilu (Shizong), 
Jiajing 6/5/11, 6/7/18.
5. Lin Fu 林富, Liang Guang shulüe 兩廣疏略, "Chuzhi Si Tian Bazhai shu" 處置思田八寨疏, A.13b-40b; 
Ming shilu (Shizong), Jiajing 8/1/8, 8/4/26.
6. Pan Jixun 潘季馴, Pan sikong zoushu 潘司空奏疏, "Wenbao qiyong cishu" 聞報起用辭疏, 4.1a-3b, 
"Baodai xie'en shu" 報代謝恩疏, 4.3b-4b; Ming shilu (Shenzong), Wanli 4/3/8.
7. Gu Yangqian 顧養謙, Chong'an Gu xiansheng fu Liao zouyi 冲菴顧先生撫遼奏議, "Ci sheng Liaodong 
xunfu shu" 辭陞遼東巡撫疏, 1.1a-4b, "Liaodong xunfu daoren xie'en shu" 遼東巡撫到任謝恩疏, 1.5a-6b.
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Result: Wu was appointed on 6/15, received the news on 7/16, and started his journey 
after 10/9. He became sick on the way, and submitted a memorial requesting a 
sick leave. This was rejected, and the response reached Wu on 3/2 of the 
following year. Eventually, Wu arrived in Nanjing on 5/3.
Person, Year: Li Hualong 李化龍 (#65), 1599
Type of Transfer: Sick Leave at Home (Henan) → SC of Sichuan, Huguang, Guizhou
Reasons for Declining: Sick
Result: Li was appointed on 3/20, and received the notification on 3/28. He submitted a 
memorial declining the post, and this was rejected. He arrived at his post on 
5/28.8
Person, Year: Ye Xianggao 葉向高 (#77), 1620
Type of Transfer: Retired at Home (Fujian) → Grand Councillor and Minister of Rites (Beijing)
Reasons for Declining: Old, sick
Result: Ye was recalled out of his retirement on 8/20. He submitted a memorial 
declining the post, which was rejected on 2/29 of the following year. Before he 
could submit another declination, Ye received an imperial rescript (dispatched 
on 4/2 and reaching Ye on 5/29) brought by a messenger. After this Ye left home
on 6/9. He fell sick on the road, and submitted two additional memorials 
pleading to be allowed to return home. These were rejected (8/9), and Ye 
arrived in Beijing on 10/23.9
Person, Year: Bi Ziyan 畢自嚴 (#78), 1621
Type of Transfer: Chief of the Court of the Imperial Stud 太僕寺 (Beijing) → GC of Tianjin
Reasons for Declining: Unqualified
Result: Bi was appointed on 4/6. He submitted a memorial declining the post, which 
was rejected by 4/27. He left Beijing on 4/30, arriving at his post on 5/3.10
Person, Year: Bi Ziyan 畢自嚴 (#82), 1622
Type of Transfer: GC of Tianjin → Coordinator of Military Supplies of Liaodong (located in 
Tianjin)
Reasons for Declining: Unqualified
Result: Bi's order of appointment (3/29) reached him on 4/5, after which he submitted a 
memorial declining the post. This was rejected (4/21), and the response reached
Bi on 4/25. He assumed responsibilities of the new post on 5/21.11
8. Li Hualong 李化龍, Fu Bo quanshu 平播全書, "Bao daoren shu" 報到任疏, 1.1a-4a; Ming shilu 
(Shenzong), Wanli 27/3/20.
9. Ye Xianggao 葉向高, Xu lunfei zoucao 續綸扉奏草, "Ci zhaoming shu" 辭召命疏, 1.8a-10b, "Yingzhao 
quchao shu" 應召趨朝疏, 1.11a-14a, "Tuci huanbing shu" 途次患病疏, 1.15a-17a, "Ci Guizhou xugong 
shu" 辭貴州叙功疏, 1.18a-20a, "Daoren shu" 到任疏, 1.24a-26b; Ming shilu (Guangzong), Taichang 
1/8/20; Ming shilu (Xizong), Tianqi 1/2/29, 1/8/9.
10. Bi Ziyan 畢自嚴, Fu Jin shucao 撫津疏草, "Lingchi wuqi lingyin cichao shu" 領敕無期領印辭朝疏, 
1.24a-25b, "Daoren shu" 到任疏, 4.34a-36a; Ming shilu (Xizong), Tianqi 1/4/6.
11. Bi Ziyan 畢自嚴, Duxiang shucao 督餉疏草, "Gong xie tian'en shu" 恭謝天恩疏, 1.1a-4a; Ming shilu 
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Person, Year: Liu Zongzhou 劉宗周 (#85), 1624
Type of Transfer: Sick leave at Home (Zhejiang) → Vice Commr of the Office of Transmission 
(Beijing)
Reasons for Declining: Responsibility too heavy, already retired
Result: Liu's order of appointment (9/4) reached him on 11/12. It seems that his 
declination memorial (11/17) was rejected, but further details are not known.12
Person, Year: Bi Ziyan 畢自嚴 (#86), 1626
Type of Transfer: Censor-in-Chief (Nanjing) → Minister of Revenue (Nanjing)
Reasons for Declining: Unqualified
Result: Bi was appointed to the new post on 1/20. After receiving the news, he 
submitted a memorial declining the post on 2/5. This was rejected (2/30), and 
Bi assumed responsibilities of the new position on 3/15.13 
Person, Year: Zhu Xieyuan 朱燮元 (#90), 1628
Type of Transfer: Mourning at Home (Zhejiang) → 
SC of Guizhou, Sichuan, Huguang, Yunnan, Guangxi
Reasons for Declining: Unqualified
Result: Zhu's order of appointment (6/18) reached him on 9/11. Zhu submitted a 
memorial declining the post, which was rejected. After this he left home, and 
arrived at his new post on 3/26 of the following year.14
(Xizong), Tianqi 2/3/29, 2/4/21.
12. Liu Zongzhou 劉宗周, Liu Jishan xiansheng zoushu 劉蕺山先生奏疏, "Ci you tongzheng shu" 辭右通政
疏, 9.5a-7a.
13. Bi Ziyan 畢自嚴, Liuji shucao 留計疏草, "Cimian hubu shangshu shu" 辭免戸部尚書疏, 1.1a-3a. 
"Daoren gong xie tian'en shu" 到任恭謝天恩疏, 1.4a-5b; Ming shilu (Xizong), Tianqi 6/1/20.
14. Zhu Xieyuan 朱燮元, Zhu shaoshuai zoushu chao 朱少帥奏疏鈔, "Ru Qian shoudai gong xie tian'en 
shi" 入黔受代恭謝天恩事, 6.1a-2a; Ming shilu (Chongzhen), Chongzhen 1/6/18.
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Table 4.5: Replacement of Superprovincial Officials
This table shows all 15 known cases in which the outgoing official was a superprovincial 
official. Occasionally, the court issued additional appointment orders before the official was able 












Original Post Appointed 
(B)
2 Yang Yiqing GC of Shaanxi 1510/08/16 n/a1 n/a n/a
(Zhang Tai) VM of Punishment, Beijing 1511/07/26
9 Lin Fu GC of Yunyang 1529/01/08 ? 21 ?
Xu Zan Admin Commr of Yunnan 1529/01/29
21 Zhang Yue GC of Yunyang 1543/01/23 1543/08/13 10 197
Wang Shou Chief of Court of Imperial Entertainments, 
Nanjing
1543/02/04
22 Zhou Yong Intendant of River Works 1544/07/09 ? 20 ?
Han Banbqi At Home? 1544/07/29
23 Zhang Yue GC of Jiangxi 1544/07/29 ? 6 ?
Qiu Yanghao GC of Sichuan 1544/08/06
27 Zhu Wan GC of Nan-Gan 1547/07/08 1547/09b/22 9 103
Gong Hui Admin Commr of Huguang 1547/07/17
30 Cai Yuncheng GC of Jiangxi 1554/03/14 ? 6 ?
Chen Zhu GC of Yingtian (Nanjing) 1554/03/20
38 Tan Lun GC of Sichuan 1566/10/19 1567/03/02 15 161
Chen Kai Chief of Court of the Imperial Stud, Nanjing 1566/10b/04
44 Zhang Han GC of Shaanxi 1572/01/03 ? 37 ?
Wen Ruzhang Vice Commr of Office of Transmission, 
Beijing
1572/02/10
50 Pan Jixun GC of Jiangxi 1577/11/23 n/a 3 n/a
Liu Yaohui At Home? 1577/11/26
55 Wu Wenhua SC of Guangdong and Guangxi 1587/06/15 1587/10/09 3 111
Wu Shan VM of Work, Nanjing 1587/06/18
58 Qin Yao GC of Nan-Gan 1589/06/02 1589/11/20 3 167
Wang Jingmin Vice Chief of Court of Revision, Beijing 1589/06/05
68 Wang Xiangqian GC of Xuanfu 1601/01/24 ? 50 ?
Peng Guoguang Surveillance Commr of Shandong 1601/03/15
82 Bi Ziyan GC of Tianjin 1622/03/29 1622/08/01 10 119
Li Banghua Assistant Admin Commr of Shanxi 1622/04/10
1. The houdai requirement was not yet in place at this time, so Yang was able to leave without waiting 
for his successor's arrival.
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Table 4.6: Officials Who Received Multiple Transfer Orders
This table summarizes all 14 known cases in which an appointee received one or more additional
appointment order(s) before reaching his original location of appointment.















1527/02/14 1527/03/19 Minister of Rites (Beijing) n/a





1527/04/05 ? GC of Yingtian (S. Zhili) ?





? 1532/11/15 GC of Shanxi 1533/01/22
? ? GC of Shuntian (N. Zhili)






1544/07/09 1544/08/04 GC of Fengyang (S. Zhili) ?
1544/10/03 1544/10/28 Censor-in-Chief (Beijing)
32 Yang Bo At Home
(Shanxi)
1558/03/08 1558/03/21 Minister of War (Beijing) ?
1558/03/19 1558/04/05 SC of Xuan-Da (N. Zhili - Shanxi)
34 Tan Lun At Home
(Jiangxi)
1563/01/23 ? Vice Admin Commr of Fujian 1563/04/01
1563/03/02 1563/03/28 GC of Fujian




1565/09/20 1565/10/28 Vice Chief of Court of Imperial 
Sacrifices, Nanjing
?
1566/03/16 1566/03/29 Vice Commr of Office of 
Transmission (Beijing)
36 Tan Lun At Home
(Jiangxi)
1565/10/01 1565/11/23 GC of Shaanxi ?
1565/12/25 ? GC of Sichuan
42 Xu Shi Admin 
Commr of 
Shandong
1571/02/14 ? Admin Commr of Jiangxi 1571/02/14
1571/03/29 ? Prefectural Governor of Shuntian 
(Beijing)






1575/06/02 ? Prefectural Governor of Yingtian 
(Nanjing)
1575/12/11
1575/09/18 1575/11/02 GC of Guangxi
50 Pan Jixun GC of Jiangxi 1577/11/23 ? VM of Punishment (Beijing) 1578/03/29
1577/02/16 1578/03/15 Intendant of Canals (South Zhili)
53 Wang Yi'e At Home (N. 
Zhili)
1585/07/19 1585/08/10 GC of Shuntian 1585/10/29
1585/09b/21 1585/10/06 SC of Jizhou, Liaodong, and 
Baoding (North Zhili)
61 Li Yi At Home 
(Jiangxi)
1592/04/11 ? Admin Commr of Henan 1592/10/03










1622/04/01 Vive Chief of Court of Imperial 
Entertainments (Beijing)
1622/08/01




FZK Airusheng zhongguo fangzhi ku 愛如生中國方志庫
SKCM Siku quanshu cunmu congshu 四庫全書存目叢書
SKJH Siku jinhui shu congkan 四庫禁毀書叢刊
SKQS Siku quanshu 四庫全書
SKWS Siku weishou shu jikan 四庫未收書輯刊
XXSK Xuxiu siku quanshu 續修四庫全書
Archival Collections and Sources of Anonymous or Collective Authorship
Benxue zhinan 本學指南. 1 juan. Lithographically printed in 1936 based on an earlier manuscript
copy. In CADAL Digital Library.
Da Ming jiuqing shili anli 大明九卿事例案例. Manuscript copy. Held in Academia Sinica Fu 
Sinian Library. Full text in Scripta Sinica.
Huang Ming zhaozhi 皇明詔制. Kong Zhenyun 孔貞運 comp. 10 juan. Printed edition prefaced 
1634. SKJH.
Jiajing xinli 嘉靖新例. Zhang Shiche 張時徹 comp. 1 juan. Postfaced 1546. Printed edition. Held
in Academia Sinica Fu Sinian Library. Full text in Scripta Sinica.
Juguan biyao weizheng bianlan 居官必要為政便覽. 2 juan. Chongzhen (1628-44) printed edition.
In Guanzhen shu jicheng 官箴書集成. Hefei: Huangshan shushe, 1997.
Liangchao congxin lu 兩朝從信錄. 35 juan. XXSK.
Libu zhizhang 吏部職掌. Printed edition prefaced 1530. Held in National Library of China.
Libu zhizhang 吏部職掌. Printed edition. Contents date up to the late Wanli reign (1573-1620). 
SKCM.
Mingdai lüli huibian 明代律例彙編. Compiled by Huang Zhangjian 黃彰健. Taipei: Zhongyang 
yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1979.
Ming huidian 明會典. Zhengde edition prefaced 1509. Facsimile in Tokyo: Kyūko shoin, 1989.
Ming huidian 明會典. Wanli edition prefaced 1587. Facsimile in Yangzhou: Guanglin shushe, 
2007. Full text in Scripta Sinica.
Ming shi 明史. Completed in 1739. Facsimile in Taipei: Dingwen shuju, 1980. Full text in Scrip-
ta Sinica.
Ming shilu 明實錄. Collated facsimile edition in Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanji-
usuo, 1962-66. Full text in Scripta Sinica.
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Neige daku dang'an 內閣大庫檔案 (Grand Secretariat Archives at Academia Sinica). Database by
Academia Sinica.
Qing huidian shili 清會典事例. Guangxu edition completed in 1899. Reprint in Beijing: 
Zhonghua shuju, 1991. Full text in Scripta Sinica. 
Qing shilu 清實錄. Scripta Sinica. Facsimile in Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986. Full text in 
Scripta Sinica.
Sichuan difang sifa dang'an 四川地方司法檔案. In Yang Yifan 楊一凡 et al. eds. Lidai panli pan-
du 歷代判例判牘, vol. 3. Typeset edition. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 
2005.
Song huiyao jigao 宋會要輯稿. Typeset digital edition by Academia Sinica, 2008. Full text in 
Scripta Sinica.
Tiaoli beikao 條例備考. 24 juan. Printed edition. Held in Naikaku bunko.
Wanli ba nian si yue jixuan bao 萬曆八年四月急選報. 3 leaves. Printed copy held in National Li-
brary of China.
Xizong qinian duchayuan shilu 熹宗七年都察院實錄. Appendix to Ming shilu 明實錄. Collated 
facsimile edition in Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1962-66. Full 
text in Scripta Sinica.
Zengxiu tiaoli beikao 增修條例備考. 24 juan. Printed edition prefaced 1597. Held in Sonkeikaku 
bunko.
Zhonguo Ming chao dang'an zonghui 中國明朝檔案總匯. 101 vols. Guilin: Guangxi daxue 
chubanshe, 2001.
Zhusi zhizhang 諸司職掌. 10 juan. Compiled 1393. In Huang Ming zhishu 皇明制書, printed edi-
tion prefaced 1579. Facsimile in Tokyo: Koten kenkyūkai, 1966. 
Sources by Single Authors or Compilers
Ai Mu 艾穆. Ai Xiting xiansheng wenji 艾熙亭先生文集. 10 juan. SKWS.
Bi Zisu 畢自肅. Liaodong shugao 遼東疏稿. 4 juan. Handwritten edition. Held in Tōyō bunko.
Bi Ziyan 畢自嚴. Duxiang shucao 督餉疏草. 5 juan. Printed edition. Held in Tōyō bunko.
———. Duzhi zouyi 度支奏議. 119 juan. XXSK.
———. Fu Jin shucao 撫津疏草. 4 juan. Printed edition prefaced by Li Banghua 李邦華 
(1574-1644). Held in Tōyō bunko.
———. Liuji shucao 留計疏草. 2 juan. Printed edition prefaced 1626. Held in Academia Sinica 
Fu Sinian Library (full text in Scripta Sinica).
Cai Yuncheng 蔡雲程. Hetian caotang ji 鶴田草堂集. 10 juan (7 extant). SKCM.
Cheng Renqing 程任卿 comp. Sijuan quanshu 絲絹全書. 8 juan. XXSK.
Dai Shizong 戴時宗. Xiu'an cungao 朽庵存稿. 4 juan. Printed edition prefaced 1553. Held in 
Naikaku bunko.
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Dong Yuchen 董羽宸. Ze yan xiaocao 擇焉小草. 8 juan. Printed edition. Held in Naikaku bunko. 
Fan Jingwen 范景文. Wenzhong ji 文忠集. 12 juan. SKQS.
Fang Liangyong 方良永. Fang Jiansu wenji 方簡肅文集. 10 juan. SKQS.
Feng Qi 馮琦. Zongbo ji 宗伯集. 81 juan. SKJH.
Gao Gong 高拱. Gao Wenxiang gong ji 高文襄公集. 44 juan. SKCM.
Gu Jiusi 顧九思. Yeyuan tigao 掖垣題稿. 3 juan. SKCM.
Gu Yangqian 顧養謙. Chong'an Gu xiansheng fu Liao zouyi 冲菴顧先生撫遼奏議. 20 juan. 
SKCM.
Guo Shangyou 郭尚友. Fucao zoushu 漕撫奏疏. 4 juan. Ming Chongzhen (1628-1644) printed 
edition. Held in former National Beiping Library (microfilm in Princeton University 
Library).
Guo Zizhang 郭子章. Pin yi sheng Qian cao 蠙衣生黔草. 24 juan. SKCM.
Hai Rui 海瑞. Bei wang ji 備忘集. 10 juan. SKQS. 
———. Hai Rui ji 海瑞集. Typeset edition. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1962.
He Dongxu 何東序. Jiuyu shanfang gao 九愚山房稿. 97 juan. Printed edition prefaced 1603. 
Held in Taiwan National Central Library.
He Mengchun 何孟春. He Wenjian zouyi 何文簡疏議. 10 juan. SKQS.
Hu Shining 胡世寧. Hu Duanmin zouyi 胡端敏奏議. 10 juan. SKQS.
Huang Chengxuan 黃承玄. Mengou tang ji 盟鷗堂集. 30 juan. Printed edition prefaced 1628. 
Held in Naikaku bunko.
Huang Jiashan 黃嘉善. Fu Xia zouyi 撫夏奏議. 6 juan. Ming printed edition. Held in Tōyō 
bunko.
Huang Yu 黃瑜. Shuanghuai suichao 雙槐歲鈔. 10 juan. In Lingnan yishu 嶺南遺書, Qing print-
ed edition.
Huang Zan 黃瓚. Xue zhou ji 雪洲集. 14 juan. SKCM.
Jiang Bao 姜寶. Jiang Feng'e wenji 姜鳳阿文集. 38 juan. SKCM.
Jiang Tingbi 蔣廷璧. Pushan Jiang gong zhengxun 璞山蔣公政訓. 1 juan. In Guanzhen shu 
jicheng 官箴書集成. Hefei: Huangshan shushe, 1997.
Jiao Hong 焦竑 comp. Guochao xianzheng lu 國朝獻徵錄. 119 juan. In Mingdai zhuanji congkan
明代傳記叢刊. Taipei: Mingwen shuju, 1991. Full text in Scripta Sinica.
Jin Guangchen 金光辰. Jin Shuangyan zhongchen ji 金雙巖中丞集. 4 juan. SKJH.
Li Cai 李材. Bingzheng jilüe 兵政紀略. 12 juan. Printed edition prefaced 1575. Held in Academia
Sinica Fu Sinian Library. Full text in Scripta Sinica.
Li Chengxun 李承勛. Shaobao Li Kanghui gong zoucao 少保李康惠公奏草. Printed edition pref-
aced 1544. Held in Academia Sinica Fu Sinian Library. Full text in Scriptia Sinica.
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Li Banghua 李邦華. Wenshui Li Zhongsu xiansheng ji 文水李忠肅先生集. 7 juan. SKJH.
Li Hualong 李化龍. Fu Bo quanshu 平播全書. 15 juan. SKCM.
Li Rixuan 李日宣. Hedong zouyi 河東奏議. 1 juan. Printed edition prefaced 1624. Held in Tōyō 
bunko.
———. Quancao zoulüe 銓曹奏畧. No juan. Printed edition. Held in Academia Sinica Fu Sinian 
Library. Full text in Scriptia Sinica.
Li Sancai 李三才. Fu Huai xiaocao 撫淮小草. 15 juan. Printed edition prefaced 1602. Held in 
University of Tokyo Central Library.
Li Shangsi 李尚思 [incorrectly Li Jinfeng 李晉峰 in Academia Sinica's catalogue]. Dufu zouyi 督
撫奏議. 6 juan. Printed edition postfaced 1590. Held in Academia Sinica Fu Sinian Li-
brary. Full text in Scripta Sinica.
Li Shida 李世達. Shaobao Li gong zouyi 少保李公奏議. 4 juan. Printed edition prefaced 1597. 
Held in former National Beiping Library (facsimile in Tōyō bunko).
Li Sui 李遂. Li Xiangmin gong zouyi 李襄敏公奏議. 13 juan. SKCM.
Li Yi 李頤. Li Jiquan xiansheng zouyi 李及泉先生奏議. 4 juan. SKCM.
Li Yue 李樂. Jianwen zaji 見聞雜記. 11 juan. XXSK.
Li Zhong 李中. Guping xiansheng wenji 谷平先生文集. 6 juan. SKCM.
Lin Fu 林富. Liang Guang shulüe 兩廣疏略. 6 juan. Printed edition prefaced 1571. Held in Tōyō 
bunko.
Lin Wenjun 林文俊. Fangzhai xungao 方齋存稿. 10 juan. SKQS.
Lin Xiyuan 林希元. Tong'an Lin Ciya xiansheng wenji 同安林次崖先生文集. 18 juan. SKCM.
Liu Yikun 劉一焜. Fu Zhe shucao 撫浙疏草. 10 juan. Printed edition. Held in Taiwan National 
Central Library. 
Liu Yuanlin 劉元霖. Fu Zhe zoushu 撫浙奏疏. 21 juan. Printed edition. Held in Tōyō bunko.
Liu Zongzhou 劉宗周. Liu Jishan xiansheng zoushu 劉蕺山先生奏疏. 5 juan. SKJH.
Lu Shen 陸深. Yanshan ji 儼山集. 110 juan. SKQS.
Lu Xiangsheng 盧象昇. Ming dasima Lu gong zouyi 明大司馬盧公奏議. 10 juan. SKWS.
Luo Qinshun 羅欽順. Zheng'an cungao 整菴存稿. 20 juan. SKQS.
Lü Kun 呂坤. Shizheng lu 實政錄. 9 juan. XXSK.
Lü Weiqi 呂維祺. Nanyu shuchao 南庾疏抄. 12 juan. Printed edition prefaced 1630. Held in 
Academia Sinica Fu Sinian Library. Full text in Scripta Sinica.
Mao Bowen 毛伯溫. Mao Xiangmao xiansheng zouyi 毛襄懋先生奏議. 20 juan. SKCM.
Mao Yuanyi 茅元儀. Xialao zhai zaji 暇老齋雜集. 32 juan. XXSK.
Min Hongxue 閔洪學. Fu Dian zoucao 撫滇奏草. 10 juan. Printed edition prefaced 1626. Held in
Naikaku bunko.
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Pan Jixun 潘季馴. Pan sikong zoushu 潘司空奏疏. 7 juan. SKQS.
———. Zongli hecao zoushu 總理河漕奏疏. 14 juan. Printed edition prefaced 1598. Held in 
Tōyō bunko.
Pang Shangpeng 龐尚鵬. Baike ting zhaigao 百可亭摘稿. 9 juan. SKCM.
Qi Biaojia 祁彪佳. Yifen quangao 宜焚全稿. 18 juan. XXSK.
Qiao Bixing 喬璧星. Qiao zhongcheng zouyi 喬中丞奏議. 10 juan. Printed edition prefaced 1611.
Held in Naikaku bunko.
Qin Jin 秦金. An Chu lu 安楚錄. 10 juan. SKCM.
Qin Yao 秦燿. Dufu quan Chu zoushu 督撫全楚奏疏. 2 juan extant. Printed edition. Held in Tai-
wan National Central Library.
Qiu Jun 邱濬. Daxue yanyi bu 大學衍義補. 160 juan. SKQS.
Shen Bang 沈榜. Wanshu zaji 宛署雜記. 20 juan. Prefaced 1592. Typeset edition. Beijing: Bei-
jing guji chubanshe, 1982.
Shen Yan 沈演. Zhi zhi zhai ji 止止齋集. 70 juan. Printed edition prefaced 1633. Held in 
Sonkeikaku bunko.
Shen Zimu 沈子木. Zongdu san Jin shuchao 督撫三晉疏鈔. 5 juan. Printed edition. Held in 
Naikaku bunko.
Sheng Wannian 盛萬年. Lingxi shuilu bingji 嶺西水陸兵紀. 2 juan. SKCM.
Song Yingchang 宋應昌. Jinglüe fuguo yaobian 經略復國要編. 14 juan. Printed edition. In 
Renchen zhi yi shiliao huiji 壬辰之役史料匯輯. Beijing: Quanguo tushuguan wenxian 
suowei fuzhi zhongxin, 1990.
Sun Chengze 孫承澤. Chunming mengyu lu 春明夢餘錄. 70 juan. SKQS.
Tan Lun 譚綸. Tan Xiangmin zouyi 譚襄敏奏議. 10 juan. SKQS.
Tu Xun 屠勲. Tu Kangxi gong wenji 屠康僖公文集. 7 juan. SKCM.
Tu Zongjun 涂宗濬. Fu Yan shucao 撫延疏草. 8 juan. Ming printed edition. Held in Academia 
Sinica Fu Sinian Library. Full text in Scripta Sinica.
Wan Shihe 萬士和. Wan Wengong gong zhaiji 萬文恭公摘集. 12 juan. SKCM.
Wang Qiao 王樵. Fang lu ji 方麓集. 16 juan. SKQS.
Wang Qiong 王瓊. Jinxi benbing fuzou 晉溪本兵敷奏. 14 juan. SKCM.
———. Shuangxi zaji 雙溪雜記. 1 juan. SKCM.
Wang Shizhen 王世貞. Yanzhou sibu gao 弇州四部稿. 381 juan. SKQS.
Wang Shouren 王守仁. Wang Yangming quanji 王陽明全集. 41 juan. Shanghai: Shanghai guji 
chubanshe, 1992.
Wang Shu 王恕. Wang Duanyi gong zouyi 王端毅公奏議. 15 juan. SKQS.
Wang Tingxiang 王廷相. Junchuan gongyi ji 浚川公移集. 3 juan. SKCM.
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———. Junchuan zouyi ji 浚川奏議集. 10 juan. SKCM.
Wang Xiangqian 王象乾. Jingli zangke zoushu 經理牂牁奏議. 14 juan. Printed edition prefaced 
1607. Held in Hōsa bunko.
Wang Yi'e 王一鶚. Zongdu si zhen zouyi 總督四鎮奏議. 10 juan. Printed edition prefaced 1588, 
reproduced in Xuanlan tang congshu 玄覽堂叢書 (Xuji 續集).
Wang Zaijin 王在晉. Haifang zuanyao 海防纂要. 13 juan. XXSK.
Wang Zonglin 王宗沐. Jingsuo Wang xiansheng wenji 敬所王先生文集. 30 juan. SKCM.
Wu Wenhua 吳文華. Liudu shugao 留都疏稿. 1 juan. SKCM.
———. Yuexi shugao 粵西疏稿. 3 juan. SKCM. 
Wu Zun 吳遵. Chushi lu 初仕錄. 1 juan. Chongzhen (1628-44) printed edition. In Guanzhen shu 
jicheng 官箴書集成. 
Xiang Dushou 項篤壽. Xiao Sima zoucao 小司馬奏草. 6 juan. XXSK.
Xie Jin 解縉. Wenyi ji 文毅集. 17 juan. SKQS.
Xiong Tingbi 熊廷弼. An Liao shugao 按遼疏稿. 6 juan. XXSK.
Xu Luan 徐鑾. Zhifang shucao 職方疏草. 13 juan. Printed edition. Held in Naikaku bunko.
Xu Shi 徐栻. Dufu Jiangxi zouyi 督撫江西奏議. 4 juan (3 extant). Printed edition prefaced 1573. 
Held in former National Beiping Library (microfilm in Princeton University Library).
Xu Sizeng 徐師曾. Hushang ji 湖上集. 14 juan. XXSK.
Xu Wen 徐問. Shantang cuigao xugao 山堂萃稿. 20 juan. SKCM. 
Xu Xuemo 徐學謨. Xu shi haiyu ji 徐氏海隅集. 79 juan. SKCM.
Xu Yuantai 徐元太. Fu Shu zouyi 撫蜀奏議. 13 juan. Printed edition postfaced 1589. Facsimile in
Zhongguo wenxian zhenben congshu 中國文獻珍本叢書.
Xue Sancai 薛三才. Xue Gongmin gong zoushu 薛恭敏公奏疏. 14 juan. Handwritten edition. 
Facsimile in Mingji shiliao jizhen 明季史料集珍.
Yang Bo 楊博. Taishi Yang Xiangyi gong jianglüe zoushu 太師楊襄毅公經略奏疏. 1 juan. Wanli 
(1573-1620) printed edition. Held in University of Tokyo Central Library.
Yang Dezhou 楊德周. Tongma bian 銅馬編. 2 juan. Printed edition prefaced 1634. SKCM.
Yang Shining 楊時寧. Zongdu Xuan Da Shanxi junmen zouyi 總督宣大山西軍門奏議. 11 juan. 
Ming Wanli (1573-1620) printed edition. Held in former National Beiping Library (fac-
simile in Tōyō bunko). 
Yang Sichang 楊嗣昌. Yang Wenruo xiansheng ji 楊文弱先生集. 57 juan. Printed edition. In Xux-
iu siku quanshu.
Yang Yiqing 楊一清, Guanzhong zouyi 關中奏議. 18 juan. SKQS.
Ye Shen 葉盛, Ye Wenzhuang gong zoushu 葉文莊公奏疏. 40 juan. SKCM.
Ye Xianggao 葉向高. Xu lunfei zoucao 續綸扉奏草. 14 juan. XXSK.
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Yu Zhan 于湛, Yu Suzhai xiansheng yigao 于素齋先生遺稿. 6 juan. Printed edition postfaced 
1603. Held in Sonkeikaku bunko.
Yu Ziqiang 佘自強. Zhi pu 治譜. 10 juan. Printed edition prefaced 1639. In Guanzhen shu 
jicheng 官箴書集成. Hefei: Huangshan shushe, 1997.
Zhang Bangqi 張邦奇. Zhang Wending gong jinguang lou ji 張文定公覲光樓集. 10 juan. XXSK.
Zhang Fengxiang 張鳳翔. Fuji shucao 撫畿疏草. 4 juan. Ming printed edition. Held in Academia
Sinica Fu Sinian Library. Full text in Scripta Sinica. 
Zhang Guowei 張國維. Fu Wu shucao 撫吳疏草. No juan. SKJH.
Zhang Han 張瀚. Taixing shugao 臺省疏稿. 8 juan. SKCM.
Zhang Shiche 張時徹, Zhiyuan ding ji 芝園定集. 85 juan. SKCM.
Zhang Xuan 張選. Zhongjian Jingsi Zhang gong yiji; fu shiyu Jingsheng Zhang gong yiji 忠諫靜
思張公遺集 附侍御靜生張公遺集. 12 juan. SKCM. 
Zhang Wenda 張問達. Fu Chu shuchao 撫楚疏抄. 12 juan. Printed edition prefaced 1612. Held in
Academia Sinica Fu Sinian Library. Full text in Scripta Sinica.
Zhang Xuan 張萱. Xiyuan wenjian lu 西園聞見錄. 107 juan. XXSK.
Zhang Yue 張岳. Xiaoshan leigao 小山類稿. 20 juan. SKQS.
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